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ABSTRACT 
 
School finance litigation has been intended to serve many purposes over the past forty years, including 
seeking equity and adequacy in school funding.  Historically, school finance litigation has been 
categorized using the three waves categorization which focuses on legal standards used and outcome 
trends.  This project re-categorizes school finance litigation using two sets of criteria, legal standard and 
school finance concept.  The legal standards used in the categorization are state equal protection clause, 
federal equal protection clause, and state education clause.  The financial concepts used in the 
categorization are horizontal equity, pure vertical equity, vertical equity as adequacy, and pure adequacy.    
The project provides answers to the following questions via a process of briefing school finance cases that 
reached a state high court or the United States Supreme Court, and categorizing the cases based on legal 
standard, financial concept, and if the decision was in favor of school finance reform or against such 
reform.   
 
Research Questions: 
1. What is the history of education finance reform litigation at the high state courts and U.S. 
Supreme Court levels with regard to the choice of finance concept being applied (horizontal 
equity, pure vertical equity, vertical equity as adequacy, or adequacy)? 
 
2. Which legal standard was used historically in education reform litigation for each case and how 
does that connect with finance concept being applied? 
 
3. Which party was successful in each legal decision? 
 
4. Is there historically a most successful combination of finance concept and legal standard for 
plaintiff success in education finance reform litigation 
 
5. Is there an emerging trend regarding school finance litigation? 
 
The main findings of the study indicate that the most frequently utilized finance concept was that of 
Horizontal Equity with Vertical Equity as Adequacy following with nearly as many instances of use as 
Horizontal Equity.  Regarding the second research question, the study found that the State Education 
Clause was by far the most frequently used legal standard historically for school finance litigation cases. 
The most successful combinations of school finance concept and legal standard were the combination of 
the State Education Clause and Vertical Equity as Adequacy and the combination of the State Education 
Clause and Adequacy.  The final research question addresses emerging trends in school finance litigation.  
A historical trend exists toward the use of adequacy as a standard paired with the used of State Education 
Clauses.  
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Chapter One--Introduction 
Public schooling in America has long been viewed as the great equalizer, allowing any student to 
use his education to raise himself up to the socioeconomic level of his choosing.  While it is clear 
that there are many factors preventing that adage from being accurate, the most significant 
barrier is found in the idea of educational inputs.  Each student brings with him to the public 
school system a set of individual past experiences and future needs.  Additionally, each school 
district receives funding at various levels, creating a vast discrepancy in educational inputs 
available to students.  Such discrepancies are primarily a result of state funding formulas and the 
impact they have on various localities‟ funding capabilities.  
  
The impact of state funding formulas has resulted in various legal attempts to change state 
funding formulas to better meet the needs of certain districts/constituents within the states.  To 
date there have been seventy-six education finance reform cases which have reached a state-level 
high court or the U.S. Supreme Court, yielding various court opinions and outcomes. Such legal 
action historically has been framed within the concept of three waves of litigation.  The first 
wave of education finance litigation was based on claims that funding formulas were 
unconstitutional as they were written based on interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  This wave is historically considered to 
have lasted from 1971 to 1973.  While wave one included various cases, one significant case is 
cited as the example of that era of litigation, Serrano v. Priest (5 Cal.3d 584).  Wave one is 
traditionally cited as having ended with the U.S. Supreme Court decision in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriquez (411 U.S.1).  Wave two is traditionally associated with 
cases based on the equal protection clauses of state constitutions and lasted from 1973 through 
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1989. The third wave of litigation runs from 1989 to the current litigation and is primarily 
categorized by a shift in the number of plaintiff victories in such cases; 1989 saw three states, 
Montana (Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. Montana (769 p.2d 684)), Kentucky (Rose 
v. Council for Better Education, Inc. (790 S.W.2d 186)), and Texas (Edgewood Independent 
School District v. Kirby--Edgewood I (777 S.W. 2d 391)), lose court cases regarding their state 
education funding formulas.  Throughout wave three, the primary focus has been on the use of 
state education clauses as the standard for making a claim (Lukemeyer, 1999). 
 
The concept of educational finance litigation fitting easily into three distinct waves, each distinct 
in its criteria, is a user-friendly approach to understanding this legal history; however, the waves 
approach oversimplifies the concepts of standards used for educational finance litigation.  Within 
each of the three waves, there are significant state level cases that do not fit neatly within the 
standards set for the wave in which it sits chronologically.  Therefore, a more appropriate 
approach to a historical review of such litigation is to classify the cases based on two factors: the 
legal standard being used to claim a violation has occurred and a determination if the case was 
decided based on horizontal equity, pure vertical equity, vertical equity as adequacy, adequacy, 
or a combination of various factors. 
 
This study is a historical meta-analysis of case law relating to educational finance reform and 
will serve as a comprehensive index of relevant case briefs.  Additionally, this study addresses 
the following five research questions: 
1. What is the history of education finance reform litigation at the high state courts and 
U.S. Supreme Court levels with regard to the choice of the finance concept being 
applied (horizontal equity, pure vertical equity, vertical equity as adequacy, or 
adequacy)? 
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2. Which legal standard was used historically in education reform litigation for each 
case and how does that connect with finance concept being applied? 
 
3. Which party was successful in each legal decision? 
 
4. Is there historically a most successful combination of finance concept and legal 
standard for plaintiff success in education finance reform litigation? 
 
5. Is there an emerging trend regarding school finance litigation? 
 
The specific process for the dissertation involved the following steps: 
Selection of Education Finance Concepts to Consider: 
In their work, “Conceptions of Equity and Adequacy in School Finance,”  Baker and Green 
outline clear definitions of each education finance concept.  Baker and Green‟s definitions were 
developed as an outgrowth of the framework originally created by Berne and  Stiefel (Berne & 
Stiefel, 1984) in which they address the questions of Who? What? How? and How Much? with 
regard to school finance policy (Baker & Green, 2008).  Baker and Green attach their definitions 
of the finance concepts to Berne and Stiefel‟s question of How?, answering the question with 
categories in which various funding solutions can be included (Baker & Green, 2008).  Baker 
and Green‟s definitions will be the functional definitions of the education finance concepts used 
within this dissertation to categorize the significant case law. 
 
Horizontal Equity asks the question, “Are there differences in resources unrelated to educational 
need?”  The fundamental concept of horizontal equity is connected to the idea of equal 
protection as it is offered to students through state constitutions. 
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Pure Vertical Equity addresses the question, “Are there sufficient differences in resources to 
accommodate educational need, measured against equity of outcomes standard?” The concept of 
pure vertical equity addresses outcome standards; does each child, regardless of his/her need, 
have the inputs necessary to reach the same outcome standard?  It is significant to note that using 
a pure vertical equity standard, the only requirement is “sameness” without regard to the level 
that “sameness” is reached; vertical equity might mean all students reach a level far above or far 
below what would be considered adequate. 
 
Vertical Equity as Adequacy asks, “Do all groups of children have sufficient resources to support 
equal opportunity to achieve minimum outcome standards?”  Like the concept of pure vertical 
equity, this standard is outcomes-based.  However, unlike the previous standard, vertical equity 
as adequacy requires that students of differentiated need levels and skill levels reach a minimum 
standard defined as adequate.  Practically, this standard means that students who need more 
educational inputs to reach an adequate outcome standard must be provided with those additional 
resources to meet their needs. 
 
Adequacy as a standard examines the question, “Is aggregate funding sufficient for children to 
achieve minimum outcome standards?”  This standard is a more systemic look at school finance 
in that it addresses if the funding formula at the state level is fundamentally adequate regarding 
inputs for the majority of the state‟s students to reach adequate outcomes.  This standard answers 
the question, “Is the state spending enough on education to meet its students‟ needs?” 
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Selection of Relevant Cases 
This study included a review of the major cases heard by the states‟ high courts or the U.S. 
Supreme Court regarding education finance.   In “A Guide to State Court Decisions on Education 
Finance” found in the text Helping Children Left Behind (Yinger, ed. 2004),  Huang,  
Lukemeyer, &  Yinger provide a comprehensive listing of court cases through June of 2003, a 
list generated in large part via Lukemeyer‟s research for her dissertation entitled “Education 
Finance Equity: Judicial Treatment of Key Issues and Impact of That Treatment on Reform” 
(1999).  Lukemeyer‟s criteria for inclusion on her list was that the cases be either decisions by 
the state‟s highest court or that the cases were a state‟s most recent decision and varied 
significantly from the state‟s latest high court decision (Yinger, ed. 2004). For the purposes of 
this study,  Lukemeyer‟s  list of court cases was narrowed to include only those that involve a 
state high court or the U.S. Supreme Court.  Additionally, WestLaw and LexisNexis were 
utilized, alongside secondary sources such as judicial advocacy websites that monitor current and 
upcoming litigation, to create a list that includes appropriate litigation since the 2003 publication 
of Huang, Lukemeyer, & Yinger‟s list. The criteria for addition of cases to Lukemeyer‟s original 
list were that the case be one in which a challenge to educational funding was being made and in 
which the case reached the state high court.  The primary source for monitoring cases was the 
website managed by the National Access Network, an organization that monitors school funding 
issues and litigation nationwide.  Once referenced by the National Access Network, cases were 
searched for using Lexis Nexis and WestLaw and the determination was made if they met the 
established criteria for inclusion in this study. 
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Case Briefing 
Each case from the created list was formally briefed using the following format:   
 Case Title: 
 Full Citation: 
 State: 
 Court: 
 Decision Date: 
 Plaintiff Claims: 
 Decision: 
 Reasoning: 
 Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 
The middle chapter of this publication serves as a comprehensive collection of these school 
finance reform litigation briefs. 
Categorization of Cases 
Each case decision was reviewed for categorization in three manners.  The first categorization 
was to determine if plaintiffs used Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of a state constitution, or an Education Clause 
within a state constitution.  The second classification was a determination if language in the legal 
decision suggests the case had been decided as horizontal equity, pure vertical equity, vertical 
equity as adequacy, or adequacy as defined by Baker & Green. The final analysis was a 
determination if the decision is pro or anti-school finance reform. The evaluation regarding pro-
school reform or anti-school reform status was made by determining if the decision would 
require legislature to revise the distribution of funds to provide an increase in funding for certain, 
or all, districts; or if the decisions resulted in a mandate for greater equity or adequacy in fund 
distribution.   If any of those criterions was met, the case was categorized as being pro-school 
finance reform. 
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Analysis/Conclusion 
After briefing and categorizing each case, the analysis with regard to the proposed questions 
occurred through a review of charts inclusive of the data to best answer the first four research 
questions:  
 
1. What is the history of education finance reform litigation at the high state courts and U.S. 
Supreme Court levels with regards to the choice of finance concept being applied 
(horizontal equity, pure vertical equity, vertical equity as adequacy, or adequacy)? 
 
2. Which legal standard was used historically in education reform litigation for each case 
and how does that connect with the finance concept being applied? 
 
3. Which party was successful in each legal decision? 
 
4. Is there historically a most successful combination of finance concept and legal standard 
for plaintiff success in education finance reform litigation? 
 
The fifth research question Is there an emerging trend regarding school finance litigation? 
will be answered by focusing the analysis more specifically on the cases within the last year, 
as well as any pending cases. 
 
The complexities created as a result of education funding, involving state budgets managed by 
legislators, serving various districts being managed at the local level that have numerous 
available inputs to meet a variety of student needs,  resulting in various levels of outputs, make it 
likely that school finance litigation will remain an active legal trend.  By creating a complete 
picture of the legal history of the issue, as well as an analysis of any upcoming trends in this area 
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of law, this dissertation will serve as a valuable contribution to the field of education, specifically 
the field of school finance reform litigation. 
 
The significance of this study is that it will provide a more sophisticated review of school finance 
litigation than a chronological review of cases provides.  Future litigation considerations can 
include consideration of the findings of this study.  Additionally, this study will provide 
information regarding history of school finance with a two-sided view, legal and financial, for 
educators and legislatures to review when they consider what is the most appropriate form of 
funding schools, and, specifically, what the historical impact of various court challenges has 
been on that discussion. 
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Chapter Two—Literature Review 
Before considering school finance cases within the framework provided by Baker and Green, it 
is appropriate to review the most prominent issues within the literature regarding school finance 
reform litigation.  Such research is well categorized by reviewing the literature against the 
framework of four categories: history and underlying theories, the recent use of adequacy 
standards, the courts‟ role in such decision making, and the educational impact of such litigation.   
The four categories of review provide a sequential look at history, current trends, and educational 
impact of school finance litigation. 
History and Underlying Theories 
In her text Courts as Policymakers: School Finance Reform Litigation (2003), Lukemeyer 
provides an excellent review of the history of school finance litigation.  Lukemeyer cites Levine 
(1991) and Thro (1990) as the legal scholars who originally categorized the litigation into the 
three waves (Lukemeyer, 2003).  Lukemeyer outlines wave one as being primarily “plaintiffs 
bringing equal protection clause claim(s) contend(ing) that a government action or law 
discriminates unfairly against them” (Lukemeyer, 2003, p. 3).  She moves on to describe wave 
two cases as being those in which “plaintiffs concentrated on state constitutional claims,” 
primarily state equal protection claims (Lukemeyer, 2003, p.5).  The final wave is outlined by 
Lukemeyer as having “relied primarily on education, rather than equal protection clauses” 
(Lukemeyer, 2003, p 6).  Lukemeyer briefly notes that McMillian (1998) suggested that a fourth 
wave exists in which justiciablity becomes the question and in which McMillian claims a 
combination of school finance and ethnic discrimination exists within the claims (Lukemeyer, 
2003). 
10 
 
The history of school finance reform is also reviewed in a different context by  Adams in his  
article entitled “Is Economic Integration the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litigation?” 
(Adams, 2007).  Adams suggests that the first trend to consider in the history of school finance 
reform is not a finance case at all, but instead a case focused on desegregation.    Adams cites 
Brown v. Board of Education  as the starting point for legal discussions regarding equity and 
adequacy in public schooling (Adams, 2007).  Adams extends his contention from Brown v. 
Board of Education to Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I) in which the Court ruled that suburban 
districts could not be required to integrate with urban districts in order to provide racial balance 
unless they caused the segregation in the urban district.  Adams contends that it was this decision 
that played a significant role in urban plaintiffs shifting their attention to school funding 
litigation (Adams, 2007).  Adams proceeds to review the school finance litigation using the 
framework of the three waves, similar to Lukemeyer‟s analysis. 
In their journal article, “When Adequate Isn‟t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational Law and 
Policy and Why it Matters,” Koski and Reich claim that the three waves can be examined more 
specifically by seeing each wave as a step away from equity contentions and toward adequacy 
contentions, which they contend is ethically and socially problematic (Koski & Reich, 2007).  
Koski and Reich frame wave one plaintiffs‟ claims to be “premised on the theoretical claim that 
the revenues of a school district should not be based on the wealth of the people or property 
within the district” (Koski & Reich, 2007, p.9).  They categorize wave two claims as having 
“primarily sought to achieve either horizontal equity among school districts such that per pupil 
revenues were roughly equalized by the state or at least fiscal neutrality such that revenues 
available to a school district would not be solely dependent on the property wealth of the school 
district” (Koski & Reich, 2007, p. 10).  Finally, Koski and Reich view wave three as representing 
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the final shift from equity to adequacy; in part Koski and Reich contend because education 
articles tend to lend themselves to adequacy claims, but also because on prima facie value 
adequacy “appears to enjoy a clarity that educational opportunity lacks” (Koski & Reich 2007, 
p.13). 
In her article, “Judicial Analysis During the New Wave of School Finance Litigation: The New 
Adequacy in Education,”. Verstegen makes a claim similar to Koski and Reich‟s that the most 
recent wave of school finance litigation is grounded in adequacy (Verstegen , 1998).  Verstegen 
extends this claim to suggest that the third wave of litigation based on adequacy can be defined 
by courts either choosing an “antiquated definition of adequacy,” in which if all students had 
access to a minimum, basic education, the standard was met, or by choosing an adequacy 
definition that is “in light of the times” in which “adequacy is defined in the context of the 
information and global economy” and “a minimum or basic education is found to be insufficient” 
(Verstegen, 2007, p.3). 
While various researchers have attached trends to each wave, it is clear that historically the 
framework for reviewing school finance litigation cases has been the “wave” theory,  watching 
each wave shift the approach to school finance litigation with the most recent analysis being 
primarily one of adequacy. 
The Recent Use of Adequacy Standards 
With a clear historical shift from equity to adequacy, the focus becomes defining adequacy as 
well as determining if it remains to most appropriate standard to utilize.    In their  article 
“Forward to School Finance Symposium,”  Ryan and Saunders effectively  connect the onset of 
the adequacy movement within the waves of school finance litigation and the arrival of the 
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standards movement in education (Ryan & Saunders, 2004).  Perhaps the largest obstacle to an 
adequacy argument is in defining a level of adequacy.    Ryan and Saunders cite the Director-
Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense‟s 1987 observation that the standards movement was “an 
affirmative opportunity to define a right to a minimally adequate education” (Ryan & Saunders, 
2004, p.473).  Additionally, they cite Liebman‟s argument that “by enacting specific and 
universally applicable minimum standards, state legislators have made the hard policy decisions, 
leaving the courts with an enforcement role that conforms to traditional visions of the judicial 
function” (Ryan & Saunders, 2004, p. 473). 
Koski and Reich have categorized judicial treatment of an adequacy standard in “three types of 
non-mutually-exclusive standards for adequacy: (1) those that articulate a vague and broad 
qualitative standard aimed at furthering the state‟s interest in producing civic-minded and 
economically productive students, but provide little guidance to policy-makers, (2) those that 
identify specific, though abstract, capacities and skills that all children should receive from 
public education to serve both the state‟s and the student‟s individual interest and then order the 
legislature to provide the resources that would permit children to obtain those capacities and 
resources, and (3) those that tie adequacy to state educational content standards which define 
with a high degree of specificity what all children should know and be able to do (Koski & 
Reich, 2007).   In a more general synopsis, Underwood and Sparkman explain that the shift to 
adequacy has “changed the focus of finance equity litigation from per pupil expenditure to the 
broader concept of meeting students‟ educational needs.  This in turn has shifted attention in 
such cases from mechanical funding formulae to the product of education” (Underwood and 
Sparkman, 1991, p. 543). 
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 From a different research perspective, Hanushek (2006) presents a concern with a fourth means 
for determining adequacy, that of “costing out” an adequate education.  Perhaps the most 
significant judicial decision regarding “costing out” an adequate education was in the Campaign 
for Fiscal Equality (CFE) cases in New York beginning in 1995.  Rebell outlines what he calls “a 
powerful 3-part remedial order” by the court in the CFE cases.  The courts mandated the state to 
(1) determine the actual cost of providing a sound basic education; (2) reform the current funding 
system to ensure that the resources necessary to provide a sound basic education are available in 
every school; and (3) provide a system of accountability to ensure that the reforms actually do 
provide all students the opportunity for a sound basic education (Rebell, 2005).  Hanushek 
(2006) takes issue with decisions such as the CFE decision, asserting that there is a “difficulty of 
defining „adequate‟ in an operational way that can be a court enforceable standard. Specifically, 
all available evidence indicates that translating an adequacy standard into a funding standard 
seriously distorts reality to the point where actual harm is possible” (Hanushek, 2006, p. xviii).  
He moves on to claim that costing out studies similar to those used in Kansas and New York are 
wound up in politics, are not reproducible science, and do not ensure outcomes (Hanushek, 
2006).    Adams addresses the issue of “costing out” by asserting that while costing out has its 
limitations, “by attempting to quantify the cost of an adequate education, costing out represents 
an important step.  The results of these studies pressure legislatures to increase funding for an 
affirmative right” (Adams, 2007, p. 6).  Baker and Green acknowledge the difficulty in making 
“costing out” a science, but contend it is much more effective than allowing courts or legislatures 
to make arbitrary decisions regarding such standards.  They summarize well by stating that truly 
identifying a cost for educational adequacy is “more art than science” (Baker & Green, 2008). 
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Justiciability 
While the value of the “costing out” studies is debated by two camps of researchers, it is made 
clear by both camps that such efforts have been a means for Courts to help distinguish judicial 
and legislative roles in school finance litigation.   One question addressed by many courts in their 
decisions regarding school finance is exactly where the responsibility of a state legislature ends 
and that of the judicial branch begins.  The question of justiciability of certain school finance 
cases is a recurring theme throughout many of the decisions.  Ralston Elder (2007) explains that 
state constitutions provide “positive rights” which gives the courts a right to be more involved 
because it is their duty to “ensure that the government is doing their job” regarding constitutional 
rights and obligations for the people of the state (Elder, 2007, p. 3).  While justiciability is 
considered as each court rules on a decision, and while it is not without controversy, there 
appears to be a legal standard for courts to intervene in school funding decisions on behalf of 
plaintiffs who have rights guaranteed by the state constitutions. 
Educational Impact of School Finance Litigation 
The ultimate question as it relates to school finance litigation is if such litigation makes a 
difference in the education of the children of any given state.  Heise summarizes the debate well 
by asserting that, “A consensus does not yet exist within the social science community about the 
specific relation between educational spending and equal educational opportunity.  It is unclear 
whether additional resources lead to additional student achievement” (Heise, 1995, p. 1166).  It 
is precisely that debate that creates controversy as courts are put in a position to determine a 
level of adequacy regarding funding while considering adequacy in outcomes as well.  Glenn 
(2009) conducted a research study addressing the issue of litigation‟s effect on student 
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achievement using achievement data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study Kindergarten 
Cohort.  Glenn‟s study found that adequacy litigation in which plaintiffs prevailed had a positive 
relationship with achievement tests scores from students with low socio-economic backgrounds, 
although with a small effect size.  Glenn concludes that adequacy litigation can play a role in a 
comprehensive education reform, but that it cannot be expected to “be a panacea for public-
school reform” (Glenn, 2009, p. 263).  . Burbridge‟s (2008) research supports the idea that it is 
comprehensive school reform that may have the effect on student achievement, not merely 
increase per pupil expenditures.  Burbridge‟s study examined student achievement in states with 
recent adequacy-based reform, with close attention to Kentucky, as they relate to student 
performance on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). Burbridge‟s 
conclusions were like Glenn‟s in that student achievement appears to be affected by adequacy-
based reform, but cannot be directly tied to a specified level of funding (Burbridge, 2008).  In 
general, it appears that the literature indicates that reform toward equity and adequacy can be 
significant to some degree. 
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Chapter Three—Case Briefs 
Chapter three includes the case-by-case criterion-based analysis of each case.  Seventy-six case 
briefs are provided in this chapter in alphabetical order, and listed in Table 1.0. 
 Each case was briefed using the following format.    
 Case Title: 
 Full Citation: 
 State: 
 Court: 
 Decision Date: 
 Plaintiff Claims: 
 Decision: 
 Reasoning: 
 Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 
The last to sections of each brief, Legal Standard Used in Decision and Financial Concept Used 
in Decision, provide the preliminary answers to research questions number one and number two.  
The preliminary answers to the third research question are found with the section of each brief. 
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Table  1.0  Listing of Cases Included in Analysis 
Case Title State Decision Date Page Number 
Abbeville v. State (335 S.C. 58) South Carolina 1999 21 
Abbott v. Burke I-XX ( New Jersey 1985-2009 23 
Board of Education of Cincinnati v. 
Walter (58 Ohio St. 368) 
Ohio 1979 27 
Brigham v. State (166 Vt. 246) Vermont 1997 29 
Buse v. Smith (74 Wis. 2d 550) Wisconsin 1976 31 
Campbell v. State I (907 P.2d 1238) Wyoming 1995 33 
CFE v. State (719 N.Y.S.2d 475) New York 2001 36 
Claremont School District v. 
Governor (138 N.H. 183)—
Claremont I 
& 
New Hampshire 1992 41 
Claremont School District v. 
Governor (142 N.H. 462)—
Claremont II  
New Hampshire 1997 43 
Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness 
in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles( 
680 So.2d 400) 
Florida 1996 45 
Columbia Falls Elementary School 
District No. 6 v. Montana (109P.3d 
257) 
Montana 2005 48 
Committee for Educational Equality 
v. State (878 S.W.2d 446) 
Missouri 2009 50 
Committee for Educational Rights v. 
Edgar (174 Ill.2d 1) 
Illinois 1996 53 
Connecticut Coalition for Justice in 
Education Funding v. Rell 
Connecticut 2010 55 
DeRolph v. State (78 Ohio St.3d 
193) 
Ohio 1997 57 
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Dupree v. Alma (279 Ark. 340) Arkansas 1983 59 
Durant v. State of Michigan (456 
Mich. 175) 
Michigan 1997 61 
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Case Title: Abbeville v. State (335 S.C. 58) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of South Carolina 
ABBEVILLE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Appellants 
v. 
the STATE of South Carolina; David M. Beasley, as Governor of the State of South Carolina; 
Nikki Setzler, as Chairman of the Senate Education Committee and Chairman of the Education 
Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee, in his representation capacity as a properly 
designated representative of the South Carolina Senate; David H. Wilkins, as Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and as representatives of the South Carolina House of Representatives; 
Barbara S. Nielsen as State Superintendent of Education and as representative of the State 
Department of Education; and Celia Gettys, as Chairman of the South Carolina State Board of 
Education, respondents. 
 
 
State:  South Carolina 
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Decision Date: April 22, 1999  
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs were a group of less wealthy school districts and representatives from the various 
districts. The plaintiffs contended that the State‟s school funding system violated the State 
Constitution‟s Education Clause (Article XI), the state and federal equal protection clauses and 
the Education Finance Act (EFA) in South Carolina code. 
 The funding of schools at the time was through the EFA as well as through the Education 
Improvement Act (EIA).  The EFA uses a wealth-sensitive formula which results in 
appellants receiving proportionately more state money than wealthier districts.  The EIA 
distributes funds evenly without regard to wealth.  In earlier challenges, specifically 
Richland County v. Campbell (294 S.C. 346) the Court denied challenges to these 
funding mechanisms. 
 The challenge in this appeal is to the State‟s funding system as a whole, with the primary 
contention being that the system is underfunded as a whole resulting in a violation of the 
state education clause and that the EIA creates a equal protection violation because it 
does not factor in wealth. 
 The plaintiffs do not desire “equal” funding because they already receive more than 
wealthier districts.  The contention is that the funding system results in an inadequate 
education.  
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that there was no Equal Protection violation, but the state Education Clause had 
been violated.  The Court further defined the language within the State Education Clause and 
issued a remand accordingly. 
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Reasoning: 
Regarding Equal Protection: 
 The Court cited its decision in Richland County v. Campbell (294 S.C. 346) as well as 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez (411 U.S.1) in determining that there is no equal protection 
violation. 
 
Regarding the State Education Clause: 
 Article XI, Section 3 reads that citizens are entitled a “system of free public schools and 
other public institutions.” 
 The Court ruled that the lower Court erred in determining that finding the meaning of that 
constitutional phrase was not the judicial branch‟s responsibility. 
 The Court ruled that the education clause guarantees that each child has an opportunity to 
receive a “minimally adequate education.” 
 The Court defined “minimally adequate to include providing students adequate and safe 
facilities in which they can have the opportunity to acquire: 1) the ability to read, write, 
and speak the English language, and knowledge of math and physical science; 2)a 
fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and of history and 
governmental processes; and 3) academic and vocational skills.” 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This decision was ultimately based only on the State Education Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This was an Adequacy question because the question at hand after the equal protection claims 
were dismissed was if enough funding existed within the system to adequately fund schooling 
across the state. 
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Case Title: Abbott v. Burke I (100 N.J. 269)  
 
State:  New Jersey 
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court 
 
 Abbott I (1985) (100 N.J. 269):   
The Education Law Center files the case on behalf of urban New Jersey school 
children.  The claim was that the 1975 Public School Education Act was 
unconstitutional because it was inadequate to provide a “thorough and efficient” 
education as mandated by the State Constitution education clause.  The Supreme 
Courts issued a remand stating that the State must assure that urban and suburban 
peers receive educations that allow them to compete with one another equally. 
 
 Abbott II (June 1990) (119 N.J. 287): 
The NJ Supreme Court rules that a “thorough and efficient” education requires 
that the State equalize funding between suburban and urban districts. 
Additionally, the Abbott II ruling mandated that programs be created to eliminate 
or reduce the disadvantages felt by children in urban districts.  The ruling was that 
the existing funding system was unconstitutional. 
 
Abbott III (July 1994) (136 N.J 444): 
This case was filed in response to the Governor‟s response to Abbott II.  
Governor Florio brought forward the Quality Education Act just prior to the 
Abbott II decision and amended it just after Abbott II to include a property tax 
relief measure.  Plaintiffs in Abbott III contended that the Quality Education Act 
did not comply with the mandate of the Abbott II ruling.    The NJ Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, stating that the Act did not equalize funding or 
provide the mandated supplemental programs.  The state had until 1997 to 
comply. 
 
Abbott IV (May 1997) (149N.J. 145):  
This case was filed in response to the Governor signing the Comprehensive 
Education Improvement and Financing Act (CEIFA) in which suburban districts 
could continue spending at their current rates, but putting spending limits on 
urban districts.  The urban spending limits were $1200 below the average 
suburban spending.  The NJ Supreme Court ruled that CEIFA was 
unconstitutional and mandated an immediate increase in funding for schools. 
 
Abbott V (May 1998) (153 N.J. 480):  
The case was a result of many hearings regarding the types of supplemental 
programs that would indeed be impactful for urban children.  The NJ Supreme 
Court mandates certain entitlements for urban children.  These included: school 
reform, full-day kindergarten, pre-school for children ages three and four, a state-
managed facilities program to get school facilities to code, social workers, 
technology, and summer school programming. 
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Abbott VI (March 2000) (163 N.J. 95): 
The plaintiffs returned to the Supreme Court claiming that the state had failed to 
implement the pre-school program mandated in Abbott V.  The NJ Supreme 
Court ruled for the plaintiffs and mandated reform of the pre-school program for 
the following academic year. 
 
Abbott: VII (May 2000) (164 N.J. 84): The Speaker of the General Assembly 
requested clarification from the NJ Supreme Court regarding the facilities 
mandates of Abbott V.  The Supreme Court held that the state is required to fund 
all costs of necessary facilities remediation and construction in the special needs 
districts and the state may remove special needs districts from having that 
classification if they no longer possess the characteristics of such. 
 
Abbott VIII (February 2002) (182 N.J. 153): The Court mandated that districts 
and the Department of Education manage their disputes regarding preschool plans 
in a timely manner.  Additionally, the Courts clarified that districts should 
develop contingency plans for facilities for preschools in order to ensure the 
facilities will meet the standards set forth in Abbott V.  Additionally, the Supreme 
Court clarified some questions of certification and curriculum for the districts. 
 
Abbott IX (June 2002) (172 N.J. 294):  
Due to state budgetary issues, the Attorney General filed a motion to relax 
remedies outlined in the previous Abbott decisions for one year.  The NJ Supreme 
Court held that the state‟s budget crisis did not entitle the Department of 
Education to preclude district appeals for supplemental funding above funding for 
prior fiscal years, but they could preliminarily establish a level of funding based 
on the previous year and suspend some requirements for one year. 
 
Abbott X (February 2004) (177 N.J. 578): 
This case served to formally approve the mediation between the Department of 
Education and Abbott plaintiff groups regarding the status of Abbott 
requirements.  The Court ordered that whole school reform remain in place at the 
elementary level and that a team be created to investigate whole school reform as 
well as research-based secondary reform efforts for middle and high schools in 
Abbott districts. 
 
Abbott XI (July 2003) (177 N.J. 596): 
The NJ Supreme Court directed the Department of Education that funding must 
be in place for districts to maintain expenditures authorized for their 2002-03 
budgets. 
 
Abbott XII (June 2004) (180 N.J. 444): 
The NJ Supreme Court allows for some relaxation of certification requirements 
and timelines for certification for preschool teachers as they relate to the Abbott V 
mandates. 
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Abbott XIII (November 2004) (182 N.J. 153): 
The plaintiff group requested further mediation with the Department of Education 
as an extension of Abbott X.  The request was granted by the Court. 
 
Abbott XIV (December 2005) (185 N.J. 612): 
The Court mandated the Abbott districts provide the Department of Education 
with long-range facilities requests by a specified deadline.  Additionally, the 
Court mandated that the Department of Education submit its annual facilities 
report by a specified deadline. 
 
Abbott XV (May 2006) (187 N.J. 191): 
The Court granted a short-term funding freeze, allowing the Department of 
Education to build funding plans with the districts, while maintaining each 
district‟s ability to appeal funding decisions. 
 
Abbott XVI (May 2006) (196 N.J. 348): 
The Court clarified that the freeze of Abbott XV did not mean operational funds 
for new facilities‟ opening expenses would be frozen as well. 
 
Abbott XVII (May 2007) (193 N.J. 34): 
The plaintiffs contended that they needed extra funding for school construction in 
order for the Department of Education to be in compliance with Abbott V, but the 
Court contended that the argument was premature because the 2008 budgets had 
yet to be adopted. 
 
Abbott: XVIII (February 2008) (196 N.J. 451): 
The Court granted a State appeal for extended time to develop new construction 
funding plans. 
 
Abbott XIX (November 2008) (196 N.J. 544):  
This case was brought to the NJ Supreme Court as a result of the new state 
funding legislation. The state sought declaration that the new formula was 
constitutional and met the standards set forth previously by Abbott.  The Court 
remanded the case and mandated testimony and evidence finding with the burden 
of proof being on the State. 
 
Abbott XX (May 2009) (199 N.J. 140):   
Based on the recommendation from the Special Master assigned via Abbott XIX, 
the new funding system (SFRA) was found by the NJ Supreme Court to be 
constitutional and may be applied to Abbott districts as long as the state fully 
funds the formula. 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The series of Abbott cases was based on the State Constitution‟s education clause, specifically 
the phrase “thorough and efficient.” 
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Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The series of Abbott cases was based on the State Constitution‟s education clause and was one of 
vertical equity as adequacy as it asks for supplemental programming to support disadvantaged 
population to the same general outcomes as the advantaged population.  Each follow-up case was 
based on the original claim of inadequacy so all Abbott cases can be categorized in this manner. 
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Case Title: Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Walter (58 Ohio St. 368) 
 
 
Full Citation: 
Board of Education of the City School District of the City of Cincinnati et al., Appellees and 
Cross-Appellants 
v. 
Walter, et al. Appellants and Cross-Appellees 
 
 
State:  Ohio 
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio 
Decision Date:  June 13, 1979 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 This appeal was a result of the lower court determining that the funding system was 
unconstitutional under Section 2 of Article VI, the Thorough and Efficient Clause and 
Section 2 of Article I, The Equal Protection and Benefit Clause of the Ohio Constitution.   
That decision was appealed to the County Court of Appeals which affirmed that the 
finance system violates the Equal Protection Clause but reversed the decision that the 
Thorough and Efficient Clause had been violated.  This case was in response to the 
decision of the Court of Appeals of Hamilton County. 
 
 
Decision: 
 The Court found that local control was a solid rational basis for supporting the funding 
system as constitutional under the Equal Protection and Benefits Clause. 
 The Court found that the state funding system did not violate the Thorough and Efficient 
Clause of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Reasoning: 
 
Regarding Constitutionality Under the Equal Protection and Benefit Clause: 
 Defendants contend that the system is designed to allow local control and that education 
is not a fundamental right and, thus, is not subject to strict scrutiny.  They also contend 
that even if held to strict scrutiny standards, local control is a compelling state interest 
justifying the disparity of educational opportunity. 
 The Court reviewed the decision of San Antonio v. Rodriguez (411 U.S.1) with regard to 
determining scrutiny, but made the determination that that case was not an appropriate 
standard by which to judge Ohio‟s specific constitutional guidelines.  The Court 
determined that this case was not appropriate for strict scrutiny because the Court saw the 
case as more a matter of how taxes were collected and spent than one of education. 
 Under the rational basis level of scrutiny, the Court presumed that statutes are held 
constitutional unless it can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the legislation and 
Constitution are in specific conflict. 
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 The Court found that local control was a solid rational basis for supporting the funding 
system as constitutional under the Equal Protection and Benefits Clause. 
 
Regarding Constitutionality Under the Thorough and Efficient Clause: 
 The Court clarified that is is within their judicial duty to review the constitutionality of 
legislation. 
 The Court indicated that wide discretion needed to be given to the Legislature regarding 
this issue. 
 The Court found that the state funding system did not violate the Thorough and Efficient 
Clause of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 
Both the State Education Clause and the State Equal Protect Clause were the basis for the 
original plaintiff claims. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 The plaintiff contention was that vast disparities existed between districts based on their 
self-taxation ability and willingness.  Additionally, the claim was made that, as a result, 
there were schools being deprived of what was necessary for an effective education.  The 
first claim is one of horizontal equity because it addresses differences in resources 
unrelated to educational need.  The second is an example of a pure vertical equity claim 
because no standard of outcome was set, but the issue of “sameness” was raised. 
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Case Title: Brigham v. State (166 Vt. 246) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Vermont 
Amanda BRIGHAM, et al. 
v. 
STATE of Vermont 
 
 
State:  Vermont 
Court:  Supreme Court of Vermont 
Decision Date:  February 5, 1997 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
Plaintiffs made three separate claims: 
 The first set of plaintiff claims was that the State‟s funding system deprived 
students from having the same educational opportunities as those in wealthier 
districts, contending that this violated the Vermont and federal constitutions. 
 The second set of claims were from plaintiffs who were property owners in 
“property poor” districts, claiming that the funding system compelled them to 
contribute more than their just portion to fund education. 
 The third claim comes from school districts in property poor districts that claim 
the funding system forced them to impose disproportionate taxes and yet still did 
not provide them with the ability to raise sufficient money to be equal to districts 
in property wealthy areas. 
 
 
Decision: 
The Court concluded that the existing system for funding public education created wide 
disparities between school districts and “deprive(d) children of an equal educational 
opportunity,” thus, violating the right to equal educational opportunities as listed in the Vermont 
Constitution. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court considered that using a foundation formula to fund schools allows for equity 
only to a certain minimum level and that the districts with higher levels of property 
wealth can more easily spend above the minimum foundation level.  
 The Court indicated that there was undisputed evidence that disparities in student 
expenditures existed among Vermont schools and there was a strong correlation between 
those expenditure levels and the taxable property wealth of the district. 
 The Court also indicated that, while various districts may manage money better than 
others, in general, money is a variable in educational opportunity. 
 The Court did not bother to determine if “strict scrutiny” or “rational basis” should be the 
standard because under either standard the Court saw a violation. 
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 The Court considered Vermont‟s constitutional history as they interpreted the Education 
Clause within the State Constitution, noting that education was the only public service 
noteworthy of being listed in Vermont‟s original constitution (a fact that the Court noted 
gave weight to the importance of education constitutionally). 
 The Court indicated that it could find no fathomable governmental purpose to justify 
gross inequities in educational opportunity. 
 Additionally, the Court indicated that “educational opportunity may not have as its 
determining force the mere fortuity of a child‟s residence.” 
 The Court noted that poorer districts cannot be expected to tax themselves at 
unmanageable tax rates to reach equitable spending on education. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
Plaintiffs made both Education Clause and Equal Protection claims, but the Court ruled based on 
its interpretation of the State Constitution‟s Education Clause.  
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The Court used the standard of Pure Vertical Equity in this decision in that the decision was 
certainly grounded in the ability to reach educational outcomes (and having the resources to do 
so), but did not address varying resources based on educational need. 
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Case Title: Buse v Smith (74 Wis. 2d 550) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Buse, and others, Petitioners 
v. 
Smith, and others, Respondents 
No 75-552 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
 
State:  Wisconsin 
Court:  Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
Decision Date:  November 30, 1976 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The original plaintiffs in this case were taxpayers from various negative-aid districts who 
asserted that by asking districts to impose taxation and by redistributing the funding across all 
districts in the state the funding plan violated the rule of uniform taxation within the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that the existing school funding scheme was a violation of Article VIII (uniform 
taxation) of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court reviewed the general components of the principle, with the primary focus and 
issue at hand being the district power equalization which property wealthy districts do not 
receive funds from the general taxation pool, but instead supplement it. 
 The goal of the equalization was to prevent per-pupil spending disparities between 
districts. 
 Two factors determined if a district ends up being a negative-aid district (contributing 
funds) or a positive-aid district (receiving funds): 1) How the district‟s actual valuation 
compares to the guaranteed valuation per pupil outlined in the funding formula. 2) 
Whether the district spends more or less in actual cost per pupil than the state primary 
cost-shared ceiling. 
 
Regarding the right of negative-aid school districts to make the constitutional challenge: 
 The Court determined that the Wisconsin Constitution prevents entities of the State 
from making such constitutional challenges; 
 However, the taxpayers listed as plaintiffs did have standing for such a challenge. 
 
 Regarding the obligation of the state for equalized education funding under Article X, 
Section 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution: 
 The article requires that the schools be “as nearly uniform as practicable…” 
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 The Court indicated that once the state had provided for each child the “privileges of 
a district which he or she may freely enjoy, the constitutional requirement is complied 
with.” 
  
 Regarding the possibility that Section 4 of Article X of the Wisconsin Constitution mandates 
local control of education: 
 The Court determined that local control was limited to provide educational 
opportunities over and above those provided by the State but that the State obligation 
to provide a free education eliminated the possibility of one hundred percent local 
control of all elements of funding. 
 
 Regarding negative-aid payments as taxes: 
 The Court indicated that local districts raise the funds that would pay the negative-aid 
payments via taxation, but that taxation is a local taxation. 
 The Court also determined that the negative-aid payment was a means of distribution 
or payment using the collected funds, but not a tax in and of itself. 
  
 Regarding the possibility that redistribution of negative-aid payments violates Section 1, of 
Article VIII in the Wisconsin Constitution: 
 This article indicates that taxation shall be uniform. 
 The Court concluded that the State cannot mandate one school district to levy and 
collect a tax for the direct benefit of other school districts or for the benefit of the 
State.  Therefore, the Court ruled that this element of the funding system was in 
violation of Article VIII of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
 
 Regarding negative-aid payments being an Equal Protection violation: 
 The Court indicated that education had been established as a fundamental right under 
the Wisconsin Constitution; thus, such consideration required the standard of strict 
scrutiny. 
 The Court determined that the system would pass the strict scrutiny standard and that 
not Equal Protection violation existed. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 The legal standard for decision was both Taxation law and State Equal Protection. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 This decision was based in Horizontal Equity.  
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Case Title: Campbell v. State I (907 P.2d 1238) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Wyoming 
CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, State of Wyoming; et a., Appellants (Plaintiffs) 
v. 
STATE of Wyoming: Diana J. Ohman, State Superintendent of Public Instruction: et al., 
Apellees (Defendants), and Big Horn County School District No. One, State of Wyoming, et al.  
Appellees (Intervening Defendants). STATE of Wyoming: Diana Ohman, Superintendent of 
Public Instruction; Fave Ferrari, State Auditor; Nedolyn Testolin, Michael Glode, Karen 
Moulton, Lynn Dickey, Lynn Messenger, Elizabeth Field, Judy Campbell, Charlotte 
Levendosky, Jack Iverson, Wayne Mortensen, and John Andrikopoulos, Members of the 
Wyoming State Board of Education, Appellants (Defendants), 
v. 
CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, State of Wyoming, et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs), 
and Laramie County School District No. One, et al., and Wyoming Education Association, 
Apellees (Intervening Plaintiffs).LARAMIE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE, 
State of Wyoming, Appellant (Intervening Plaintiff), 
v.  
Diana OHMAN, Superintendent of Public Instruction, State of Wyoming, et al. Appellees 
(Defendants), and Big Horn County School District No. One, State of Wyoming, et al. Appelless 
(Intervening Defendants). WYOMING EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Appellant (Intervening 
Plaintiff) 
v. 
Diana OHMAN, Superintendent of Public Instruction, State of Wyoming, et al. Appellees 
(Defendants), and Big Horn County School District No. One, State of Wyoming, et al. Appelless 
(Intervening Defendants). BIG HORN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. ONE, State of 
Wyoming, et al., Appellants (Intervening Defendants). 
v.  
CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, State of Wyoming, et al. Appellees (Plaintiffs), 
and Laramie County School District No. One, et al., and Wyoming Education Association, 
Appellees (Intervening Plaintiffs). 
 
State:  Wyoming 
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming 
Decision Date:  November 8, 1995 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The original plaintiffs claimed that Wyoming‟s public school finance system violated the Equal 
Protection section of the Wyoming Constitutions, specifically Article 1, 34) and the Education 
Article of the Wyoming Constitution (Article 7, 1-23).  After the state denied those claims, 
twenty-three school districts aligned with the state as intervening defendants and one school 
district and the Wyoming Education Association aligned with the plaintiffs and intervenors. 
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The plaintiffs contended that five components of the school finance system were 
unconstitutional: the divisor feature, the municipal divisor feature, the recapture feature, the 
optional mills feature, and the capital construction feature. 
 
 
Decision: 
The Court found the funding system to be in violation of both the State Education Clause 
mandates and the State Equal Protection mandates under a review of strict scrutiny. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court determined three key questions for analysis with this appeal: 1.) Whether the 
court‟s exercise of its judicial power to declare school finance system statutes 
unconstitutional violates the doctrine of separation of powers.  2.) Whether the court must 
apply a rational basis or strict scrutiny standard of review to determine the 
constitutionality of the school finance system status.   3.) Applying the appropriate 
standard of review to the challenged components of the school finance system, whether 
these components are constitutional. 
 The Court grounded its analysis in the prior decision of Washakie County School District 
No. One v. Herschler (606 P.2d 310) in which they determined that public education is a 
fundamental right under the Wyoming Constitution. 
 The court reviewed in detail their working definitions from various sources of the 
following phrases in the education article “a thorough and efficient system of public 
schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the state” and “a complete and 
uniform system of public instruction.” 
 The Court acknowledged that because each district sets knowledge and skills standards 
and the benchmarks for meeting them, the standard of education can legally vary from 
district to district. 
 The Court determined that is was within their judicial power to determine the 
constitutionality of legislation such as that outlining the school funding formula. 
 The Court ruled that the district court erred in applying rational basis for review and that 
strict scrutiny should be the standard for review. 
 
Regarding the divisor feature: 
 It was undisputed by both parties that the divisor system produced wide disparities in 
funding on a per pupil basis between schools and between districts. 
 The intent was to provide assistance for small schools and districts and to allow larger 
schools and districts to benefit from the “economy of scale,” but there was an inverse 
impact for large urban schools. 
 The Court also noted that the divisor system does not account for varying educational 
needs of certain groups of students that may be more prevalent on one size district than 
another (ie: At-risk students). 
 
Regarding the municipal divisor feature: 
 The municipal divisor recalculation was designed to prevent districts from building 
unnecessary small schools in cities or towns in efforts to generate additional funding. 
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 Evidence was considered by the court that at least one school district was functionally 
bankrupt as a result of the recalculation.  
 Additionally, it was noted by the Court that the recalculation appeared arbitrary because 
some districts could increase enrollment by almost three hundred and receive not 
additional funding while some districts received additional funding with an increase of 
only three students. 
 
Regarding the recapture feature: 
 The statute set the recapture rate at one hundred and nine percent.  Plaintiffs contended 
that this rate was set in an arbitrary manner because it had not had a cost study to define 
the rate. 
 The Court determined that there was no disagreement that the recapture feature had the 
effect of wealth-driven funding disparities and turned to the question of if the state can 
constitutionally justify those disparities. 
 The Court ruled that recapture was permitted, but because the one hundred and nine 
percent was arbitrarily set, this feature of the funding legislation was not constitutional. 
 
Regarding optional mills: 
 Plaintiffs claimed that districts with low assessed valuation and which receive lower 
formula funding are required to use all their optional mills to maintain a functioning 
system while districts of other demographics may not use any optional mills. 
 For some districts the optional mills were necessary to fund programs, and in other 
districts they were deemed futile because of the minimal amount of funding they raised. 
 The state‟s defense of this feature was a focus on local control. 
 The Court determined that local control did not fulfill the strict scrutiny standard, and 
thus, this feature was in violation of the State Equal Protection provisions. 
 
Regarding the capital construction feature: 
 The Court reviewed evidence of districts that had exceeded bonding capacity and were 
forced to make educationally-poor decisions due to limited access to capital funding. 
 The Court determined that the lack of capital outlay to schools in the existing formula 
was in violation of the constitutional requirements within the State Education Clause. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The decision was made using both the State Education Clause and the State Equal Protection 
Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The decision was one of Vertical Equity as Adequacy as it focused on getting resources 
distributed in an adequate manner while recognizing various levels of needs of districts of 
various demographics. 
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Case Title: CFE v. State (719 N.Y.S.2d 475) 
 
 
Full Citation:    
Supreme Court of New York 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, et al. 
v. 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al. 
 
 
State:  New York 
Court: Supreme Court of New York 
Decision Date:  January 10, 2001 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The original plaintiffs made two primary assertions: 
 Plaintiffs claimed that the State has failed to assure that New York City‟s public schools 
receive adequate funding to afford their students the “sound basic education” guaranteed 
by the Education Article of the New York Constitution. 
 Plaintiffs also contended that the State‟s funding mechanisms have an adverse and 
disparate impact upon the City‟s minority public school students in violation of Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
 
Decision: 
Regarding Plaintiff Claim number one, the Court ruled that the education provided to New York 
City students is so deficient that it falls below the constitutional floor outlined by the Education 
Article of the State Constitution.  Regarding the possible civil rights violation, the Court ruled 
that the funding system did have a disparate impact on minority students but did not have a 
discriminatory intent which is necessary to be a Title VI violation. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The State Education Article reads, “The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and 
support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may be 
education.”  However, in the Levittown decision (57NY2d), the Court of Appeals 
determined that to mean a provision of “a sound basic education.”  This Court determined 
that, as a result of the Levittown decision (57NY2d) three primary issues needed to be 
addressed: 
o What constitutes a sound basic education? 
o Are New York school children provided with a sound basic education in the 
City‟s public schools? 
o If not, is there a “causal link” between the failure and the State‟s system of 
funding public schools? 
 The Court noted that the Levittown decision did not call for a “state of the art” education. 
The Court noted specifically that the Levittown decision did not include specific 
minimums as some courts in other states had provided. 
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o After the 1995 decision, the New York State Board of Regents issued more 
rigorous educational standards, some of which the Court considered to exceed a 
sound basic education. 
 The Court was hesitant to create with any specificity a standard for “sound basic 
education” but did create some general frameworks for that definition: 
o The Court rejected that a sound basic education was one limited to allow high 
school graduates to simply serve as jurors and voters. 
o Defendants argued that passage of the Regents Competency Tests was an 
indicator of sound basic education, but the Court noted that would only require 
the equivalent of a ninth grade education. 
o Plaintiffs argued that preparing students for employment was a relevant factor in 
this definition, but the Court questioned what level of employment was sufficient 
to meet the standard. 
o Ultimately, the Court determined that the standards for a sound basic education 
must evolve as society and societal needs change. 
 The State argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing because no injury had been 
inflicted.  The Court disagreed, indicating that parents within the parent organizations 
serve as the representatives of their children to whom the injury was applied. 
 The Court reviewed the demographics of the New York City public schools in which a 
large number of students have factors that correlate highly with poor academic 
achievement. 
 
Regarding Measuring a Sound Basic Education By Inputs and Outputs: 
 The Court noted the Levittown decision (57NY2d) in which inputs were generalized into 
three large categories: 
o “minimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date curricula such as reading, 
writing, mathematics, sciences, and social studies, by personnel adequately 
trained to teach those subject areas”; 
o “minimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which provide enough 
light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn”; and 
o “minimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks, chairs, pencils 
and reasonably current textbooks.” 
 
Regarding Measuring Teacher Quality: 
 The Court noted the research in which teacher quality has a high correlation to student 
achievement, noting several measures of teacher quality: number of uncertified teachers 
in the school system, teacher scores on certification exams, and the quality of teachers‟ 
undergraduate education. 
 Using the above standards, the Court determined that the quality of teachers in the New 
York City public schools, in aggregate, was inadequate. 
 
Regarding Competition for Qualified Teachers: 
 The experts testified that there was a difference in the range of twenty percent and thirty-
six percent between New York City teacher salaries and those in surrounding suburbs. 
 Experts testified that salary differentials were a primary cause of teachers selecting 
suburban schools in New York versus city schools. 
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 The defendants argue that salaries should not have been compared to suburban districts, 
but instead to other larger metropolitan areas. 
 
Regarding Curricula: 
 The Court indicated that a reasonable curriculum was in place, but the problem existed in 
the implementation and delivery of it due to inadequate teaching. 
 The Court rejected the Court of Appeals omission of art and physical education as part of 
a sound basic education, asserting that those areas support a sound basic education in the 
core areas, and yet those two areas have not been adequately funded. 
 
Regarding School Facilities and Classrooms: 
 The Court found a causal link between poor facilities and performance of students, but 
indicated that the link was difficult to measure. 
o Despite master plans for ongoing repair and upkeep, the conditions of the schools 
continued to be below the acceptable range. 
o The Levittown decision (57NY2d) indicated that the adequacy of school facilities 
is measured by whether they “permit children to learn.” 
 
Regarding Overcrowding and Class Size: 
 The Board of Education conducted an annual Enrollment Capacity Utilization (ECU) 
report and found that schools serving 70% of the City‟s students were overcrowded, 
using the ECU formula. 
 The Court acknowledged evidence that class size correlates to student performance and 
heard evidence that New York City‟s class sizes exceeded the state average. 
 The Court found that teacher/student ratios are not a benchmark of adequacy because 
without classroom space, the teachers cannot be utilized to decrease class size. 
 
Regarding Instrumentalities of Learning:  
 The BOE had not maintained a record of textbooks used from year-to-year.  Evidence 
indicated that historically there had been a shortage of textbooks, but most recently that 
had been alleviated to the point of meeting a standard of minimal adequacy. 
 However, reviewing the primary source of textbook funding, the Court determined an 
inadequate amount to maintain a solid textbook rotation and replacement cycle for 
consumables. 
 The Court determined that the libraries in the public schools are inadequate in number 
and quality. 
 The Court determined that despite efforts to infuse instructional technology, the resources 
were outdated and underfunded in the City‟s schools. 
 
Regarding Graduation/Drop-out Rates & Performance on Standardized Tests: 
 The drop-out rate of New York City public schools was 30%.  
 Additionally, ten percent of the students entering ninth grade end up receiving a GED, 
which the Court determined to not meet the standard of a sound basic education. 
 Forty-eight percent received a local diploma, indicating they met credit requirements but 
did not pass the Regents test—essentially limiting them to a ninth grade equivalent 
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education--and twelve percent obtained a diploma, indicating they had received what the 
Court considered a sound basic education. 
 The Court noted that on all standardized tests issued in the state, the City students 
performed below an acceptable standard in aggregate. 
 
Regarding Causal Links between the Funding System and Educational Opportunity: 
 Defendants offered two experts to testify that resources do not have a causal link to 
student outcomes (Dr. David Armor and Dr. Hanushek).  
 Dr Armor‟s essential contention was that socioeconomic background is such a crucial 
factor that student performance is not statistically affected by school funding.  The Court 
determined that Dr. Armor‟s contentions were not persuasive and that his research 
methods were flawed as they related to this particular issue. 
 Dr. Hanushek‟s presented evidence that poor students can increase their performance 
with high teacher quality, but he did not feel the school systems were using the correct 
criteria for teacher quality.  He suggested tying compensation to outcomes and indicated 
he felt the City had sufficient resources to improve student outcomes with such an 
adjustment.  The Court did not find Dr. Hanushek‟s evidences to be persuasive. 
 
The Courts Remedy and Order: 
 The Court indicated that the legislature must be given first opportunity to reform the 
system and provided the following parameters for the reform.   
 The system must include: sufficient numbers of qualified teachers, principals and other 
personnel; appropriate class sizes; adequate and accessible school buildings with 
sufficient space to ensure class size and implementation of a sound curriculum; sufficient 
and up-to-date books, supplies, libraries, educational technology and laboratories; 
suitable curricula, including an expanded platform of programs to help at-risk students by 
giving them “more time on task”; adequate resources for students with extraordinary 
needs; and a safe, orderly environment. 
 Additionally, the Court indicated that reforms must address the following issues: 
o Ensuring that every school district has the resources necessary for providing the 
opportunity for a sound basic education. 
o Taking into account variations of local costs. 
o Providing sustained and stable funding in order to promote long-term planning by 
schools and school districts. 
o Providing as much transparency as possible so that the public may understand 
how the State distributes school aid. 
o Ensuring a system of accountability to measure whether reforms implemented by 
the legislature actually provide the opportunity for a sound basic education and 
remedy the disparate impact of the current finance system. 
o Examining the effects of racial isolation on many of the City‟s school children 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The decision was based on the State Education Clause, specifically the language “sound basic 
education.” 
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Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This case is best categorized as Vertical Equity as Adequacy because it addresses inputs against 
outcome standards for a specific group of students, specifically those living within the urban City 
limits. 
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Case Title: Claremont School District v. Governor (138 N.H. 183)—Claremont I 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
CLAREMONT SCHOOL DISTRICT and another 
v. 
GOVERNOR and another. 
 
 
State:  New Hampshire 
Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
Decision Date:  December 30, 1992 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 The plaintiffs made multiple claims addressed in this case: 
o That the State fails to spread educational opportunities equitably among its 
students and adequately fund education. 
o That the foundation aid statutes unconstitutionally restrain the State aid to public 
education by capping State assistances at eight percent. 
o That both the State school finance system and the foundation aid statutes deny 
plaintiffs equal protection. 
o That the heavy reliance on property taxes to finance public schools results in an 
unreasonable and disproportionate tax burden in violation of Part II, Article 5 of 
the State Constitution.  
 
Decision: 
 Reversing the decision of the lower Court, the State Supreme Court found that Part II, 
Article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution imposes a duty on the State to provide a 
constitutionally adequate education to every educable child in the public schools in New 
Hampshire and to guarantee adequate funding.  The Court remanded the other issues 
presented. 
 
Reasoning: 
 This case was an appeal of the lower court decision that the New Hampshire Constitution 
imposes no duty on the State to support the public schools.   
 Reversing the decision of the lower Court, the State Supreme Court found that Part II, 
Article 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution imposes a duty on the State to provide a 
constitutionally adequate education to every educable child in the public schools in New 
Hampshire and to guarantee adequate funding. 
 The lower Court had connected its decisions on all the other plaintiff claims to its 
determination that Part II, Article 83 did not create a duty for the State to spread 
educational opportunities equitably.  Therefore, the high court focused only on that 
decision and remanded other decisions contingent on their determination regarding that 
element of the plaintiff claims. 
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 The Court gave strong consideration to the Massachusetts case of McDuffy v. Secretary of 
the Executive Office of Education (415 Mass. 545) because the Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire Constitutional language were very similar. 
 Additionally, the Court considered the historical context of the language—being 
connected to an era in which Puritan settlers highly valued education and saw it highly 
connected with the governmental process. 
 Based on the extensive review of language/definitions and a review of the historical 
connections, the Court determined that Part II, Article 83 of the New Hampshire 
Constitution imposes a duty on the State to provide universal education and to financially 
support the schools. 
 The Court purposefully avoids defining the parameters of such an education, indicating 
that is the duty of the legislature and the Governor. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 The plaintiffs made both State Equal Protection claims and State Education Clause 
claims; however, the court only addressed and based a decision on the State Education 
Clause plaintiff assertions. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 The multiple plaintiffs can be categorized each into various financial concepts; however, 
the Court only ruled on the assertion that the state education clause mandated an adequate 
education be provided.  That particular focused ruling is best categorized as a pure 
Adequacy decision because the focus was on the State obligation to provide adequate 
funding into the system as a whole.   
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Case Title: Claremont School District v. Governor (142 N.H. 462)—Claremont II 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
 
CLAREMONT SCHOOL DISTRICT and others. 
v. 
GOVERNOR and another. 
 
State:  New Hampshire 
Court:  Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
Decision Date:  December 17, 1997 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
Plaintiffs contended that the lower Court ruling regarding the state funding system and its 
constitutionality under the State Equal Protection Clause and the State Taxation Clause was 
erroneous. 
 
Decision: 
 The Court ruled that the existing system of financing elementary and secondary public 
education was unconstitutional. 
o The Court ruled that an adequate education was a fundamental right because it 
was outlined as such in the State constitution. 
o The Court ruled that the property tax levied to fund education was a State tax and 
was disproportionate and in violation of Part II, Article 5 of the New Hampshire 
Constitution. 
 
 
Reasoning: 
 This case is a second appeal—the first appeal resulted in the Court‟s determining that it 
was a state duty to provide an adequate education, remanding the remaining issues for 
decision. 
 The issues on remand were re-reviewed by the lower court and the following decisions 
were made by the trial court: 
o The education in the plaintiff school districts is constitutionally adequate. 
o The system of funding in the state ensures constitutionally adequate funding to 
each of the plaintiff school districts. 
o The system of school funding does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 
State constitution 
o The funding system does not violate Part II, Article 5 of the state constitution. 
 In this appeal the Supreme Court ruled that the property tax levied to fund education was 
a State tax and was disproportionate and in violation of Part II, Article 5 of the New 
Hampshire Constitution—having made that ruling, the Court did not rule on the 
plaintiffs‟ other claims. 
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 Regarding the State tax, the plaintiffs contended that the mandate from the state and the 
use of the state control of the funds made the levy a State tax.  The State argued that the 
local control of budgeting and tax need determinations made the levy a local tax. 
 Part II, Article 5 of the State Constitution provides that the legislature may “impose and 
levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates and taxes upon all the inhabitants of, 
and residents within the said state.”  The Court indicates that the article requires that all 
taxes be proportionate and equal in value and uniform in rate. 
 The lower court had said that the criteria for determining if a tax is local or state are “the 
entity that controls the mechanics of assessment and collection” and “the disposition of 
the tax revenue after their collection.”  The Supreme Court in this appeal determined that, 
instead, the criterion should be the purpose of the tax, indicating “if the tax is for the 
general purposes of the state, the rate should be the same throughout the state.” 
 The Court reversed the lower court decision and determined that the levied tax in the 
existing funding system was a State tax and thus needed to be proportional. 
 The questions of proportionality and reasonableness were then addressed by the Court: 
o The Court found a tax rate discrepancy as high as four hundred percent and 
determined that the existing tax is a disproportionate state tax. 
o The Court defined reasonable to mean “just” and determined that the funding 
system was not reasonable because the burden of educational opportunities for all 
was not evenly distributed. 
 The Court addressed the issue of adequacy in the system. 
o The Court referred back to their decision in Claremont I mandating that the 
legislature define adequate as it relates to the constitutional mandate. 
o The Court stated that the standard of adequacy must change in an ever-evolving 
world. 
o The Court cited the standards of adequacy outlined in Rose v. Council for Better 
Education, Inc. (790 S.W.2d). 
o The plaintiffs were seeking on appeal that the Court define an adequate education 
as a fundamental right, requiring the strict scrutiny standard of review. 
 The Court indicated that the mere existence of a charge to the legislature 
in a State Constitution to provide a public education makes it a 
fundamental right. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The issue of taxation was decided based on a taxation clause within the State Constitution.  The 
issue of adequacy education being a fundamental right is one that would be addressed under the 
state Equal Protection Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision 
This appeal dealt with Horizontal Equity claims when considering taxation rates and burden for 
educational opportunity.  It also addressed Adequacy in that is focused on developing a standard 
of adequacy and determined that an adequate education was a fundamental right in the State of 
New Hampshire. 
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Case Title: Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc. v. Chiles ( 680 So.2d 
400) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding, Inc., et al., Appellants.  
v.  
Lawton Chiles, Governor of the State of Florida and presiding Officer of the State Board of 
Education; Douglas Jamerson, Commissioner of Education of the State of Florida; State Board of 
Education, a public Florida corporation; Pat Thomas, as President of the Florida Senate; and 
Bolley L. Johnson, as Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, Appellees. 
 
State:  Florida 
Court:  Supreme Court of Florida 
Decision Date:  June 27, 1996 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 Plaintiffs sought a ruling that an adequate education is a fundamental right under the 
Florida Constitution and that the State had failed to provide its students that fundamental 
right by failing to allocate adequate resources for a uniform system of free public schools. 
 Specifically, plaintiffs made the following assertions: 
o Certain students were not receiving adequate programs to permit them to gain 
proficiency in the English language; 
o Economically-deprived students are not receiving adequate education for their 
greater educational needs; 
o Gifted, disabled, and mentally handicapped children are not receiving adequate 
special programs; 
o Students in property-poor counties are not receiving an adequate education; 
o Education capital outlay needs are not adequately provided for; and 
o School districts are unable to perform their constitutional duties because of the 
legislative imposition of noneducational and quasi-educational burdens. 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that the plaintiffs had not provided ample enough evidence to cause the Court to 
intervene in the “enormous discretion by the Florida Constitution to determine what provision to 
make for an adequate and uniform system of free public schools.” 
 
Reasoning: 
 
Regarding Parties and Standing: 
 The plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred by determining they did not had 
jurisdictional basis for action. 
 The Court determined that because the appellees either had taken  a present, adverse, and 
antagonistic position to that espoused by the plaintiffs or would be necessary parties for 
state action on the matter, all parties listed are appropriate. 
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Regarding Declaratory Relief: 
 The court notes that “the purpose of declaratory judgment is to afford parties relief from 
insecurity and uncertainty with respect to rights, status, and other equitable or legal 
relations.” 
 The Court used that standard and determined the case appropriately sought declaratory 
relief. 
 
Education Article: 
 Article IX, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution provides: 
o “Adequate provision shall be made by law or a uniform system of free public 
schools and for the establishment, maintenance and operation of institutions of 
higher learning and other public education programs that needs of the people may 
require.” 
 The phrase “adequate provision” is what was being questioned. 
 The Court began its analysis with a historical review of the Florida education article. 
o The original article (1838) indicated that “ample provision for the education of all 
the children” be provided and listed it as a “paramount duty of the State.” 
o In 1885, “paramount duty” was deleted. 
o The Court reviewed the various Florida cases that have tried to define “uniform 
system of free public education.” 
 In 1939, Clark v. Henderson (137 Fla. 666) indicated that “a uniform 
system means that a system of free schools, as distinguished from the 
authorized State educational institutions, shall be established upon 
principles that are of uniform operation throughout the State and that such 
system shall be liberally maintained.” 
 In 1977, School Board of Escambia County v. State (353 So. 2d 834) 
defined a uniform system as one where “the constituent parts, although 
unequal in number, operate subject to a common plan or serve a common 
purpose.” 
 In 1991, a group of buildings claimed that a fee for new construction to be 
given for new school construction was unconstitutional.  The Court ruled 
against the builders in St. Johns County v. Northeast Florida Builders 
Association (583 So. 2d 635). 
 In Florida Department of Education v. Glasser (622 So. 2d 944), the 
Supreme Court of Florida declined to define with specificity a uniform 
system of free public schools, indicating that such a definition is the 
responsibility of the legislature. 
 The Court affirmed the trial court‟s decision that it cannot be the role of 
the Court to determine a level of adequacy for education. 
 
Regarding Separation of Powers: 
 Appellees argued that the Court has the power to evaluate the constitutionality of an 
existing system even if the court was unwilling to define adequacy. 
 The Court disagreed, calling the request a “non-justiciable political question.” 
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Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This case was based in the Education Clause of the Florida Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The question presented by the plaintiffs was one of Vertical Equity as Adequacy in that they 
cited various groups with special needs and outlined their level of adequacy; however, the case 
was decided based on justiceability of the matter. 
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Case Title: Columbia Falls Elementary School District No. 6 v. Montana 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Montana 
COLUMBIA FALLS ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 6 and H.S. District No. 6; 
East Helen Elementary District No. 9; Helena Elementary District No. 1 and H.S. District No. 1; 
Billings Elementary District No. 2 and H.S. District No. 2; White Sulphur Springs Elementary 
District No.8 and H.S. District No. 8; Troy Elementary District No. 1 and H.S. District No. 1; 
MEA-MFT; Montana School Boards Association; Montana Rural Educational Association; 
School Administrators of Montana; Alan and Nancy Nicholson; Gene Jarussi; Peter and Cheryl 
Marchi; and Michael and Susan Nicosia, for themselves and as parents of their minor children, 
Plaintiffs, Respondents and Cross-Appellants. 
v. 
The STATE of Montana, Defendant and Appellant. 
 
State:  Montana 
Court: Supreme Court of Montana 
Decision Date:  March 22, 2005 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The original plaintiffs contended that Montana had been unconstitutionally administering and 
funding the public schools system.  The District Court agreed with plaintiffs and the State 
appealed, claiming the issue was one for political, not judicial decision, and that the system is not 
in violation of either the Education Clause or Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution. 
 
Decision: 
 The Court deferred to the legislature to determine what a true standard of quality means, 
but determined that the existing system did not meet any level of quality, even one yet to 
be determined. 
 
Reasoning: 
Regarding Justiceability: 
 Leaning on the federal case of Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 186), the Court determined the 
key question regarding justiceability is a determination regarding whether the provision is 
“self-executing.” 
 Because the Education Clause provides a direction to the legislature, the Court 
determined it was not self-executing.  Thus, once the legislature has “executed” that 
directive, there can be a judicial review of the constitutionality of how it was executed. 
 The Court ruled the issue at hand as justiciable. 
 
Regarding Article X, Section 1(3): 
 The question at hand focuses on the phrase within Article X that calls for “providing a 
basic system of free quality public elementary and secondary schools”; the key word 
being questioned was quality. 
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 In response, in part, to the Court‟s earlier ruling in Helena School District No. 1. v. State 
(769 P2.d 684), the legislature created a system under HB677 that created minimums and 
maximums for school districts‟ budgets. 
 The Court noted that most school districts are operating at over ninety-eight percent of 
their budget, and many are exceeding their allowed maximum.  The districts content that 
a “quality” education cannot be provided within the existing parameters. 
o The State conceded that in passing HB677 no cost analysis study was done. 
o The lower court had noted that HB 677 did not provide for inflation. 
o The Court determined that no threshold of “quality” existed, and thus, they could 
not determine that the legislature had met that constitutional obligation. 
o The Court took note that the current system is deficient financially based on 
undisputed trial evidence. 
 
Regarding State Equal Protection: 
 The Court did not address the issue because it had already found the system to be 
unconstitutional under Article X, Section 1(3). 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The decision was based in the State Education Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This was an example of Adequacy in that the districts were contending that systemically there 
was not enough money to provide an adequate education in any district based on the limitations 
set by the funding formula. 
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Case Title: Committee for Educational Equality v. State (878 S.W.2d 446) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Missouri 
COMMITTEE FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY, et al., Appellants 
Coalition to Fund Excellent Schools, et al., Appellants, 
v. 
STATE OF MISSOURI, et al., Respondents,  
W. BEVIS SCHOCK, REX SINQUEFIELD and MENLO SMITH, Respondents 
 
State:  Missouri 
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri 
Decision Date:  September 1, 2009 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The Plaintiff districts claim that Missouri‟s school funding system results in a system that is 
unconstitutionally disparate and inadequate.  Plaintiffs claim the formula applies incorrectly 
calculated tax assessment data and, thus, renders incorrect “local effort” which impacts the 
adequacy and equity across schools in the state of Missouri. 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that there was no constitutional violation created by the revision of the school 
funding system. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The original claim revolved around the funding formula in 2004 known as Senate Bill 
Number 380 (SB380).  Plaintiffs claimed SB380 created inadequacies that violated the 
Missouri constitution, specifically Article IX, Section 1(a) which reads the State should 
provide an education that promotes “a general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence.” 
 As the case proceeded through the years, the legislature revised the funding system to 
Senate Bill 287 (SB287).  SB287 was an attempt to remedy inequities; it reflected a view 
that districts with greater “local effort” require less assistance from the state to meet the 
needs of a free public education.  SB287 was designed to be phased in over seven years.  
Plaintiffs contend that both funding formulas fail to fund schools adequately. 
 The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals erred by allowing the Defendant-
Interveners to join the case, but that the error did not require decision reversal. 
 The Plaintiff‟s appeal was categorized in four general categories: 
o The formula “inadequately” funds schools in violation of Article IX of the 
Missouri Constitution; 
o The formula violates equal protection; 
o The formula violates the Missouri Hancock Amendment; and  
o The legislature violated Article X of the Missouri Constitution by incorporating 
inaccurate assessment figures into the formula. 
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Regarding Plaintiff Standing: 
 The defendants contended the plaintiffs‟ standing on several grounds. 
o The defendants claimed that school districts are not-for-profit organizations and 
cannot litigate.  The Court had previously ruled that “the capacity of a school 
district to sue and its authority to prosecute actions required to protect and 
preserve school funds and property is necessarily implied from the district‟s duty 
to maintain schools and conduct instruction within its boundaries” (State ex rel. 
School District of Independence v. Jones --653 S.W. 2d 178). 
 The Court determined that the school districts had standing to challenge 
the funding formula under Article IC, Section 1(a).  
 The Court also ruled that school districts have standing for their 
assessment challenges under Article X. 
 The Court, however, ruled that school districts lacked standing to assert 
inadequacy of school funding violates their equal protection rights or the 
Hancock Amendment because they are not “persons” within the realm of 
such protections. 
o The defendants also contended that the individual taxpayer plaintiffs lacked 
standing to bring challenges to other taxpayer‟s property assessments as they were 
not injured personally. 
 The Court determined that such taxpayers had standings as it related to an 
assertion that the State was spending tax revenue improperly under 
Articles IX and X of the Missouri Constitution. 
 
Regarding Article IX, Section 3(b)—The Education Clause: 
 Article IX, Section 3(b) of the Missouri Constitution reads: 
 
“In event the public school fund provided and set apart by law for the support of free 
public schools, shall be insufficient to sustain free schools at least eight months in 
every year in each school district of the state, the general assembly may provide for 
such deficiency; but in no case shall there be set apart less than twenty-five  percent 
of state revenue, exclusive of interest and inking fund, to be applied annually to 
support of the free public schools.” 
 
 Plaintiffs did not argue violation of this section.  They instead contend that SB287 fails to 
provide what is extended beyond this section in Article IX, Section 1(a) which states: 
“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the 
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the general assembly shall 
establish and maintain free public schools for the gratuitous instruction of all persons 
in this state within ages not in excess of twenty-one years as prescribed by law.” 
 
 Plaintiffs contend that SB287 does not adequately provide “a general diffusion of 
knowledge and intelligence” as mandated. The Court ruled that this phrase was not 
intended to determine a fiscal level of adequacy (instead that was outlined in Section3(b) 
with the minimum of twenty-five percent).  Thus, the Court rule there was not violation 
of Article IX, Section 1(a). 
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Regarding Equal Protection: 
 Plaintiffs contended that SB287 violated Article I, Section 2, Missouri‟s Equal Protection 
Article by claiming that school funding adequacy and per-pupil expenditures are 
fundamental rights in Missouri. 
 The Court noted that education is not a fundamental right under the United States 
Constitution, as was determined by San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez (411 U.S. 1) and Missouri Courts have followed federal decisions regarding 
fundamental rights.  Additionally, the Court examined Article X of the Missouri 
Constitution and found no “free-standing” mandate for adequacy or per-pupil 
expenditures. 
 The Court ruled that there is no violation of Missouri‟s Equal Protection Clause 
 
Regarding the Hancock Amendment: 
 The general purpose of the Hancock Amendment is to limit excessive governmental 
expenditures. 
 The Court ruled that because districts were seeking an increase in spending of tax dollars, 
not a decrease, the Hancock Amendment challenge failed. 
 
Regarding Article X: 
 The plaintiffs contended that the State Tax Commission did not follow the mandates of 
Article X, Sections 3, 4, and 14 in reporting the 2004 assessments for school funding 
purposes.  Additionally, they contended that the legislature acted unlawfully by freezing 
the Commission‟s 2004 property tax assessments into SB287‟s funding formula. 
 Plaintiffs contend that the assessments create incorrect “local effort” calculations. 
 The plaintiffs had a burden to prove that taxes were not uniform.  Plaintiffs were not 
making such a claim but instead were contending that wrong figures were utilized in the 
creation of the formula. 
 The Court ruled that without a specific mandate within the Constitution to dictate how a 
formula is created, burden remains with the legislature and is at their discretion. 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This case was decided on State Equal Protection, State Education Clause, and State Taxation 
Articles. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
Plaintiffs were essentially making a Horizontal Equity claim, claiming that factors outside of 
educational need were impacting funding. 
  
53 
 
Case Title: Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar (174 Ill.2d 1) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Illinois 
The COMMITTEE FOR EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS et al., Appellants, 
v. 
Jim EDGAR, Governor of the State of Illinois, et al., Appellees. 
 
 
State:  Illinois 
Court: Supreme Court of Illinois 
Decision Date:  October 18, 1996 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
Plaintiffs alleged that the general state aid formula does not effectively equalize funding among 
wealthy and poor district in violation of the State Education Clause.  
 
Decision: 
The Court made the following rulings: 
1. Disparities in educational funding between school districts based on relative property 
wealth of districts did not offend “efficiency” requirements of the Education Clause in 
the State Constitution. 
2. The question of whether state educational institutions and services were “high quality” 
was outside the sphere of judicial function. 
3. The state constitutional right to an education was not a fundamental right for the purpose 
of equal protection analysis. 
4. A funding system that created disparities in funding based on local wealth met the 
rational basis standard of maintaining local control. 
 
Reasoning: 
Regarding the Education Clause: 
 Article X, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution includes the clause, “The state shall 
provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and 
services.” 
 Plaintiffs contend that the vast disparities in levels of funding make the system 
“inefficient” in violation of Article X, Section 1. 
o The court reviewed the definition of efficient and determined that by definition 
alone it does not necessarily indicate a need for parity.  However, the Court 
acknowledged that the contextual use of the word does provide some ambiguity. 
o The Court reviewed historical records of framers‟ intent (specifically in the 1970 
reframing of the Constitution) as well as similar case in other states. 
o The Court determined that based on the debates had during the 1970 reframing 
process, “efficiency” and “educational equality” should be held to be separate and 
distinct. 
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 Additionally, plaintiffs argue that the low property wealth districts are unable to create 
“high quality” education because of inadequate funding. 
 The plaintiffs also claim that the existing funding scheme made it impossible to provide a 
“high quality” education for students who are considered “at-risk.” 
 The Court determined that it was outside of its jurisdiction judicially to make a 
determination of how to define “high quality.” 
 
Regarding Equal Protection: 
 Citing San Antonio v. Rodriguez (411 U.S. 1), the Court determined that no equal 
protection claim could be made under the US Constitution regarding the state funding 
scheme for public education. 
 Plaintiffs contend that Rodriguez did not dictate equal protection claims using the State 
Constitution‟s Equal Protection Clause.   
o The Court ruled that education is not a fundamental right under the State 
Constitution. 
o Thus, the rational basis level of scrutiny was applied 
o The Court determined that maintaining local control was a rational basis for the 
existing funding scheme, despite the inequalities. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
Plaintiffs made contentions using the State Education Clause as well as both the State and 
Federal Equal Protection Clauses. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The plaintiffs were making a claim of Horizontal Equity in claiming that factors other than 
educational need, namely property wealth, were impacting educational funding. 
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Case Title: Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding v. Rell  
 
 
Full Citation:   
CONNECTICUT COALITION FOR JUSTICE IN EDUCATION FUNDING, INC., ET AL. 
v.  
GOVERNOR M. JODI RELL, ET AL. 
 
State:  Connecticut 
Court:  Supreme Court of Connecticut 
Decision Date:  March 30, 2010 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
Plaintiffs asserted that Article 8, Section 1 of the Connecticut Constitution guarantees students to 
a minimum quality of education, namely suitable opportunities. 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that Article 8, Section 1 of the Connecticut Constitution guarantees students 
educational standards and resources suitable to participate in democratic institutions, and to 
prepare them to attain productive employment and otherwise to contribute to the state‟s economy 
and remanded the case back to the trial court. 
 
Reasoning: 
 Specifically the plaintiffs contend their right to a suitable education have been violated 
because of the lack of: high quality pre-school, appropriate class sizes, programs and 
services for at-risk students, highly qualified administrators and teachers, modern and 
adequate libraries, modern technology and appropriate instruction, a rigorous curriculum 
with a wide breadth of textbooks, a school environment that is healthy, safe and well 
maintained, adequate services to fulfill IDEA, appropriate career and academic 
counseling, and suitably-run extracurricular activities. 
 Plaintiffs also point to outputs, including AYP status, to assert that the state has failed to 
provide “suitable educational opportunities.” 
 Plaintiffs attributed the shortfall of necessary funding for a suitable education to the 
following things: 
o The legislature‟s failure to raise the foundation grant amount from $5891 since 
1999. 
o The failure of that foundation amount to account for the actual costs of providing 
special education students with suitable and substantially equal educational 
opportunities, and 
o The failure of the minimum base aid ratio to accurately calculate a town‟s ability 
to raise the necessary funds. 
 
Regarding Justiceability: 
 Referencing their decision in Sheff v. O’Neill (238 Conn 1), the Court determined that 
“courts do not have jurisdiction to decide case that involve matters that textually have 
been reserved to the legislature…In the absence of such a textual reservation, however, it 
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is the role and duty of the judiciary to determine whether the legislature has fulfilled its 
affirmative obligations within constitutional principles.” 
 The Court determined the issues at hand were justiciable. 
 
Regarding the Actual Text of the Constitution: 
 The Court referred to the six standards they established for reviewing constitutional 
language as decided in State v. Geisler (222 Conn. 684): persuasive relevant federal 
precedents; the text of the operative constitutional provisions; the historical insights into 
the intent of the framers; related Connecticut precedents; persuasive precedents of other 
state courts and contemporary understandings of applicable economic and social norms. 
 The Court determined that the language of the text was ambiguous regarding the 
plaintiffs‟ claims; thus, other Geisler factors needed to be employed. 
 
Regarding Previous Holdings of the Court: 
 This case was the first in history to present a question of qualitative content in the 
education clause. 
 However, the Court did reference its decision in Horton I (172 Conn 618) in which the 
Court determined that education in the state is a fundamental right subject to a strict 
scrutiny level of review. 
 The Court indicated that previous decisions were well aligned with the plaintiff claims in 
this case. 
 
Regarding Constitutional History: 
 Although the Article does not lay it out in specific text, the Court noted that there had 
been a substantial historical importance of education in the state. 
 
Regarding Other State Decisions: 
 The Court indicated that other state high court decisions were in line with the concept 
that education must in some way be minimally adequate. 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This case was decided based on the State Education Clause 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The Plaintiffs made claims regarding inadequacy of both inputs and outputs for public schooling, 
making this decision one of pure Adequacy. 
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Case Title: DeRolph v. State (78 Ohio St.3d 193) 
 
 
Full Citation: 
Supreme Court of Ohio 
DeROLPH et al., Appellants 
v. 
The STATE of Ohio et al., Appellees 
 
 
State:  Ohio 
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio 
Decision Date:  March 24, 1997 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that the existing legislation failed to provide for a thorough and efficient system 
of common schools in violation of Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
Reasoning: 
 Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution reads that the state needs to provide “a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the state.” 
 The Court determined that it was well within their jurisdiction to make such a 
determination regarding constitutionality of legislation even though creating the 
legislation is the role of the General Assembly. 
 Under the existing funding system, Ohio funded schools more from local funding than 
state funding, which was contrary to the national trend. 
 The Court noted expert opinion that the foundation formula amount was not designed as 
an educational adequacy standard, but instead was derived backwards from the total 
dollars the legislature allocated to school funding that year. 
  The Court indicated that the guarantees within the formula substantially benefit the 
wealthier districts more than the poor ones, working against the equalization effect of the 
formula. 
 Because of legislation forbidding increased taxation as a result of reappraised property, 
the districts had been forced to increase levies to keep up with inflation. 
 The existing legislation requires school districts unable to meet existing operating 
expenses to take out a spending reserve loan through a commercial lender—the Court 
considered this forced borrowing to be a weakness of the system. 
 
Regarding the Language “Thorough and efficient system of common schools”: 
 The Court heard testimony that “through and efficient” means it is the state‟s 
responsibility to provide a system which allows its citizens to fully develop their human 
potential. 
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 The Court referenced their 1923 decision regarding the phrase in Miller v. Korns (107 
Ohio St. 287) in which the Court ruled that “a thorough system could not mean one in 
which part or any number of the school districts of the state were starved for funds.  An 
efficient system could not mean one in which part or any number of the school districts 
lacked teachers, buildings or equipment.”   
 The Miller v. Korns decision was also referenced by this Court in their 1979 decision in 
Cincinnati School District Board of Education v. Walter (58 Ohio St.2d 368), but the 
Court expanded the definition to say that the system could not be thorough and efficient 
if “a school district [were] receiving so little local and state revenue that the students 
were effectively being deprived of educational opportunity.” 
 The Court reviewed evidence that some students were “making do in decayed carcass[es] 
from an era long passed” and other facilities were “dirty, depressing places” referring to 
the school buildings.  Additionally, health situations involving carbon monoxide, 
asbestos, flooding and roach infestation were noted by the Court. 
 Evidence was provided that many school districts within the state had insufficient 
funding to replace textbooks, leaving outdated or no textbooks for student use. 
 Many school districts did not have sufficient funding to staff schools in order to comply 
with the state law requiring a district-wide average of no more than twenty-five students 
per classroom. 
 The plaintiffs contend that their curricula and course offerings were limited in 
comparison to other wealthier districts. 
 Based on the above issues of disparity, the Court decided that the existing system was 
neither thorough nor efficient. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The decision was based on the language of the State Education Clause, specifically the language 
“thorough and efficient.” 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This decision was one of Horizontal Equity and Adequacy.  The Adequacy component exists in 
that the Court reviewed the quality of education and facilities in various districts, with a focus on 
the existence of enough funding in the system to meet the minimum standards of adequacy.  
However, there is also a Horizontal Equity element because the Court addressed the issue of 
property poor districts being in worse shape than the wealthy districts, addressing the concept of 
differences in resources unrelated to educational need. 
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Case Title: Dupree v. Alma (279 Ark. 340) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Arkansas 
Jim DuPREE et al., Appellants 
v. 
ALMA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 30 of CRAWFORD COUNTY et al., Appellees 
 
State:  Arkansas 
Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas 
Decision Date:  May 31, 1983 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 The plaintiffs contend that the public school financing system, specifically the Minimum 
Foundation Program and vocational funding, is in violation of the state constitutional 
right for equal protection. 
 In general, the plaintiff claims were that because the state funding system is highly 
dependent on local tax revenue, there are great discrepancies with regard to availably 
funds for education.  They also contend that the funding system not only did not alleviate 
the issue, but instead worsened it. 
 
 
Decision: 
The Court found the state funding system for public education to be in violation of the Equal 
Protection mandate in the Arkansas State Constitution. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The hold-harmless policy allowed some districts to retain funding from the state 
at a rate unchanged while other districts were experiencing change, thus widening 
the effect of discrepancies. 
 Under the state funding policy, prior to a district using state funds toward a 
vocational program, it must first establish the program with local funds. 
 The Court reviewed the discrepancies in educational opportunities created by 
discrepancies in funding, noting that the primary factor in the discrepancies was 
property wealth of a district. 
 The state pointed to the education clause requiring only a general, suitable, and 
efficient education, but the Court refocused on the idea of equity as defined by the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
 The Court determined that there was no sound rational basis for the system that 
warranted the discrepancies it created, indicating that equity and local control are 
not mutually exclusive. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
Although the State attempted to use the State Education Clause as the standard, the Court made 
its decision as a State Equal Protection decision. 
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Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This decision was based in the concept of Horizontal Equity because the focus was on the 
discrepancies created in fund distribution and availability based on factors external to 
educational need, namely property wealth. 
  
61 
 
Case Title: Durant v. State of Michigan (456 Mich. 175) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Michigan 
Donald DURANT, et al, Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
STATE of Michigan, et al, Defendants-Apellants. 
Gerald SCHMIDT, et al., Plaintiffs—Appellees, 
v. 
STATE of Michigan, et al., Defendents-Appellants. 
 
State:  Michigan 
Court: Supreme Court of Michigan 
Decision Date:  July 31, 1997 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The Court saw five key questions as the core of this appeal: 
1. Are special education and special education transportation state-mandated 
activities or services within the meaning of Article 9, 29? 
2. Is the “state match” payment for school lunches part of the “state financed 
portion” for the purpose of compliance with Article 9, 29? 
3. Are payments that are required of the state by Article 9, 29 “funds constitutionally 
dedicated for specific purposes” and exempt from executive order reduction under 
Const. 1963, Art 9, 32? 
4. Are plaintiffs‟ attorneys fees in this case part of the costs that may be recovered 
under Const. 1963, Article 9, 32? 
5. What is the appropriate remedy for the violation of Article 9, 29 in this case? 
 
Decision: 
The decision was to support the lower court rule that certain components of the state funding 
system needed adjustments to be best in compliance with state taxation laws. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court addressed the relevant portions of the Headlee Amendment including the 
following: 
o Section 26 limits any changes in total state revenue to an amount based on 
changes in personal income in the state. 
o Section 31 prohibits units of local government from levying any new tax or 
increasing an existing tax above authorized rates without the approval of the 
unit‟s electorate. 
o Section 25 prevents the shifting of taxation burden to local entities as a result of 
the limits placed at the state level. 
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The History of the Plaintiff Groups and the Appeals: 
 The first case leading to this appeal was the Durant case which consisted of taxpayers 
who were residents of the Fitzgerald School District contending that the state was in 
violation of Article 9, 29 which requires maintenance of the state-finance proportion of 
the necessary costs of activities that state law orders the school district to perform. 
o The Court of Appeals ruled that elementary and secondary education as a whole 
was not a state-mandated activity, but more specific programs, such as special 
education, were. 
 The second case leading to this appeal was the Schmidt case, which noted that some 
districts had seen a loss of funding from the year 1978-79, which they considered to be a 
violation of the standards set forth in the Headlee Amendment. 
o The Supreme Court determined that the base-year proportion would be computed 
on a state-wide level, and each district could count on that base level of support 
each year. 
o The Supreme Court remanded the Durant case to the Court of Appeals for 
reconsideration based in the Schmidt discovery. 
 A third set of plaintiffs were folded into the case (plaintiffs making similar claims to 
those in Durant and Schmidt). 
 
Regarding Special Education and Special Education Transportation: 
 Defendants claim that because Special Education is a federal mandate, it does not also 
fall under the requirements of the Headlee Amendment regarding state mandates.  The 
Court rejected that assertion. 
 Defendants also claim that within the Court‟s Schmidt ruling, they had excluded federal 
mandates when they excluded the employer share of federal social security taxes for 
districts.  
 The Court ruled that federal mandates are not exempted from the limitations set forth in 
the Headlee Amendment. 
 
Regarding State-match for School Lunches: 
 The State argued that participation in the school lunch program is voluntary in that 
schools only need participate if they desire federal funds. 
 Additionally, the defendants argue that federal programs are not mandated by federal or 
state law and therefore do not fall under the restrictions of the Headlee Amendment. 
 The Court ruled that the “State match” program must comply with the restrictions of the 
Headlee Amendment. 
 
Regarding Executive Order Reductions: 
 The Court determined that Article 9, 29 money is any money constitutionally dedicated 
for specific purposes, not specifically those earmarked. 
 
Regarding Attorney Fees: 
 The State argued that the Court of Appeals erred when allowing for attorney fees to be 
recovered from the previous Durant and Schmidt cases.  The Court agreed with the Court 
of Appeals and did not find error in the decision. 
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Regarding Remedy: 
 The Court found that the only viable remedy was declaratory relief coupled with 
monetary damages for the years 1991-1994. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This decision was based in the taxation requirements of the State Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This case was not grounded in equity or adequacy, but instead in compliance with state taxation 
requirements and limitations set forth that hindered school districts from having what they 
deemed their rightful funding. 
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Case Title: Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby (777 S.W. 2d 391) 
(Edgewood I) 
 
Full Citation:    
Supreme Court of Texas 
EDGEWOOD INDPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
William KIRBY et al., Respondents 
 
State:  Texas 
Court: Supreme Court of Texas 
Decision Date:  October 2, 1989 
 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 The original plaintiff claims were that the vast disparities in per pupil funding across the 
districts in the state  violated the state Equal Protection Clause as well as the State 
Constitution‟s mandate for an “efficient system of public free schools” as was outlined in 
the State Education Clause (Article VII, section I) 
 
 
Decision: 
 The Court overturned the Appeals Court decision and agreed with the trial court decision 
that the existing funding system was unconstitutional because it is “neither financially 
efficient nor efficient in the sense of providing for a general diffusion of knowledge 
statewide, and therefore that it violates Article VII, section I of the Texas Constitution.” 
 The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeal, and determined that the issue of 
“efficiency” in a funding system for schools was justiciable. 
 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court of Appeals made the determination that the issue of “efficient” schooling was 
a legislative decision and thus was not justiciable. 
 The State contended that the framers intended “efficient” to mean simple and 
inexpensive.  The Court disagreed, indicating that  efficient means “effective and 
productive and connotes the use of resources so as to produced results with little waste,” 
noting that framers had used the term “economical” elsewhere in the Constitution, and 
had they simply meant “inexpensive,” they would have repeated the use of that term. 
 The Court concluded that the framers did not intend for disparities to develop and if the 
state had grown at equal rates in equal economic situations, the issue would not exists, 
but because growth does not happen that way,  an imbalance existed, which no longer 
met the constitutional requirement of efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
65 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 The Court made its decision regarding constitutionality based on the Education Clause of 
the State Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 The plaintiffs original claims and the Supreme Court of Texas‟s final decision were ones 
of Horizontal Equity because the issue at hand was one of funding disparities or 
inequities unrelated to educational need. 
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Case Title: Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby (804 S.W. 2d 491)--Edgewood II 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Texas 
EDGEWOOD INDPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Petitioners, 
v. 
William KIRBY et al., Respondents 
 
 
State:  Texas 
Court:  Supreme Court of Texas 
Decision Date:  January 22, 1991 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 The plaintiffs in Edgewood II appealed to the state Supreme Court that the District Court 
exceeded its authority by vacating the Supreme Court injunction.  The State issued a 
cross-appeal that the District Court erred in finding the new legislation unconstitutional.  
Defendant intervenor districts challenged the Court‟s authority to consider the issues. 
 
Decision: 
The Court determined that the revised public school finance system continues to violate article 
VII, Section I of the Constitution. 
 
Reasoning: 
History (Edgewood I): 
 This case was a follow-up to the decision in Edgewood I finding the state funding system 
to be unconstitutional and setting a deadline of May 1, 1990, for the legislature to 
conform to the Constitution or funding of public schools would cease. 
 The District Court extended the deadline to allow the Legislature to complete work on 
Senate Bill 1. The original Edgewood I plaintiffs returned to District Court, seeking a 
decision that Senate Bill 1 remained an unconstitutional funding system for public 
schools.  The District Court agreed, but vacated the Supreme Court‟s injunction and 
denied any other form of enforcement. 
 
Regarding Justiceability: 
 The Court reviewed its authority to hear appeals unless there is a “change of conditions.” 
 The Court determined that there had not been a change of conditions since Edgewood I; 
thus, the District Court‟s decision was appealable to the Supreme Court. 
 The Court also referenced that they had created a mandate in Edgewood I; it was the 
Supreme Court‟s Duty to enforce its own mandates. 
 
Regarding the Constitutionality of the New Legislation: 
 The Court determined that the only difference since Edgewood I was the details of Senate 
Bill 1, which was designed to shift State contributions to the bottom ninety-five percent 
of the state‟s districts in an effort to better equalize. 
 The Court determined that Senate Bill 1 did not do any of the following things that would 
be necessary to make the funding system constitutional: 
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o Remedy the major causes of the wide opportunity gaps between rich and 
poor districts. 
o Change the boundaries of any of the current 1052 school districts. 
o Change the basic funding allocation which has one half of all education 
funds coming from local property taxation. 
o Does not attempt to equalize access to funds across districts. 
 The Court also determined that under the new funding system that the 170,000 students 
in the wealthiest districts are supported from the same level of tax base as the 1,000,000 
students in the poorest districts. 
 Senate Bill 1 provided for future Legislatures to consider tax base consolidation, but the 
District Court indicated that would not be constitutional.  The Supreme Court notes in 
this decision that the Constitution does not prevent tax base consolidation as a means for 
equalizing school funding across the state. 
 
Regarding the District Court‟s Decision to Extend the Deadline of the Injunction: 
 The Court determined that the District Court had abused its power in making such a 
decision. 
 Because the deadline of the original injunction had passed, the Court set a new date of 
April 1, 1991, and ordered the District Court to comply. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 The Court made its decision regarding constitutionality based on the Education Clause of 
the State Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 Like Edgewood I, the decision in Edgewood II was one of  Horizontal Equity because the 
issue at hand was one of funding disparities or inequities unrelated to educational need. 
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Case Title: Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School District v. Edgewood independent 
School District (826 S.W. 2d 489)---Edgewood III 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Texas 
CARROLLTON-FARMERS BRANCH INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., 
Appellants. 
v. 
EDGEWOOD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al, Appellees. 
 
State:  Texas 
Court: Supreme Court of Texas 
Decision Date:  January 30, 1992 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 The appellants claimed that the revision to the state school finance system as outlined in 
Senate Bill 351 violated the state constitution for three reasons: 
1. That it levied a state ad valorem tax in violation of article VIII, section 1-e; 
2. That is levied an ad valorem tax without approval of the voters in violation of 
article VII, section 3; and  
3. That it created county election districts in violation of Article VII, section 3 and 
Article III, sections 56 and 64(a).  
 
Decision: 
 Regarding claim number one, the Court determined that Senate Bill 351 did levy a state 
ad valorem tax in violation of Article VIII, section 1-e. 
 Regarding claim number two, the Court determined that Senate Bill 351 levied an ad 
valorem tax without an election in violation of Article VII, section 3. 
 Regarding Claim number three, the Court determined that it was within the power of the 
Legislature to create CED‟s. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The burden of evidence was on the appellants because state statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional. 
 Senate Bill 351 is a two-tier funding formula that includes a mandate that County 
Education Districts (CEDS) levy an ad valorem tax rate to raise the local share of the 
state funding formula. 
 Between the Edgewood I decision and this appeal, the formula has changed from 
encouraging local districts to contribute local tax revenue to making state funds 
contingent on such a contribution (without a local vote). 
 Article VIII, section 1-e of the Texas Constitution reads, “No State ad valorem taxes shall 
be levied upon any property within this State.”  The Court found Senate Bill 351 to be in 
violation of this Constitutional provision because CED‟s are mandated to levy, and no 
CED can decline the levy. 
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 The State contended that the tax is not in violation because each CED sets the rate to 
create the yield necessary.  The Court, however, found that to be a de facto rate mandate 
based on the set formula. 
 The State contended that because the CED‟s manage their own collection of funds, the 
tax is not a state tax.  The Court described the CED‟s as “mere puppets” of the State, 
refuting the claim. 
 The Court interpreted Article VII, Section 3 to “condition the imposition of a local ad 
valorem tax upon the approval of the electorate.” 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The legal standard here was one of State Constitutionality, but not within the Education Clause.  
Instead, the decision was based on taxation limitations as outlined in the Texas Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
Senate Bill 351 was designed in response to an original decision in Edgewood I and II that of 
Horizontal Equity because the focus is on inequities between districts based on criteria other than 
educational need. 
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Case Title: Edgewood Independent School District v. Meno (917 S.W. 2d 717)---Edgewood IV 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Texas 
EDGEWOOD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Alvarado Independent School 
District et al., Guadalupe Gutierrez et al., Carrollton-Farmers Branch Independent School 
District et al., Coppell Independent School District et al., Sterling City Independent School 
District et al., Stafford Municipal School District et al., Humble Independent School District  
et al., and Somerset Independent School District et al., Appellants, 
v. 
Lionel R. MENO et al. and Bexar County Education District et al., Appellees 
 
State:  Texas 
Court:  Supreme Court of Texas 
Decision Date:  January 30, 1995 
 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 Multiple groups of appellants exist: 
o Two groups of appellants are composed of property-poor school districts who 
have issue with the efficiency of Senate Bill 7. 
o Five groups are comprised of property-rich districts concerned primarily with the 
revenue system within Senate Bill 7. 
o The State is appealing the district court‟s ruling that Senate Bill 7 does not 
account well enough for facilities. 
o The Guadalupe Gutierrez group is appealing the district court‟s dismissal of its 
cause of action. 
o The Somerset Independent School District raises concerns regarding the 
distribution of excess CED funds. 
 
Decision: 
 The Court determined that all parties contending that Senate Bill 7 was unconstitutional 
had not met the burden of proof necessary for the Court to rule as such.  Thus, the ruling 
was that Senate Bill 7 met all constitutional requirements challenged. 
 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court began with the presumption that Senate Bill 7 is constitutional; the burden of 
proof falls to those claiming it is not. 
 The Court reviewed the basic tenant of Senate Bill 7.  It is a Two-tier foundation funding 
system.  Tier 1 is intended to provide sufficient funding for all school districts to provide 
a basic program.  Tier 2 is designed to provide districts with the opportunity to 
supplement the basic program at a level of its choosing with additional funding for 
facilities. 
 Unlike previous Two-tier systems presented to the Court, Senate Bill 7 contains a cap on 
a school district‟s taxable property at a level of $280,000 per student. 
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 The property-poor districts asserted that Senate Bill 7 does not meet the standard of 
“efficient” as outlined in the Constitution and prior Edgewood decisions.  The Court 
determined that the accountability regime within Senate Bill 7 meets the standard of 
efficiency.  Additionally the court noted that under Senate Bill 7 the discrepancy between 
the richest and poorest districts would go from a 700:1 ratio to a 28:1 ratio. 
 The property-rich appellants claim that the legislature created standards for measuring 
suitability and failed to meet its own standards. The Court rejected this argument, noting 
that the Legislature‟s funding obligations are generally limited to what it appropriates, 
regardless of what it promises in other statutes. 
 The property-rich districts also claim that Senate Bill 7 creates a state ad valorem tax in 
violation of the State Constitution.  The Court noted that the structure within Senate Bill 
7 closely matches one it outlined as being within the realm of legal possibilities in their 
Edgewood III decision. 
 The property-rich districts also argue that Senate Bill 7 violates the standards set for the 
in Love v. City of Dallas (120 Tex. 351), claiming that it requires districts to spend 
money on nonresident students.  The Court determined that Senate Bill 7 was not in 
violation of the principles set forth in Love v. City of Dallas. 
 The property-rich districts also contend that Senate Bill 7 violates state regulations 
regarding lending of credit or grant of public money.  The Court determined that no 
public money would be lent or transferred for private purpose so Senate Bill 7 was with 
within the framework of the law regarding transfer of public funds. 
 The Carrollton-Farmers appellants claim that Senate Bill 7 was an unconstitutional 
delegation of power to the Commissioner of Education.  The Court determined that the 
bill kept Commissioner powers within the range of those that can be delegated by the 
legislature. 
 The Carrollton-Farmers branch claims that the Commissioner of Education was provided 
inappropriate judicial review powers under Senate Bill 7.  The Court determined that 
such a claim was premature and needed to be attached to an actual decision put forth by 
the Commissioner. 
 The Carrollton-Farmers branch asserts that redistribution of property could hinder a 
district‟s ability to repay its bonded indebtedness.  The Court did not find creditability in 
that claim. 
 A couple of appellant groups claim that the potential of property‟s being detached from 
one district and given to another might cause excessive noncontiguity.  The Court noted 
that there was no constitutional obligation for contiguity for an entity to be called a 
district. 
 The Sterling and Crocket appellants claim that Senate Bill 7 violates the state 
requirement that taxes on property be paid “in the county where situated.”  The Court 
notes that when detached property is reassigned, it is considered to be within the 
receiving district.  Thus, the Court did not find a violation of this law. 
 The Guadalupe Gutierrez appellants assert that the district court erroneously dismissed 
their claim as non-justiciable.  They assert they have a constitutional right to select the 
schools of their choice and receive reimbursement.  The Supreme Court determined that 
the District Court made the correct decision because it is not the judicial branch‟s role to 
build or allow a specific structure for the school system. 
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 Senate Bill 7 eliminated previously established CED‟s and required that the remaining 
funding be distributed in a specified manner.  The Somerset districts challenged how the 
following were resolved: excess funds, delinquent taxes, and the designation of 
successors-in-interest.  The Court found that the duties delegated to the Commissioner of 
Education in these three areas were both legal and appropriate. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
o The legal standards used by appellants were based in the State Constitution, but with the 
exception of the property-poor districts efficiency claim, they were not based on the State 
Education Clause but instead on taxation and property laws within other areas of the 
Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
o The claims by the appellants are based in a general concept of Horizontal Equity.  Senate 
Bill 7 was crafted to address Horizontal Equity issues, and appellant claims are focused 
on the legalities of various components of Senate Bill 7. 
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Case Title: Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State (746 P.2d 1135) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
FAIR SCHOOL FINANCE COUNCIL OF OKLAHOMA,INC and Oklahoma Corporation, et 
al.,  
Plaintiffs—Appellants, 
v. 
STATE of Oklahoma; George Nigh, Governor of the State of Oklahoma; Leslie R. Fisher, State 
Superintendent of Public Instruction; State Board of Education: Harry Shackelford, Jack Mace, 
Seay Sanders, Dr. C.B. Wright, R.E. Carleton, and E.L. Collins, members of the State Board of 
Education; and Leo Winters, Treasurer of the State of Oklahoma, Defendants—Appellees, and 
Independent School District No. 1 of Alfalfa County, Oklahoma, et al., Intervenors—Appellees. 
 
State:  Oklahoma 
Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
Decision Date:  November 24, 1987 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the method of financing public education violated 
the U.S. and State Constitutions because the system failed to provide “equal educational 
opportunities” for all children in the state.  Specifically, plaintiffs claim that opportunities are 
“materially inferior”; thus, the Court determined that the plaintiff request was for equal revenues 
per ADA. 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that neither the United States Constitution nor the Oklahoma State Constitution 
requires a funding system that provides equal expenditures per child. 
 
Reasoning: 
Regarding the Education Language in the State Constitution: 
Article I, Section 5 reads:  “Provisions shall be made for the establishment and maintenance of a 
system of public schools, which shall be open to all the children of the state and free from 
sectarian control; and said schools shall always be conducted in English, provided, that nothing 
herein shall preclude the teaching of other languages in said public schools.” 
 
Article 13, Section1 reads: “The Legislature shall establish and maintain a system of free public 
schools wherein all the children of the State may be educated.” 
 
Regarding the Funding Mechanisms and State Constitution: 
 The Court noted that because property taxation is a primary lever in the funding 
mechanism, there is significant difference in the amount of per pupil revenue that can be 
raised by various districts based primarily on property wealth of those districts. 
 The plaintiff districts were levying the maximum allowed by law but were still unable to 
reach the revenue per pupil of the property wealthy districts in the state. 
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 In addition to the impact on levy and operating revenue, property value of a district 
impacts the amount of bond indebtedness a district can incur for maintenance and growth 
in facilities. 
 The Court noted the Incentive Aid component of the funding system, which sets 
minimum and maximum amounts a district can receive in ADA, was designed as a form 
of equalizer for districts. 
 In addition to recognizing differences in property wealth, the plaintiffs contend that the 
county assessors had not employed a standard method in valuing property in various 
counties.  The Court noted that the assessors were not listed as parties in the case; thus, 
that line of reasoning was not acknowledged further by the Court. 
 Regarding plaintiff concerns with a state ad valorem tax, the Court had determined in 
previous, non-education-based cases that unless the tax is create with the purpose of 
creating inequities, it may be constitutionally permissible. 
 
Regarding a Potential Federal Equal Protection Violation: 
 Citing San Antonio v. Rodriguez (411 U.S. 1), the Court determined that the plaintiff 
claims did not create an Equal Protection violation. 
 
Regarding a Potential State Due Process (Equal Protection) Violation: 
 The Court felt the need to answer the issue of if the mere mention of a subject in the 
constitution make that subject a fundamental interest or create a fundamental right? 
 The Court was willing to assume that education in general is a fundamental interest, but 
then was faced with the question, what is the exact nature of the interest guaranteed? 
o Citing their previous decisions (Miller v Childres (107 Okl. 57) and 
School District No 25 of Woods County v. Hodge (199 Okl. 81)), the Court 
indicated that a standard of a “minimum educational program for all 
children of the state” was the threshold. 
o The Court determined they could not find a plaintiff issue in which a child 
was not receiving an adequate basic education. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The Court ruled on all three standards of State and Federal Equal Protection and the language of 
the State Education Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This case was an example of Horizontal Equity because the primary question at hand is if 
something other than educational need wer creating a disparity in educational funding; 
specifically questioned in this case was property wealth as a factor in the funding mechanism,  
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Case Title: Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. Montana (769 p.2d 684) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Montana 
HELENA ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 and High School School District No. 1 
and Lewis and Clark County; Billings Elementary School District No. 2 and High School School 
District No. 2 of Yellowstone County, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
and 
Montana Education Association, et al., Intervenors/Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
The STATE of Montana; and The Montana Board of Public Education ; and The Montana 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Defendants and Appellants and C.J. Holje, Bernt Ward and 
Robert Frederich on behalf of the residents and taxpayers of Sheridan County, Montana and all 
others similarly situated, Intevenors/Defendants and Appellants.  Hays-Lodge Pole Elementary 
School District No. 50 and High School District No. 50, and Blaine County, et al. and the 
Association of Indian Impact Schools of Montana, Intervenors/Defendants and Appellants. 
 
State:  Montana 
Court: Supreme Court of Montana 
Decision Date:  February 1, 1989 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiff school districts contended the funding system in the State violated Article X of the 
State Constitution.  Additionally, they sought for a ruling that federal funds could not be figured 
into the formula for Indian schools. 
Decision: 
The Court ruled: 
1. The system of funding violated the constitutional guarantee of equal educational 
opportunity; 
2. Accreditation standards did not establish the state‟s obligation under constitutional 
guarantees; 
3. Federal funding to schools which serve children on Indian lands may not be taken into 
account in school funding formula unless the Secretary of Education has approved the 
states equalization system; and 
4. School districts were not entitled to attorney fees. 
 
Reasoning: 
 
Regarding Article X (The Education Article) 
 The Court noted trial evidence that between districts within the state there were 
significantly large differences in “educationally relevant factors” and that the wealthier 
school districts were not spending on frills or unnecessary educational expenses. 
 Additionally, the Court noted unrebutted testimony that the funding system falls 
significantly short of meeting the costs of complying with accreditation standards. 
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 The defendants contend that the phrase “equality of educational opportunity” in 
Subsection 1 of Article X, Section 1 was merely an “aspirational goal.” 
o The Court disagreed, indicating that the framers had used the word goal in a 
previous part of the section and would have reused it in this context if that had 
been the intent.   
 Additionally, the State suggested that the last sentence of the Article which addresses 
equal distribution of funds limited the state responsibility regarding adequacy. 
o The Court ruled that the sentence is not a limiting provision on the guarantee of 
equal educational opportunity found within the earlier subsection of Section 1. 
 The State suggested that student outcomes is a better means of measuring educational 
opportunity, but the Court did not find that argument to be convincing. 
 The State made the contention that local control of school districts mandates spending 
disparities. 
o The Court noted that the spending disparities were not based in decisions of local 
control, but in a state funding scheme that was out of the control of local districts. 
 
Regarding Accreditation as a Standard of Quality Education 
 The Board of Education objected to the lower court‟s ruling that the state accreditation 
standards are merely minimums from which a quality education should be built. 
 The Court ruled that the lower court had ruled correctly but did soften some of the 
language. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This case was one decided based on the State Education Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This was a case of Horizontal Equity as the question was if factors, other than educational need, 
were affecting the availability of education funds. 
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Case Title: Horton v. Meskill (172 Conn. 615)—Meskill I 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Connecticut 
Barnaby HORTON et al. 
v. 
Thomas J. MESKILL et al. 
Peter D. GRACE 
v.  
Thomas J. MESKILL et al. 
 
State:  Connecticut 
Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut 
Decision Date:  April 19, 1977 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The original plaintiffs were seeking four actions from the high Court: 
1. A declaratory judgment that the system of financing public elementary and secondary 
education in the state violates the Connecticut and U.S. Constitutions; 
2. An order in equity directing the defendants to cease implementing the present financing 
system; 
3. An order that the court retain jurisdiction to assure a transition with all deliberate speed to 
a constitutional system of financing public schools; and  
4. Any other equitable relief the court should deem proper. 
 
 The plaintiffs contend the Connecticut Constitution lists education as a fundamental 
right; and, thus, strict scrutiny should be applied under a review of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the State Constitution. 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that the existing state system of funding public schools did not pass the Equal 
protection strict scrutiny test and was unconstitutional. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court first addressed the idea that this type of suit may not be valid under the 
concept of sovereign immunity.  The Court determined that sovereign immunity cannot 
protect a leader if a party claims he took property from them in an unconstitutional 
manner. The Court ultimately determined that the trial court did not err in determining 
that sovereign immunity was not available because of the public interest at stake. 
 In comparing the breakdown of where funding came from, the Court noted that in 
Connecticut, the break down was 705 local, twenty to twenty-five percent state and about 
five percent federal in comparison to the national breakdown of fifty-one percent local, 
forty-one percent state and eight percent federal. 
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 The Court reviewed facts that indicated that taxpayers in property-poor towns pay higher 
tax rates than those in property-wealthy towns.  Additionally, the higher tax rates 
generate lower revenues for those schools. 
 The following were indicated as criteria for “quality of education in a town”; the Court 
noted that many of them are strongly attached to higher per pupil expenditures: 
o Size of classes 
o Training, experience and background of teaching staff 
o Materials, books and supplies 
o School philosophy and objectives 
o Type of local control 
o Test scores as measured against ability 
o Degree of motivation and application of the students 
o Course offerings and extracurricular activities 
 The Court noted that the state ranked fiftieth in the nation with regard to efforts to 
equalize fund distribution for state-wide schools. 
 The lower Court had accounted for efforts from the General Assembly to improve the 
situation, but found it only created a flat grant of $35 per pupil, which did not amount, in 
the Court‟s eyes, to a significant or meaningful improvement. 
 The lower Court had ruled based on the facts that “the State Board of Education has 
consultants available who concern themselves with assisting local boards of education in 
maintaining the statutorily-mandated minimum quality of education” and “Canton is 
providing the basic elementary and secondary education required by statute.” 
 The Court cited San Antonio V. Rodriguez (411 U.S. 1), Robinson v. Cahill (62 N.J. 473), 
and Serrano v. Priest (18 Cal. 3d 728) and determined that “in Connecticut the right to 
education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that right must be strictly 
scrutinized.” 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This decision was based on a strict scrutiny of the State Equal Protection Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This was a decision of Horizontal Equity because it was based on the idea that differences other 
than educational need, namely property wealth, were affecting funding for districts. 
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Case Title:  Horton v. Meskill (195 Conn. 24)—Horton II 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
Barnaby HORTON et al. 
v.  
Thomas J. MESKILL et al. 
Peter D. GRACE et al. 
v. 
Thomas J. MESKILL et al. 
 
 
State:  Connecticut 
Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
 
Decision Date:  January 15, 1985 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs from Horton I are re-challenging the state funding system based on changes made 
by the General Assembly that had been made in response to the Court‟s ruling in Horton I. 
 
Decision: 
 Because the trial court had used what the Supreme Court determined to be the incorrect 
standard in its ruling, the Court remanded the case back to trial court for consideration 
under the standard of strict scrutiny and indicated that relief should be outlined by the 
trial court if, using the proper standard, the current funding system were considered 
unconstitutional. 
 
Reasoning: 
 In response to Horton I, the General Assembly had enacted in 1979 the Public Acts 1979, 
No 79-128 which included a guaranteed tax base grant (GTB) formula and a minimum 
expenditure requirement.  The lower court determined that that created a constitutional 
funding system.  However, the lower court also concluded that the effects of the 1979 
legislation were being undermined by post-1979 legislation that was allowing the 
implementation of the GTB to be postponed. 
 The Court first felt the need to address the constitutionality of the GTB plan as originally 
enacted by Public Acts 1979 No 79-128. 
o The Court reiterated from Horton I that strict scrutiny was the appropriate 
standard to utilize.  
o The court noted that this had not been the standard used by the trial court in this 
case. 
o The Court ruled that Public Acts 1979, No. 79-128 were constitutional (meeting 
the strict scrutiny test) as originally drafted and approved by the General 
Assembly. 
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 Plaintiffs had originally requested from the lower court that a mandate of fifty percent 
state funding be applied, but both the lower Court and the state Supreme Court indicated 
that a flat percentage would not effectively resolve equity issues. 
 Plaintiffs had contended that the lower court was out of its jurisdiction by ruling that a 
state mandated curriculum replace local curricula.  The Supreme Court did not end up 
ruling on this issue because the General Assembly had since passed law mandating the 
state curriculum. 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
Part two of this case was focused on a State Equal Protection claim. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This case was an extension of Horton I, which was an example of Horizontal Equity being 
considered. 
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Case Title: Hull v. Albrecht (190 Ariz. 520) 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. 
Governor Jane Dee HULL, Intervenor/Petitioner. 
v. 
Hon. Rebecca A. ALBRECHT, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, Respondent 
Judge, and ROOSEVELT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 66 et. al;  Lisa Graham 
Keegan, Superintendent of Public Instruction; State Board of Education; State of Arizona, Real 
Parties in Interest. 
 
State:  Arizona 
Court:  Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. 
 
Decision Date:   December 23, 1997 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
This case is a request by the Governor for the Court to issue a ruling that the recent amendments 
to Arizona‟s school funding system created a system in compliance with the Court‟s mandate in 
Roosevelt Elementary School District v. Bishop (179 Ariz. 233). 
 
 
Decision: 
The ruling was that the most recent legislation (the ABC Fund) did not bring the state funding 
system to be in compliance with the mandate from Roosevelt Elementary School District v. 
Bishop (179 Ariz. 233), and, thus, the funding system remained unconstitutional. 
 
Reasoning: 
 In Roosevelt Elementary School District v. Bishop (179 Ariz. 233), the Court ruled that 
the existing funding system at the time was not constitutional because it relied heavily on 
local property taxation and arbitrary district boundaries creating unjust disparities. 
 In 1996 the legislature made amendments to the funding system, but kept the general 
scheme in place—thus, the lower court had ruled the amendments insufficient to meet the 
mandates of Roosevelt. 
 In 1997, the legislature amended the system again with what was called the Assistance to 
Build Classrooms Fun (ABC Legislation)—the lower court again ruled the changes 
insufficient to meet the mandate; the governor responded by filing this petition to the 
Supreme Court. 
 Regarding the ABC Legislation: 
o The ABC Fund would put into the system $32.5 million in the first year and 
would be distributed based on weighted student count to account for growth.  
o The ABC fund required a reduction of the distribution amount based on one of 
two deductions (assessed value deduction or the equalization assistance 
percentage deduction). 
o The ABC funding was earmarked for capital expenditures and could be spent or 
saved annually. 
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o The ABC Fund also creates bottom and top caps on local bonding for capital 
projects. 
o The Governor indicates that the highest rate of disparity under the new system 
would be 4:1.  The defendants dispute that ratio, contending it would be closer to 
12:1. 
o The Court determined that the ABC legislation dealt inadequately with the 
symptoms and did not address the core problem of heavy reliance on district 
property taxation with unequalized districts. 
o The Court also noted that the ABC legislation did not meet the standard set in 
Roosevelt because the dollar amount chosen to cure inadequacies in public school 
was arbitrary and bore no relation to actual need. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This was an extension of a case using the State Education Clause as the legal standard. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This was an extension of a case using Horizontal Equity as a standard because the focus was on 
disparities in funding unrelated to educational need. 
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Case Title: Kukor v. Grover (148 Wis.2d 469) 
 
Full Citation: 
David J. KUKOR, Christopher A. Kukor, Glen W. Kukor, Mark Czerwinski, Renee Czerwinski, 
Jean Czerwinski, Jill Czerwinski, Eric Czerwinski, David Czerwinski, Dieter Czerwinski, Julie 
Harling, Pamela Harling, Stephanie Harling, Eric Bates, David Bates, Douglas Bates, Paulette 
M. Eddie, Percy E. Eddie, Lillian A. Eddie, Patrick O. Eddie, Antrice L. Eddie, Martha Swigart, 
Kristen Kreuzer, Richard Kreuzer II, Amalia Kreuzer, Jenny Tooley, Henry Brumirski, Terrence 
Brumirski, Denise Swiderski, Barbara Tibbits, Todd Tibbits, Timothy Tibbits, and Vickie 
Tibbits, minor residents if the City and County of Milwaukee, State of Wisconsin, behalf of 
themselves and all other children in the City and County of Milwaukee similarly situated; 
Cynthia Broydrick, Brian Czerwinski,, Harry A. Morris, Mary J. Morris, Joseph Bates, William 
James, Velma James, Stephen Swigart, Frances Swigart, Richard Kreuzer, Susan Kreuzer, 
Russell R. Tooley, Mary Tooley, Dominik Brumirski, Arleen Brumirski, John Swiderski, Betty 
Swiderski, Benjamin Tobbits, and Jean Tibbits, adult residents of the City and County of 
Milwaukee, State of Wisconsin, on behalf of themselves and all other parents in the City and 
County of Milwaukee similarly situated; Lois Riley, Margaret DInges, Michael Elconin, Gerald 
P. Farley, Stephen Jesmok, Jr., Peggy Kenner, James F. Koneazny, Marian McEvilly, Edward S. 
Michalski, Lawrence J. O‟Neil, Lorraine M. Radtke, Doris Stacy, Leon W. Todd, Jr.  Henry W. 
Maier, Roy B. BAors, John R. Kalwitz, Sandra Hoech, Kevin D. O‟connor, Rod Lanser, Ben E. 
Johnson, Robert M. Weber, Wayne P. Frank, James Kondziella, Betty Voss, Joan Soucie, 
Clifford A. Draeger, Robert L. Spaulding and Gerogory G. Gorak, as taxpayers and residents of 
Milwaukee, Plaintiffs—Appellants.  Rochelle Betjia, James Blask, Jennifer Giradot, Debbie 
Narloch, Kevin O‟Connell, and David Walsh, minor residents of the West Allis-West Milwaukee 
and City of Wauwatosa School Districts, Cities of West Allis, West Milwaukee, and Wauwatosa, 
State of Wisconsin, on behalf of themselves and all other children in the state similarly situated; 
Ilsa Ehlert, Robert A. Giaeck, Philip Jrold, Paule A Kolff, Craig Larson, Michael J. Piasecki, and 
Lois Weber, adult residents of West Allis-West Milwaukee and City of Wauwatosa School 
Districts, Cities of West Allis, West Milwaukee, and Wauwatosa, State of Wisconsin, on behalf 
on themselves and all other taxpayers in the state similarly situated; Gordon J. Bethia, James F. 
Blask, David A. Giradot, Catherine Narloch, Joyce O‟Connell, and Roger Walsh, adult residents 
of West Allis-West Milwaukee and City of Wauwatosa School Districts, Cities of West Allis, 
West Milwaukee, and Wauwatosa, State of Wisconsin, on behalf on themselves and all other 
parents in the state similarly situated, Plaintiff-Intervenors-Appellants, 
v. 
Herbert GROVER, Wisconsin Superintendent of Public Instruction, Wisconsin Department of 
Instruction, Charles P. Smith, Treasurer of the State of Wisconsin, W. Michael Ley, Secretary of 
the Wisconsin Department of Revenue, and Wisconsin Department of Revenue, Defendants-
Respondents. 
 
 
State: Wisconsin 
Court:  Supreme Court of Wisconsin 
Decision Date: February 22, 1989 
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Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs make two claims.  The first claim is that the state‟s school funding system violates 
the education clause of the Wisconsin State Constitution, specifically Article X, Section 3, which 
reads, “[T]the legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which 
shall be as nearly uniform as practicable…”  The second claim is that the school finance system 
violates the equal protection provision in Article I, Section I of the Wisconsin State Constitution. 
 
The plaintiffs contend that while the state funding system creates a system of the “same,” in fact, 
more is necessary for some students to have the same.  Plaintiffs argue that “children have 
differing educational needs, some of which may, as a result of socioeconomic factors, require 
greater financial resources to achieve the same level of educational opportunity.” Kukor v. 
Grover (148 Wis.2d 469).  Additionally, “it is argued that those districts with the greatest 
educational burden are the least capable of raising sufficient financing from property taxation as 
a result of lower property valuations or „municipal overburden‟ placing greater tax demands 
upon the property” Kukor v. Grover (148 Wis.2d 469). 
 
Decision: 
 The Court upheld the trial court‟s decision that the existing system did not violate Article 
X, Section 3 of the Wisconsin State Constitution. 
o In reviewing the current funding formula, the Court determined that the 
equalization formula allows for the districts in question to meet state standards of 
“character of instruction,” and in fact have claimed improvement in some basic 
educational programs.  Therefore, the Court determines that there is no 
constitutional violation of Article X, Section 3 of the Wisconsin State 
Constitution. 
 
 Regarding the Equal Protection Provisions claim, the Court used the “rational basis” 
standard and found that maintaining local control of education was a rational basis for the 
existing funding formula.  Additionally, the Court noted that no plaintiff was indicating a 
denial to the right to attend school; therefore, they found no Equal Protection violation. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court reviews the funding formula, specifically the concept of a Guaranteed Tax 
Base (GTB) which is designed to cause some level of equalization.  The Court explains 
that without such equalization, the equalized valuation per member would vary from 
$77,927 to $988,561, but that the GTB of $270, 100 helps to ensure that districts have a 
minimal level of funding and that the existence of a secondary tier of funding helps to 
equalize funding as well.  The result is a system in which districts that spend at the same 
level may tax at the same level, regardless of their assessed property valuation. 
 The Court reviews the phrase “as nearly uniform as practicable” from three standpoints:  
the plain meaning of the words in context, a historical analysis of practices in 1848 with 
an inference of framers‟ intent, and previous interpretations of the law.   
o The Court considers their decision in Buse (74 Wis2d.568) in which the Court 
rejects the contention that absolute uniformity was necessary as it previously 
considered the negative aid provision.  The plaintiffs contend this case is a 
different matter because it deals with funding the educational needs at the “lower 
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end of the spectrum.” Kukor v. Grover (148 Wis.2d 469).  The Court agrees that 
Buse is not determinative in this case and proceeds to the other two standpoints 
for review. 
o In considering the historical debates and framer‟s intent in the wording of Article 
X, Section 3, the Court reviews testimony that framers had no original 
consideration for adequacy of school funding, and, in fact, felt there would be 
surplus funding in the school fund; therefore, the assumption must mean that the 
framers intended equity as a focus.  Additionally, the Court reviewed that the 
original intent was for one-third of the school fund to be raised through local 
taxation of property. 
 With regard to the Equal Protection Claim, the plaintiffs contend that equal opportunity 
for education is a fundamental right, and, thus, the strict scrutiny standard should be 
applied instead of the rational basis standard.  The Court indicates that in order for strict 
scrutiny to be used, a suspect class must exist, not just a fundamental right.  The Court 
uses Rodriquez (411 U.S. 1) as a basis for rejecting the claim that wealth is a “suspect 
class,” but agrees with the plaintiffs that “equal opportunity for education‟ is a 
fundamental right” Kukor v. Grover (148 Wis.2d 469).  However, the Court determines 
that education being a “fundamental right” does not mandate absolute equality in 
districts‟ per pupil expenditures.  In fact, such complete equalization is constitutionally 
prohibited to the extent that it would necessarily inhibit local control” Kukor v. Grover 
(148 Wis.2d 469). 
 The Court indicates it will allow the legislature to determine the level of practicability of 
a funding system. 
 The Court also notes that recent legislation enacted addresses some of the plaintiffs‟ 
concerns, specifically acts focused on early intervention for at-risk students and minority 
student assistance programs. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
Article X, Section 3 of the Wisconsin State Constitution: “The legislature shall provide by law 
for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and 
such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 
20 years.” 
 
Equal Protection Provision with Article I, Section I of the Wisconsin State Constitution: “All 
people are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The plaintiffs‟ claims were Vertical Equity claims as they contend that same is not equal, but that 
students and districts with higher needs require more financial inputs to reach the same level of 
education as their more fortunate peers.  The plaintiffs‟ claims do not reach the level of vertical 
equity as adequacy because there is no discussion of a certain standard, beyond basic educational 
needs, being set for each student. 
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Case Title: Lake View School District No. 25 of Phillips County v. Huckabee  (351 Ark 31) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Arkansas 
LAKE VIEW SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 25 of PHILLIPS COUNTY, Arkansas, et al., 
Appellants 
v.  
Governor Mike HUCKABEEE; Senator Mike Beebe, President Pro Tempore of the Senate; 
Representative Shane Broadway, Speaker of the House; State Auditor Gus Wingfield; State 
Treasurer Jimmie Lou Fisher; Director of Arkansas Department of Education Raymond Simon; 
Arkansas State Board of Education Members Luke Gordy, William Fisher, Jonell Caldwell, 
Anita Yates, Lewis Thompson, Claiborne Deming, Richard Smith, Betty Pickett, Robert 
Hackler, and Shelby Hillman; and Director of the Arkansas Department of Finance and 
Administration Richard Barclay, Appellees; and Rogers School District No. 30 and Bentonville 
School District No. 6, and Little Rock School District of Pulaski County, Intervenors, Appellees. 
 
State:  Arkansas 
Court:  Supreme Court of Arkansas 
Decision Date:  November 21, 2002 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 
This case is an appeal of a decision in which the decision was rendered that the existing school 
funding system in the state of Arkansas was unconstitutional under the Education Article as well 
as under the Equality provisions of the Arkansas Constitution.  The original decision also 
awarded trial/counsel fees to the Plaintiff. 
 
In this appeal, the State makes a variety of claims: 
 The constitutionality of the school-funding system is a nonjusticiable issue for the courts. 
 That an adequate education is impossible to define. 
 That there is no correlation between enhanced school funding and better student 
performance; and 
 That the trial courts erred in determining the existing funding system to be inequitable. 
 The claim was that horizontal equity was in place because the State equalized per 
pupil revenues and that vertical equity was in place as a result of categorical 
weighting. 
 The State also claimed it met an equity standard as determined by the Federal 
Range Ratio and the GINI Index. 
 The State claimed that any remaining discrepancies were outweighed by the need 
for local control of schools and the need for the State to fund other public 
programs. 
 
Decision(s): 
Regarding justiciability of the issue: The Court found that it is the responsibility of the judicial 
branch to review school funding legislation with regard to its constitutionality.  
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Regarding the claim that the funding system violates the Education Clause of the State 
Constitution: The Court decided that the State had “not fulfilled a constitutional duty to provide 
the children of the state with a general, suitable, and efficient school-funding system”; thus, the 
system was found to violate the Education Article of the Arkansas Constitution. 
 
Regarding the claim that the funding system violates the Equal Protection Section of the  State 
Constitution:  The Court decided the  funding system violates the Equal Protection Section of the 
State Constitution. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Courts recognized the history of the case, referring to Tucker v. Lakeview in which 
the decision in 1995 was that existing school funding system violated the Arkansas 
Constitution.  The State was awarded a two-year stay to remediate the situation.   
 At the end of the two years (December 1996), neither the State nor Lakeview 
School District appealed the trial court‟s decision.  The State Legislature enacted 
various forms of legislation between 1995 and 1997 regarding the funding of the 
public school system.  
 Throughout this process, Lakeview filed four amendments to the case.  In 1998, 
the trial judge dismissed Lakeview‟s fourth amendment to the case; however, that 
dismissal was appealed and overturned.   
 In 1999 the Arkansas General Assembly enacted a new funding and 
accountability act regarding public education.  In October of 2000, the Court 
conducted a trial of compliance to previously established standards.  
 On May 25, 2001, the final trial court order was issued determining that the 
existing funding system was unconstitutional on grounds of both inadequacy 
under the Education Article and inequality under the Equality provision of the 
Arkansas Constitution.  The judge also awarded Lakeview‟s petition for counsel 
fees.   
 After the Court was forced to determine who was the Appellant and who was the 
Appellee, the decision of the Court was that it was the May 2001 decision being 
appealed. 
 Regarding the State‟s claim of nonjusticiability:  
 The Court referred back to their decision in Dupree v. Alma School District, No 
30 (279 Ark 340) in which they addressed roles of the legislative and judicial 
branches.   
 Additionally, the Court indicated that without such review there would be an 
incorrect assumption that any legislative act is automatically constitutional, and 
not subject to judicial review. 
 Regarding the definition of an “adequate education,”  
 The Court noted that in 1995 the General Assembly mandated that an adequacy 
study be conducted, but one was not conducted (and seven years had passed).   
 As a result, the General Assembly created a list of student outcomes that would 
indicate “adequacy.” 
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 Because an adequacy study had not been conducted, the lower courts relied on the 
standards set in Rose v. Council for Better Education (790 S.W. 2d 186) to define 
an “efficient” education. 
 Regarding the state claim that funding does not equate to student performance, 
 The Court reviewed various monetary discrepancies including teacher salaries, 
buildings, equipment and budget.   
 Additionally, they interviewed the Director of the Department of Education who 
indicated funding played key role in attracting and maintaining quality teachers.  
 Regarding the issue of an adequate education is a “fundamental right” or simply an 
absolute duty, 
 The Courts reviewed various other State Courts‟ interpretations of the issue, 
including Arizona, Tennessee, Vermont, and New Hampshire. 
 The Court determined that in Arkansas “a constitutionally adequate public 
education is a fundamental right”; 
 However, they did not feel the need to enact a standard of strict scrutiny because 
the system failed, using even the rational basis standard. 
 Regarding the state‟s claims of equity, 
 The Court determined that expenditures by districts should be the standard use, 
not revenues paid to the districts per student. 
 The Court referred back to their DuPree v. Alma School District No. 30 (279 Ark 
344) in which they determined that expenditures would be the standard and that 
the State maintained an obligation even if local government could not fulfill their 
own. 
 The Court determined that equalizing revenues only creates a base floor of 
funding but does nothing to equalize the disparities between wealthy and poor 
districts.   
 The determination was made that the funding system was discriminatory based on 
wealth and, thus, had to determine which standard to employ.  Following suit with 
San Antonio v. Rodriguez (411 US 1), the Court determined rational basis was the 
correct standard. 
 Under the rational basis standard, the State offered local control of the schools 
and other state programs as their rational basis.  The Court had decided previously 
in Dupree that local control was an acceptable argument and rejected the “other 
State programs” as an acceptable argument. 
 The Court was asked to determine if early childhood education could be implied to be 
mandated as a result of its impact on student readiness for kindergarten.  The Court 
acknowledged the effects of such education but denied that such a mandate existed 
constitutionally. 
 The Court additionally addressed a number of claims made by Lakeview, such as that 
retroactive funding should be provided and that attorney expenses were calculated 
incorrectly.  Some level of modification was made regarding certain of these issues. 
 The Court issued a stay of their decision until January 1, 2004, to provide the General 
Assembly and the Department of Education time to remedy the situation. 
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Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 At this final level of appeal, the decision was based on both the Education Clause of the 
State Constitution and the Equal Protection Section of the State Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 The final decision labeled “equity” by the Court was one of Horizontal Equity, as the 
Court was making expenditure comparisons from district to district and was discussing 
revenues as “base level” funding. 
 The Court‟s decision that the Equal Protection Section of the Constitution was violated 
due to inadequate funding in certain districts was much more of a Pure Vertical Equity 
argument in that the question was not if enough money existed in the State‟s system as a 
whole, but instead if sufficient funding existed in each district for all students to reach a 
certain standard (state assessments were referenced, as were other general competencies).  
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Case Title:  Leandro v. State(346 N.C. 336) 
 
Full Citation:   
Kathleen M. LEANDRO, individually and as guardian ad litem of Robert A. Leandro; Steven R. 
Sunkel, individually and as guardian ad litem for Andrew J. Sunkel; Clarence L. Pender, 
individually and as guardian ad litem of Schnika N. Pender; Tyrone T. Williams, individually 
and as guardian ad litem of Trevelyn L. Williams; D.E. Locklear, Jr., individually and as 
guardian ad litem of Jason E. Locklear; Agnus B. Thompson, II, individually and as guardian ad 
litem of Vandaliah J. Thompson; Jennie G. Pearson, individually and as guardian ad litem of 
Sharese D. Pearson; Wayne Tew, individually and as guardian ad litem of Natosha L. Tew; Dana 
Holton Jenkins, individually and as guardian ad litem of Rachel M. Jenkins; Floyd Vick, 
individually and as guardian ad litem of Ervin D. Vick; Hoke County Board of Education; 
Cumberland County Board of Education; Vance County Board of Education, Plaintiffs, and 
Cassandra Ingram, individually and as guardian ad litem of Darris Ingram; Carl Penland, 
individually and as guardian ad litem of Jeremy Penland; Darlene Harris, individually and as 
guardian ad litem of Shemek Harris; Nettie Thompson, individually and as guardian ad litem of 
Annette Renee Thompson; David Martinez, individually and as guardian ad litem of Daniela 
Martinez; Ophelia Aiken, individually and as guardian ad litem of Brandon Bell; Asheville City 
Board of Education; Buncombe County Board of Education; Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education; Durham Public Schools Board of Education; Wake County Board of Education; 
Winston Salem/Forsyth County Board of Education, Plaintiffs-Intervenors, 
v. 
STATE of North Carolina; State Board of Education, Defendants 
 
State: North Carolina 
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina 
Decision Date: July 24, 1997 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
Original Plaintiffs:  The original plaintiff group consisted of students and guardians 
from, as well as the Boards of Education of,  the property-poor school systems of 
Cumberland, Halifax, Hoke, Robeson, and Vance Counties.  The plaintiffs entered both 
equity and adequacy claims, although the claims were intertwined and based on 
discrepancies in what plaintiffs called “educational opportunities.”  Plaintiffs contended 
that their children did not have the same educational opportunities as students in 
wealthier districts.  Plaintiffs contended that despite taxing themselves at a rate much 
higher than the “property-wealthy” districts, the poor districts did not generate enough 
revenue through the state‟s funding formula to provide adequate facilities, resources, or 
competitive salaries to recruit high-quality teachers.  Additionally, Plaintiffs claimed that 
college admission test scores, end-of-grade exams, and yearly aptitude test scores were 
evidence of both inadequacy and disparity. 
 
Intervenors: The Plaintiff-Intervenors were students and their guardians, as well as 
Boards of Education, from the relatively large and wealthy school districts of the City of 
Asheville, Buncombe, Wake, Forsyth, Mecklenburg, and Durham Counties.  The 
Intervenors claimed that their urban settings meant that they served a disproportionate 
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number of students with “extraordinary educational needs.”  Specially, Intervenors cited 
large numbers of students requiring special education, English language instruction, and 
gifted instruction.  Additionally, they claimed that their urban areas had a faster rate of 
student growth than other areas in the state, as well as higher levels of poverty, 
homelessness, crime, unmet health needs, and unemployment.  In addition to making 
these adequacy claims, Intervenors made the equity claim that it was a violation of the 
State Constitution for the state to single out poor rural districts to which to provide 
supplemental funding without doing the same for other districts of need. 
 
 
Decision(s): 
 Regarding the plaintiffs‟ claim that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there is no 
qualitative standard for an adequate education within the North Carolina Constitution, the 
Court agreed with the plaintiffs‟ claim. 
o A right to a qualitatively adequate education is provided for in the North Carolina 
Constitution.   The decision reads, “An education that does not serve the purpose 
of preparing students to participate and compete in the society in which they live 
and work is devoid of substance and is constitutionally inadequate.” 
o The Supreme Court ruled that students in North Carolina are guaranteed “an 
opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.  For 
purposes of our Constitution, a “sound basic education” is one that will provide 
the student with at least (1) sufficient ability to read, write, and speak the English 
language and a sufficient knowledge of fundamental mathematics and physical 
science to enable the student to function in a complex and rapidly changing 
society; (2)sufficient fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic 
economic and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices 
with regard to issues that affect the student personally or affect the student‟s 
community, state, and nation; (3) sufficient academic and vocational skills to 
enable the student to successfully engage in post-secondary education or 
vocational training; and (4) sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable the 
student to compete on an equal basis with others in further formal education or 
gainful employment in contemporary society.”  The Court then referenced Rose v 
Council for Better Education (790 S.W. 2d 186) &  Pauley v. Kelly (162 W. Va 
672). 
 Regarding the plaintiffs‟ claim that Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the state‟s 
funding system does not violate Article IX, Section 2(1) of the State Constitution which 
requires a “general and uniform system of free public schools…wherein equal 
opportunities shall be provided for all students” because of the per pupil expenditures 
from district to district and the varied available resources and systems from wealthy to 
poor districts, the Court disagreed with the plaintiffs‟ claim, upholding the Court of 
Appeals decision. 
o The Court considered the historical context of the original wording of the 
Constitution, which did not include the equal opportunities clause, and determined 
the intent was to provide every student with a sound education.  The Court then 
concluded that, historically, the equal opportunities clause was added to ensure 
that all children in the state were provided the right to that education. 
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o The Court then reviewed Article IX, Section 2(2) which mandates local funding 
and control of school districts. The Court stated that such a constitutional mandate 
cannot yield unconstitutional results. 
 Regarding the plaintiff-intervenors‟ claim that they were unable to provide “minimally 
adequate” basic education in their districts because of the high numbers of disadvantaged 
children in their district, the Court returned to their decision that the State Constitution 
does provide for a “sound basic education” and indicates that plaintiff-intervenors can 
proceed with their claims based on that standard.  As a result, the Court does not address 
the plaintiff-intervenors‟ claim any further. 
 Regarding the plaintiffs‟ claim that the Equal Protection Clause in the North Carolina 
Constitution is being violated as a result of the disparities in local spending in various 
school districts, the Court found that the argument would require determining that one 
portion of the Constitution violated another portion, and thus, the Court found the 
argument to be without merit. 
 Regarding the plaintiff-intervenors‟ claim that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that 
the North Carolina Constitution is not being violated by the means the state system 
provides supplemental funding, the Supreme Court ruled in the plaintiff-intervenors‟ 
favor. 
o The Supreme Court found that the General Assembly is within their rights to 
provide supplemental funds, but cannot do so arbitrarily. 
 Regarding the plaintiffs‟ specific claims regarding various detailed elements of the 
funding system and their impact on providing a sound basic education, the Court 
remanded the case to the trial court to permit plaintiff-parties to proceed with the claims 
based on the Supreme Court‟s interpretation of “sound basic education” in this case. 
 
Reasoning: 
 After a series of appeals regarding a motion by the Defendants to dismiss the case in 
which the decision by the Appeals Court was to deny the motion for dismissal, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the question of educational adequacy claims 
being “nonjusticiable political questions.”  The Court decided that “when a government 
action was being challenged as unconstitutional, the courts have a duty to determine 
whether the action exceeds constitutional limits;” therefore, the Court found the matter to 
be justiciable. 
  The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals‟ interpretation that the 
constitutional right to an education is “limited to one of equal access to education, and it 
does not embrace a qualitative standard because the Court of Appeals had, in the 
Supreme Court‟s eye, used a single sentence from the previous case Sneed v Greensboro 
City Board of Education (299 N.C. 609) out of context.  The sentence the Court of 
Appeals had based their decision on was “It is clear then, that equal access to 
participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state 
constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process” Sneed v 
Greensboro City Board of Education (299 N.C. 609).  The Supreme Court noted in 
Leandro v. State(346 N.C. 336) that the Sneed sentence referred to equal access to 
existing public education opportunities; and because Leandro did not involved such 
issues of equal access to existing opportunities in the educational system, the Court of 
Appeals had misapplied the Supreme Court‟s language from Sneed. 
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 The Supreme Court outlined a series of rationale for considering a qualitative standard in 
the right to education as outlined in the State‟s Constitution, as well as by state 
legislation.  The Court referenced their decision in Board of Education v. Board of 
Commissioners of Granville County (147 N.C. 469) in which the Court stated, “It is 
manifest that these constitutional provisions were intended to establish a system of public 
education adequate to the needs of a great a progressive people…”  Additionally, the 
Supreme Court cited state statutes that read “(a) It is the policy of the State of North 
Carolina to create a public school system that graduates good citizens with the skills 
necessary to cope with contemporary society, using State, local, and other funds in the 
most cost-effective manner… & (b)To insure a quality education for every child in North 
Carolina, and to assure that the necessary resources are provided, it is a policy of the 
State of North Carolina to provide from State revenue sources the instructional expenses 
for current operations of the public school system as defined in the standard course of 
study” (cited by the Court from Chapter 115C of the North Carolina General Statutes).  
The final statute cited by the Supreme Court regarding a qualitative standard in education 
is that of North Carolina General Statute 115C-408 which indicates that local school 
boards should “provide adequate school systems within their respective local school 
administrative units, as directed by law.” 
 The Supreme Court concludes that the stream of litigation that would be generated by 
determining that the constitution guaranteed the right to a sound basic education would 
“constantly interfere with the running of the schools of the state and would unnecessarily 
deplete their human and fiscal resources as well as the resources of the courts.” 
 The Supreme Court provides general commentary on the impact of fiscal “inputs” and 
resources to student achievement “outputs,” noting that it is a topic of great controversy 
and complexity, citing San Antonio v Rodriquez (411 U.S.1) and providing an example in 
the Kansas City, Missouri School District in which large expenditures did not have 
significant “output” impact, citing Missouri v. Jenkins (515 U.S. 70). 
 
 
Legal Standard(s) Used in Decision: 
 State Constitution Adequacy Claim:  The North Carolina State Constitution addresses 
public education in two manners.  The articles read, “The people have a right to the 
privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right” and 
“The General Assembly shall provide by taxation and otherwise for a general and 
uniform system of free public schools, which shall be maintained at least nine months in 
every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.”  The 
Court defined the right to education as it is constitutionally outlined as a “sound basic 
education,” moving on to define that as an education that “serve(s) the purpose of 
preparing students to participate and compete in the society in which they live and work.” 
 State Constitution Equal Protection Claim: The Court refused to address the plaintiffs‟ 
Equal Protection Claim because the Court found that the claim being made by the 
plaintiffs was that the local funding process mandated by Article IX, Section 2(2) was 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause in the same Constitution.  The Court 
found such a claim “axiomatic,” and did not address the claim further.  The plaintiff-
intervenors‟ State Equal Protection claim was supported in that the Court determined that 
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supplemental funding by the state or General Assembly could not be not in an arbitrary 
manner. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 
 The plaintiff-parties‟ adequacy claims were decided by the courts as a pure Adequacy 
decision because it was not considering individual student needs but, instead, focused on 
determining that there was a qualitative standard for an adequate education that was 
constitutionally guaranteed. 
 The plaintiff-intervenors‟ claim that they could not meet a basic level of adequacy 
because of their high population of disadvantaged students was a Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy claim in that it addressed providing differentiated inputs based on student need 
in order to reach a standard of adequacy.  The Court left this option for plaintiff-
intervenors to pursue by outlining the standards of a “sound basic education” and 
referring plaintiff-intervenors back to pursue the issue using that standard. 
 The plaintiff-intervenors‟ claim that supplemental funding by the state was arbitrary was 
a Horizontal Equity claim and was supported to some level by the Court. 
 
 
 
  
95 
 
Case Title:  Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist 
 
Full Citation:   
Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District et al., Respondents-Appellants, and 
Board of Education, City School District, Rochester et al., Intervenors-Respondents-Appellants 
v.  
Ewald B. Nyquist, as Commissioner of Education, et al., Appellants-Respondents.   
Court of Appeals of New York.   
Argued May 10, 1982; Decided June 23, 1982 
 
State:  New York 
Court: Court of Appeals of New York 
Decision Date: June 23, 1982 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
Original Plaintiffs:  The original plaintiff group consisted of a group of “property-poor” 
school districts who claimed that the existing state education funding system violated the 
equal protection clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions, as well as violated 
the State Education Clause.  This argument was based on the fact that the education 
funding system raised money locally via property taxes.  Because of their “property-
poor” status, the original plaintiffs contended that such a local-taxation system created 
grossly disparate educational opportunities because of the grossly disparate financial 
support generated. 
 
Intervenors:  The intervenors are a group that represented the school districts in four of 
the largest cities in the state.  They also claimed that the funding system violated the 
equal protection clauses of both the State and Federal Constitutions, as well as violated 
the State Education Clause because of the impact the system had on districts in large 
cities.  The intervenors claimed that special financial burdens existed for city districts 
because of “metropolitan over-burden.”  This group of plaintiffs contended that there 
were four identifiable prongs of “metropolitan over-burden,” the first prong being 
demands on municipal budgets for non-education needs peculiar to cities; the second 
being diminished purchasing power of the municipal education dollar; the third being 
significantly greater student absenteeism; and the fourth prong being larger populations 
of students in municipal areas with special needs. 
 
Decision: 
 The Court reversed the earlier Court‟s rulings and ruled that the State‟s existing funding system 
was constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution and under the 
Equal Protection Clause and Education Article in the State Constitution. 
 
Specific Relevant Factors: 
 The decision acknowledges that funding discrepancies exist as a result of the local 
taxation element of the system but ruled that no claim had been moved forward, 
indicating that any school district fell below the state-wide minimum standard of 
educational quality and quantity as established by the Board of Regents. 
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 The decision states that it would be inappropriate for the judicial branch of government to 
involve themselves in the determination of state expenditures because that duty falls to 
the legislature. 
 The decision acknowledges “great difficulty of fashioning practical remedies” if the 
Court were to issue a “blanket declaration of unconstitutionality as to the entire system 
for financing public education.” 
 Specifically regarding the plaintiff claim that “property-poor” districts were being 
discriminated against as a result of the funding formula thus violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the decision returns to the decision of San Antonio District v. Rodriquez in 
which property-wealth discrimination was considered and rejected by the Supreme Court. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 Federal Equal Protection Claim:  Regarding the original plaintiffs‟ claim, the Court 
applied the standard established in San Antonio v. Rodriguez and found the existing 
funding system to be constitutional.  With regard to the Intervenors claim, the Court 
applied a rational basis standard and determined that “inequalities existing in cities are 
the product of demographic, economic, and political factors intrinsic to the cities 
themselves, and cannot be attributed to legislative action or inaction.”  Additionally, the 
decision refers to the responsibility of fiscal distribution within city management to be a 
municipal responsibility, not one of the state.  Thus, on both claims, the system was 
found not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
 State Equal Protection Claim:   Considering the original plaintiffs‟ and the intervenors‟ 
claims, the Court applied the rational basis standard to its analysis of the funding system 
as it relates to the State Equal Protection Clause.  This standard was based on analysis 
previously made in the case Levy v City of New York (429 US 805).  Applying rational 
basis standard, the Courts indicated that the State‟s contention that the rational basis was 
the preservation of local control of education was supported by the decision. 
 
 State Education Article Claim:   The Article reads, “the legislature shall provide for the 
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of 
this state may be educated.”  The decision indicates that the article “makes no reference 
to any requirement that the education to be made available be equal or substantially 
equivalent in every district”; thus, the plaintiffs‟ equity claim is not supported 
constitutionally.  Additionally, the decision references that the intent of the 1894 Article 
was a “State-wide system assuring minimal acceptable facilities and services in contrast 
to the unsystematized delivery of instruction then in existence within the State”; 
therefore, the existing system in the State met constitutional standards in the Court‟s 
eyes. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
Plaintiffs made a Horizontal Equity claim, but the Courts rejected the claim based on an 
Adequacy decision. 
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Case Title: Lewis v. Spagnolo (710 N.E.2d 798) 
 
Full Citation:  
LEWIS E. et al., Appellees 
v. 
Joseph A. SPAGNOLO, Superintendent of Education, et al., Appellants 
 
State:  Illinois 
Court: Supreme Court of Illinois 
Decision Date: April 15, 1999 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
Claims against the District Defendants:  The plaintiffs claim that the district-
defendants have failed to provide safe physical environments and have failed to provide 
quality instructional resources, including a teaching faculty, for decades.  The plaintiffs 
claim that the district-defendants have “otherwise mismanaged the affairs of the District 
that children are unsafe and cannot reasonably be expected to learn in District schools.”  
Plaintiffs provide a list of physical problems with various school buildings in the district, 
such as flooding, fire hazards, presence of asbestos, etc.  Additionally, the plaintiffs 
contend that the district-defendants do not meet their obligation to provide security, and, 
as a result, violence is widespread in the schools. The plaintiffs argue that the district-
defendants mismanagement of the district has led to staffing deficiencies and poor 
student achievement outcomes.  The plaintiffs seek a declaration that they “have the right 
to a safe, adequate education under the Illinois and U.S. Constitutions, the School Code, 
and common law.”  Additionally, they seek an order from the Court for the defendants to 
create and implement a plan correcting the existing conditions.  Otherwise, the 
defendants ask that the State Board no longer recognize District 189 and divide the 
schools and pupils between other school districts.  Finally, the plaintiffs seek funding 
from the District to provide supplemental education services they deem necessary to 
compensate for inadequate education they received in the past. 
 
Claims against the State Defendants: The plaintiffs claim that the State defendants 
have failed to properly intervene in the administration of the District.  This claim 
recognized that the State did provide a financial oversight panel to oversee the District 
but contends the panel does not have the necessary authority to remedy the problem.  The 
defendants also claim that the State continued to accredit the District schools despite their 
knowledge that the schools were inadequate.  
 
 
Decision(s): 
 Regarding the adequacy claim based on the Education Article of the Illinois Constitution, 
the Court found that the issue of adequacy had already been determined by the Court in 
Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar (174 Ill.2d 1) to be unjusticiable and an issue 
that must be left to legislators and administrators. 
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 Regarding the adequacy claim based on the Due Process Clauses of the United States and 
Illinois Constitution, the Court found that the plaintiffs cannot state a claim for a due 
process violation under either Constitution. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court referred to their 1996 decision in Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar 
(174 Ill.2d 1) in which their reasoning outlined justification for limiting judicial 
involvement in determining quality levels of schools or educational systems.  The 
decision reads, “It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of 
quality courts might develop would actually be derived from the Constitution in any 
meaningful senses.  Nor is education a subject within the judiciary‟s field of expertise, 
such that a judicial role in giving content to the education guarantee might be warranted.  
Rather, the question of educational quality is inherently one of policy involving 
philosophical and practical considerations that call for the exercise of legislative and 
administrative discretion.  To hold that the question of educational quality is subject to 
judicial determination would largely deprive the members of the general public of a voice 
in a matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals in Illinois.  An open and robust 
public debate is the lifeblood of the political process in our system of representative 
democracy.  Solutions to problems of educational quality should emerge from spirited 
dialogue between the people of the state and their elected representatives.” 
 The plaintiffs claim that the reasoning of Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar 
(174 Ill.2d 1) should not apply to this case because the issue is not reaching a certain 
level of adequacy but, in their mind, providing any level of basic education.  The Court 
disagreed with the plaintiffs‟ claim on this matter. 
 The plaintiffs made two federal due process claims. The first claim is that the Illinois 
compulsory education law constitutes a deprivation of the plaintiffs‟ liberty which gives 
rise to an affirmative duty on the part of the state to provide a minimally adequate 
education.  The second claim is that the duty arose because the District subjected the 
plaintiffs to state-created dangers.  The Courts disagreed with the plaintiffs on both 
claims. 
 The Court notes that education is not a fundamental right protected by the Federal 
Constitution, citing San Antonio v. Rodriquez (411 U.S. 1). 
 
Legal Standard(s) Used in Decision: 
Education Article of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art X, 1): The Article reads, “A 
fundamental goal of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons to the 
limit of their capacities.  The State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public 
educational institutions and services.  Education in public schools through the secondary level 
shall be free.  There may be such other free education as the General Assembly provides by law.  
The State has the primary responsibility for financing the system of public education.”  The 
Court ruled that educational quality is not a judicial decision; thus, the plaintiffs claims under the 
Education Article of the Illinois Constitution were without merit. 
 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution:   
 In their claims regarding the compulsory education law, the plaintiffs cite Estelle v 
Gamble (429 U.S. 97) & Youngsberg v. Romero (457 U.S. 307) and claim that requiring 
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the attendance of school was essentially the equivalent loss of liberty as institutionalizing 
a mentally retarded individual or incarcerating a criminal, thus claiming that an 
affirmative responsibility is created under the Due Process Clause.  The Court rejected 
the idea that compulsory education created such a “special relationship” and cited 
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services (489 U.S. 189) as a 
quality summation of the role of the Due Process Clause with regard to affirmative 
government responsibility.  The DeShaney Court explained Youngsberg and Estelle as 
follows: “Taken together, [these cases] stand only for the proposition that when the State 
takes a person into its custody and hold him there against his will, the Constitution 
imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and 
general well-being.  The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when The State by 
the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual‟s liberty that it renders him 
unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human 
needs—e.g. food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses 
the substantive limits in the state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due 
Process Clause.  The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State‟s knowledge of 
the individual‟s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the 
limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf.” 
 The plaintiffs also assert there is a due process violation because the students were 
subjected to “state-created dangers.”  The plaintiffs argue to lines of reasoning in this 
assertion; however, the first depends on the compulsory attendance law contention in 
which the Court disagreed with the plaintiffs.  Therefore, the Court did not address that 
line of reasoning further.  The second line of reasoning suggests that the State has an 
affirmative responsibility to ensure the safety of the students.  The Court disagreed, 
indicating that the Due Process Clause does not impose a duty on the State to protect 
citizens but, instead, the “state-created danger” scenario only applies when a state 
“affirmatively places a particular individual in a position of danger the individual would 
not otherwise have faced” Reed v. Gardner (986 F.2d 1122).  More specifically, the 
plaintiffs would need to “plead facts showing some affirmative act on the part of the state 
that either created a danger to the plaintiff or rendered him more vulnerable to an existing 
danger” Stevens v. Umsted ( 131 F.3d 697).  The Court indicated that the lack of action to 
repair and maintain the schools did not constitute an affirmative act.  
 
Due Process Clause of the Illinois Constitution:  The plaintiffs requested that the Court extend a 
broader interpretation of the State Due Process Clause than they had of the Federal Due Process 
Clause.  The Court found no compelling reason to do so in this case. 
 
Provisions of Illinois School Code: Because the plaintiffs were seeking  to force public officials  
to do what they claim the law requires, the Court suggested, based on their reasoning in Noyola 
v. Board of Education (179 Ill.2d 121), that the plaintiffs may have necessary elements for a writ 
of mandamus.  The Court reviewed such a possibility and determined that plaintiffs had not 
provided specific enough ways school code had been violated to generate a writ of mandamus; 
however, the Court dismissed the issue without prejudice, leaving room for plaintiffs to pursue a 
future writ of mandamus by providing more detailed evidence.   
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Common Law:  The plaintiffs argue that the District should be held to the same standard as a 
landowner who is liable for any physical harm caused on the land if “the owner knows or should 
know of the condition and that it presents an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees; should 
expect that invitees will not discover the danger or protect themselves against it; and fails to 
exercise reasonable care to protect invitees against the danger.” Ward v. Kmart Corp. (136 I;;.2d 
132).  Since the plaintiffs were not claiming specific injury, this claim was rejected by the Court. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This case was argued and decided as a pure Adequacy case. 
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Case Title: Londonderry v. State (958 A. 2d 930) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Londonderry School District SAU #12 
v. 
State of New Hampshire 
 
State:  New Hampshire 
Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
Decision Date:  September 8, 2006 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The original plaintiffs made the following claims regarding House Bill 616: 
 It fails to define, determine the cost of, and ensure delivery of a constitutionally adequate 
education; 
 It requires a number of municipalities to fund a constitutionally adequate education 
through local taxes;  
 It all but eliminates “donor communities” and imposes an unreasonable and 
disproportionate tax burden on property-poor municipalities; and 
 It creates a class of former donor communities that retain all the revenue that they raise 
through the statewide enhanced education tax, resulting in an equal protection violation. 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that House Bill 616 (the education funding law) did not, with a deep enough 
level of specificity, define clear standards for an adequate education in the State of New 
Hampshire, thus not meeting the constitutional standard set in the Claremont (138 N.H. 183) 
decisions. 
 
Reasoning: 
 This case was an appeal of the lower court finding that the State had failed in its duty to 
define a constitutionally adequate education, failed to determine the cost of an adequate 
education, and failed to satisfy the requirement of accountability; and that House Bill 616 
(the education funding law) created a non-uniform tax rate in violation of Part II, Article 
5 of the State Constitution. 
 The Court referenced the four mandates from the Claremont (138 N.H. 183) decisions 
including: 
o Define an adequate education 
o Determine the cost of an adequate education 
o Fund it with constitutional taxes 
o Ensure its delivery through accountability 
 Regarding Claremont‟s first mandate of defining an adequate education: 
o The State claims the mandate was met with state statute RSA 193-E:2 entitled 
“Criteria for an Equitable Education” which outlines: 
 An equitable education shall provide all students with the 
opportunity to acquire: 
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 Skill in reading, writing, and speaking English to enable them to 
communicate effectively and to think creatively and critically. 
 Skill in mathematics and familiarity with methods of science to 
enable them to analyze information, solve problems, and make 
rational decisions. 
 Knowledge of the biological, physical and earth sciences to enable 
them to understand and appreciate the world around them. 
 Knowledge of civics and government, economics, geography, and 
history to enable them to participate in the democratic process and 
to make informed choices as informed citizens. 
 Grounding in the arts, languages, and literature to enable them to 
appreciate our cultural heritage and  to develop lifelong interest 
and involvement in these areas. 
 Sound wellness and environmental practices to enable them to 
enhance their own well-being, as well as that of others. 
 Skills for life-long learning, including interpersonal and 
technological skills, to enable them to learn, work and participate 
effectively in a changing society. 
o Citing various cases in other states including Pauley v. Bailey (324 S.E.2d) from 
West Virginia and Rose v. Council for Better Education (790 S.W.2d 186), the 
Court revealed multiple cases in which other high courts had mandated an 
increased level of specificity in the definitions of adequate educational standards 
for a state. 
 Without the standards being more defined, the Court determined 
that a highly subjective decision would need to be made, regarding 
if the standards had been met because they were so very general. 
o The state also contended that the combination of RSA 193-E:2 and the state 
standards created the more detailed level of adequacy definition. 
 The Court was willing to allow that determination be made by the 
legislature but indicated that if that was the standard being set, the 
state would be obligated to pay for the entire statutory scheme, 
adding a substantial financial burden to the state.  Whatever the 
state defines as constitutionally adequate, it must fund without 
shifting any burden to local school districts. 
o Because the decision was made that “constitutionally adequate” had not been 
effectively defined, the Court did not rule on costing out an adequate education 
and the funding portion of the case. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This case was grounded in the Claremont decisions in which the State Education Clause was the 
determining legal factor. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This case addresses pure Adequacy as it sought a determination for a clear set of outcome 
standards regarding an adequate education in the State of New Hampshire. 
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Case Title: Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education (649 P.2d 1005) 
 
Full Citation: 
Theodore LUJAN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v. 
COLORADO STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants—Appellants, 
And Adams-Arapahoe-Aurora School District 28-J, et al., 
Intervenors-Appellants 
 
State:  Colorado 
Court:  Supreme Court of Colorado 
Decision Date: May 24, 1982 (Rehearing denied August 3, 1982) 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs claimed that the existing Colorado system of funding public schools was 
inequitable because it relied substantially on districts assessed valuation and ability to tax 
themselves, thus creating financial disparity between high-wealth  and low-wealth districts.  
Plaintiffs claimed the system created a suspect classification based on wealth and asks the Court 
to apply the strict scrutiny standards.  Defendants contended there was a legitimate state interest 
in maintaining local control of schools and contend that a rational basis standard should be 
applied 
 
Plaintiffs also contended that the phrase “thorough and uniform” in the state‟s education Article, 
requires equal opportunities be provided to each child.  Plaintiffs contended that the varied 
funding levels generated by the existing system violate that requirement. 
 
Decision: 
Regarding the Equal Protection claim, the Court overruled the trial court‟s decision by ruling that 
the Colorado finance system “does not violate Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution, 
nor does it deny equal protection of the lap to the plaintiffs-appellees, or those similarly 
situated.”  The Court also ruled that “Colorado‟s method of capital outlay financing, whereby 
each local school district is governed  by a limitation on its taxing authority, is rationally related 
to a legitimate state purpose” Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education (649 P.2d 1005). 
 
Regarding the State Education Article claim, the Court reversed the trial court‟s decision and 
determined that “the requirement of a „thorough and uniform system of public schools‟ does not 
require that educational expenditures per pupil in every school district be identical,” and, thus, 
the existing funding system does not violate Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution 
Lujan (649 P.2d 1005). 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court reviewed the three standards it should consider in reviewing the Equal 
Protection Claim.  The first standard relates to gender only, and thus does not apply.  The 
second standard exists of “a fundamental right is affected or a suspect classificat ion is 
created” Lujan (649 P.2d 1005).  The third standard applies if gender, fundamental rights, 
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or suspect classifications are not involved.  The third standard then requires only that the 
State action be rationally related to the State purpose. 
 
Education as a Fundamental Right 
o Citing San Antonio v. Rodriquez (411 U.S. 1), the Court found the question of 
education as a fundamental right of this case to be the same as that in Rodriquez 
(411 U.S. 1) and thus ruled that it “negate(s) any claim that the Colorado school 
finance system interferes with a fundamental right to education” Lujan (649 P.2d 
1005) under the U.S. Constitution. 
o After rejecting education as a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution, the 
Court reviewed the question if it is a fundamental interest under the Colorado 
Constitution.  They did not apply the Rodriquez standard because of the differing 
natures of the U.S. & Colorado constitutions, but they also did not find that the 
Colorado Constitution made education a fundamental right. 
 
  Wealth as a Suspect Classification 
 At the federal level, the Court felt the circumstances presented match those of 
Rodriquez, and, thus, wealth would not be considered a suspect classification for 
means of determining from which standard to evaluate the case. 
 In considering if the State Constitution can allow for categorization of wealth as a 
suspect class, the Court determined that because a political body, namely a school 
district, cannot be a suspect classification, which is limited to individuals‟ 
characteristics, and because there is no distinct “class” of poverty, the standard of a 
suspect classification cannot be applied for wealth under the State Constitution either. 
 
 The Court determined that the correct standard is that of Rational Basis, and the Court 
agreed with defendants that the rational basis for the existing funding system is the 
maintenance of a locally controlled public school system and is not an Equal Protection 
violation. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
State Education Clause: Article IX, Section 2 of the Colorado Constitution states, “Establishment 
and maintenance of public schools. The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, provide 
for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free public schools 
throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six and twenty-one 
years, may be educated gratuitously.  One or more public schools shall be maintained in each 
school district within the state, at least three months in each year; any school district failing to 
have such school shall not be entitled to receive any portion of the school fund for that year.”  
The Court determined that “the requirement of a „thorough and uniform system of public 
schools‟ does not require that educational expenditures per pupil in every school district be 
identical”; and, thus, the existing funding system does not violate Article IX, Section 2 of the 
Colorado Constitution Lujan (649 P.2d 1005). 
 
U.S. & State Equal Protection Clauses: 
The Court determined that the rational basis standard was the standard to apply, and that the state 
had provided a rational basis for the existing funding system. 
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Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
Both the Equal Protection Act claim and the State Education Article claim are those of 
Horizontal Equity.  The State Education Article claim has the potential to be considered an 
adequacy claim based on the use of “thorough and uniform,” but the focus remains on the 
“uniform” and not on “thorough,” so this case does not become one of Adequacy.  
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Case Title: McDaniel v. Thomas (248 Ga. 632) 
 
Full Citation: 
McDANIEL, et al. 
v. 
THOMAS, et al. 
THOMAS, et al. 
v. 
McDANIEL, et al. 
 
 
State: Georgia 
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia 
Decision Date: November 24, 1981 (Rehearing denied December 17, 1981) 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs are students, parents and school officials from property-poor school districts.  At 
the trial court level, plaintiffs made two initial claims regarding the state funding system for 
public schools: 1.) they contend that it violates the Equal Protection Provision of the Georgia 
State Constitution and 2) that it deprives children of an adequate education as they contend is 
mandated in the Education Article of the State Constitution.  The trial court agreed with the 
plaintiffs first claims and found the system to be unconstitutional but did not agree with the 
assertions regarding the adequate education requirements.  Both parties appealed, bringing the 
case to the Georgia Supreme Court.  
 
 
Decision: 
 Regarding the Cross-Appeal (the original plaintiffs‟ claim that the existing system does 
not fulfill the obligation for an “adequate” education), the Court affirms the lower court 
decision that there is not a constitutionally-mandated definition or level of adequate; 
thus, no violation exists. 
 
 Regarding the Main Appeal (the original plaintiffs‟ claim that the existing funding plan 
violate the State Equal Protection provisions), the Court determines that education is not 
a fundamental right under the Georgia Equal Protection Clause, using San Antonio v. 
Rodriquez (411 U.S. 1) as guidance; therefore, the Court determines the correct Equal 
Protection standard to use is that of rational basis.  They find that local control of the 
small portion of funding that comes from local taxation is a rational basis for the existing 
funding plan.  Thus, the decision of the trial court is reversed, and the funding program is 
constitutional. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The defendants claim the issue is nonjusticiable; but the Court disagreed, indicating that 
they were not being asked to choose one funding plan over another but to determine the 
constitutionality of the existing plan.  Additionally, they cited other states in which 
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similar cases had been heard, specifically quoting Board of Education, Levittown v. 
Nyquist (83 App.Div.2d 217) out of New York. 
 After deciding that the existing public school finance system meets the constitutional 
requirements of an “adequate” education, the question becomes “whether the state equal 
protection provisions impose additional obligation on the state to equalize educational 
opportunities” McDaniel v. Thomas (248 Ga. 632).  The Court notes that the Education 
Article of the State Constitution is very detailed regarding the requirements of the state 
with regard to education, but it is not inclusive of a mandate requiring the General 
Assembly to equalize educational opportunities. 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 State Education Clause:  In considering the Cross-Appeal, the Court concludes that the 
existence of a massive state-wide system for funding schools, and the lack of evidence 
that any particular school district lacks the resources to provide a basic education, the 
Court was unwilling to intervene any further in defining “adequate” as listed in the State 
Constitution above and beyond the existence of “basic education,” ruling that such a 
definition would need to be legislative. 
 
 State Equal Protection Provisions:  The Court determines that education is not a 
fundamental right under the Georgia Equal Protection Clause, using San Antonio v. 
Rodriquez (411 U.S. 1) as guidance; therefore, the Court determines the correct Equal 
Protection standard to use is that of rational basis.  They find that local control of the 
small portion of funding that comes from local taxation is a rational basis for the existing 
funding plan.  Thus, the decision of the trial court is reversed and the funding program is 
constitutional. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The State Equal Protection claim is one of Horizontal Equity because the focus is on equalizing 
inputs to each district, regardless of need. 
 
The State Education Clause claim is one of Adequacy in that it asks the court to define an 
“adequate education” and to mandate funding to accommodate every district reaching that level. 
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Case Title: McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Education (615 N.E.2d 516) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.  
Jami McDUFFY and Others 
v. 
SECRETARY of the EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF EDUCATION & Others 
 
State:  Massachusetts 
Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk. 
Decision Date:  June 15, 1993 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 The plaintiffs claim that the State‟s school financing system denies them the opportunity 
to receive an adequate education in the public schools which plaintiffs contend is a 
violation of Part II C, 5 & 2 and Articles 1 and 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the 
Massachusetts Constitution. 
 The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that “the Commonwealth has an obligation 
to provide each public school child with the opportunity to receive an adequate 
education” as well as a judgment that “the Commonwealth has violated the 
Massachusetts Constitution by failing to fulfill its obligations to Plaintiff school 
children.” 
 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that a constitutional mandate of an adequate education existed, that many 
students in the state were being denied that constitutional mandate and that the acceptable 
guidelines for adequacy should match those outlined by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Rose v. 
Council for Better Education, Inc. (790S.W.2d 186). 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court determined that the plaintiffs wanted them to rule the entire financing scheme 
unconstitutional; the Court was unwilling to do that, but instead tailored the focus to a 
decision if a constitutional duty exists to ensure the education of its children in the public 
schools. 
 
Regarding Adequacy: 
 Plaintiffs contend that “the education provided is inadequate by any reasonable standard 
of adequacy.” 
o Plaintiffs cite crowded classes, reductions of teaching staff, inadequate teaching 
of basic subjects, neglected libraries, inability to attract and retain quality 
teachers, lack of teacher training, lack of curriculum, lack of predictable funding, 
administrative reductions and inadequate guidance counseling.  
o Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that most districts are represented by those 
who struggle with the above issues, but there are a handful of comparison districts 
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in the state that have the necessary resources and thus, plaintiffs claim, have a 
more adequate provision for education. 
o Plaintiffs and defendants agree that the question at hand is “equal access to an 
adequate education, not absolute equality.” 
 
Regarding Part II C, 5 & 2: 
 The Court indicated that in reviewing a phrase in the Constitution words “are to be given 
their natural and obvious” meaning. 
 Additionally, the Constitution is to be reviewed in light of what is considered to be the 
framers‟ intent. 
 Finally, the Court notes that the Constitution is “a statement of general principles and not 
a specification of details.” 
 The relevant portion of Part II C, 5 & 2 reads: 
o  “Wisdom and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the body of 
the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and liberties; and as 
these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the 
various parts of the country, and among the different orders of people, it shall be 
the duty of the legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this 
Commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all 
seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and 
grammar schools in the towns…” 
o Plaintiffs contend that the language includes a duty to an adequate education; 
defendants consider the language to be aspirational. 
 The Court determined, using a “common language” and “framers‟ intent” analysis of the 
language, that Part II C, 5 & 2 imposes a duty to provide for the education of the 
populace. 
 The defendants argued that a standard of constitutional adequacy had been met by 
existing standards of education in the state. The Court reviewed the data and evidence 
submitted in trial and determined that children in much of the state were not receiving 
their constitutional entitlement of an adequate education. 
 The Court accepted the guidelines for adequacy established in Kentucky in the Rose v. 
Council for Better Education, Inc. (790S.W.2d 186). 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The decision was based on the State Education Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This was a case of Adequacy because the issue was sufficient funding existing systemically to 
support a level of adequacy throughout the entire system. 
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Case Title: Milliken v. Green (212 N.W. 2d 711) 
 
Full Citation: 
William G. Milliken, Governor, and Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, in the Name of and for 
Use and Benefit of the People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiffs, and Leo G. Steers et al., 
Intervening Plaintiffs,  
and Thomas C. Walsh, Intervenor 
and John H. King, Intervenor 
v. 
Allison GREEN, State Treasurer, Bloomfield Hills School District, a body corporate, et al., 
Defendants 
 
 
State: Michigan 
Court:  Supreme Court of Michigan 
Decision Date: December 14, 1973 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The Governor requested a rehearing to address the question of the constitutionality of the public 
school financing system.  The original decision was Governor v. State Treasurer, 203 N.W.2d 
457 in 1972.  However, after the U.S. Supreme Court‟s 1973 decision in San Antonio v. 
Rodriquez (411 U.S. 1) the Supreme Court of Michigan granted a rehearing  to answer the 
following question: “Does the Michigan public school financing system, consisting of local, 
general ad valorem property taxes and state school aid appropriations, by relying on the wealth 
of local school districts as measured by the state equalized valuation of taxable property per 
student which results in substantial inequality of maintenance and support of the elementary and 
secondary schools, deny the equal protection laws guaranteed by Article I, Section 2 of the 
Michigan Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?” 
 
Additionally, plaintiffs question the constitutionality of a funding system in which taxpayers‟ 
ability or willingness to tax themselves created discrepancies between districts regarding 
financial inputs. 
 
Decision: 
 Regarding the review of a possible Fourteenth Amendment Violation, the Court cited San 
Antonio v. Rodriquez (411 U.S. 1), and determined that no violation existed. 
 Regarding the State Equal Protection Claim, the Court determined that there was no 
violation. 
 The Court also decided that the Michigan Constitution does not prohibit districts from 
levying at rates higher than other districts, nor does it mandate State supplement should 
such a situation occur.  
 The Court determined that no evidence of educational inequities as a result of the funding 
system had been presented. 
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Reasoning: 
 The Court referred to a state-wide study of financing of public education which 
determined that higher revenue districts could expend more per pupil and that there was 
little evidence that more spending was related to higher student achievement (the study 
cited non-school factors as larger influences). 
 In comparing operating expenses between the ten highest and the ten lowest districts the 
study found discrepancies in what the Court considered to be a reasonable range. 
 The decision of San Antonio v. Rodriquez (411 U.S. 1) was new at the time of this 
decision, so the Court aligned the similarities between Michigan and Texas systems, 
concluding that the Michigan Court could defer to the decision rendered by the U.S. 
Supreme Court regarding the Texas system. 
 The Court acknowledged the need for a state review, citing Robinson v. Cahill (62 NJ 
473); however, the Court deferred in making a decision on this portion of the matter to 
allow for the legislature to act. 
 With regard to “disparities in educational opportunities,” the Court noted that the 
Constitution does not forbid disparities of wealth, nor does it forbid self-taxation.  It only 
requires that the Legislature “maintain and support” the system. 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The Court answered negatively a claim regarding the Federal Fourteenth Amendment.  The 
Court also determined that there had been no discrimination based on the State Equal Protection 
Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The plaintiffs were essentially making a Horizontal Equity claim by claiming that taxation rates 
created inequities that were not related to educational need. 
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Case Title: Montoy v. State (62 P.3d 228) 
 
 
Full Citation: 
Supreme Court of Kansas  
Eric and Ryan MONTOY, et al., Appellants 
v. 
STATE of Kansas, et al., Appellees 
 
 
State:  Kansas 
Court:  Supreme Court of Kansas 
Decision Date:  January 24, 2003 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs (students representing African-American, Hispanic, Special Education groups and 
two large school districts) made three original claims regarding the state school funding system: 
1.) The system violated the State Constitution requirement for “the suitable finance of 
educational interests of the State”; 2.) The system violated the Kansas Equal Protection Clause; 
and 3.) The system violated due process rights guaranteed under the State Constitution.  The 
judgment at the lower Court had been in favor of the defendants. 
 
In this appeal to the State Supreme Court, the plaintiffs make the following claims: 1.) the 
district court erred by excluding certain claims on the grounds that they were outside the 
pleadings; 2.) the district court erred by failing to treat the dismissal of their case as a dismissal 
based upon a motion for summary judgment; and 3.) the district court erred in finding the 
original plaintiff claims legally insufficient. 
 
Decision: 
Regarding the Excluded Claims: The Court determined that the district court erred in excluding 
the three additional constitutional claims. 
Regarding Summary Judgment Procedure:  The Court determined that there remained genuine 
issues of material fact. 
Regarding Finding the Original Plaintiff Claims Legally Insufficient: The Court determined that 
plaintiffs claims of fact had potential to be legally sufficient and deserved further legal 
consideration. 
 
The Supreme Court of Kansas reversed the district court‟s finding and remanded for further 
proceedings based on the legal issues presented. 
 
 
Reasoning: 
Regarding the Excluded Claims: 
 The original decision by the district court were excluded because they had not been 
presented in their original pleadings.  The district court cited Missionary Baptist 
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Convention v. Wimberly Chapel Baptist Church (170 Kan. 684) in the decision to 
exclude. 
 On appeal the Court indicated that the use of Missionary Baptist Convention v. Wimberly 
Chapel Baptist Church (170 Kan. 684) in this case was not appropriate because they 
differed in that unlike in Missionary Baptist Convention v. Wimberly Chapel Baptist 
Church (170 Kan. 684), these issues were raised by the plaintiffs at the district court 
level. 
 Additionally, the Court addressed that the spirit of disclosure had been met and that “the 
consideration of the additional constitutional claims could cause the defendants surprise 
or unfair prejudice.” 
 
Regarding Summary Judgment Procedure: 
 Plaintiffs claim that parties were submitting briefs to the District Court to determine 
which legal issues would be addressed, not to determine if there was legal standing to 
move forward, or for the briefs to be used as the grounds for a decision. 
 The Court referenced Missouri Medical Ins. Co v. Wong (234 Kans. 811) as a reminder 
that a trial court has inherent power to dispose of litigation on its own motion. 
 The Court also noted Green v. Kaesler-Allen Lumber Co (197 Kan. 788)  in which the 
Court determined that it must appear “conclusively that there remains no genuine issues 
as to a matter of fact…” 
 On appeal, the Court determined that there remained genuine issues of material fact. 
 
Regarding Finding the Original Plaintiff Claims Legally Insufficient: 
Count I--Suitability:  The Court reviewed the following facts presented by plaintiffs in their 
suitability claim: 
 “The state law no longer contains educational goals or standards”; 
 “The BOE has not issued any regulations containing academic standards or 
objective criteria against which to measure the education Kansas children 
receive”; 
 “the amount of Base State Aide Per Pupil (BSAPP) has not kept up with inflation.  
For FY 2003, the BOE requested approximately $635 million in additional 
educational funding”; 
 “School districts are still required to raise capital outlay expenses locally, the four 
mill levy limit has been removed, allowing wealthier districts even greater access 
to capital outlay expenditures than poorer districts and this increasing funding 
disparities”; 
 “The school finance formula provides widely different amounts of revenue to 
different districts”; 
 “A substantial gap exists between the performance of minorities and whites, and 
between students in the free and reduced lunch programs and those not in 
programs on state tests”; 
 “The 2001 legislature changes the finance formula to allow school boards to raise 
a greater proportion of funds with local taxes creating disparities in educational 
opportunity”; 
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 “The plaintiff school districts must raise money locally through the „local option 
budget‟ (LOB) or the capital outlay fund to meet the minimum school 
accreditation requirements”; 
 “The LOB was originally capped at twenty-five percent of the general fund 
budget of the local school district, and was designed to decrease as the base state 
aid per pupil increased, in an attempt to achieve parity statewide over time.  In the 
1993 legislative session, this equalizing methods was abandoned and the LOV 
was allowed to increase as the BSAPP increased”; 
 “The plaintiff school districts raise less money per pupil with each mill levy than 
wealthier districts”; 
 “Increased reliance on the local taxes has resulted in less advantageous education 
in the plaintiff school districts than in wealthier districts”; 
 “The school finance formula is based on political decisions because neither the 
legislature nor the BOE has gathered information about the actual costs if 
education in the various districts”; 
 “The Kansas legislature has recognized that there are inherent inadequacies and 
inequities in the SD-FQPA.L2001,Ch.215,10(a)”; 
 “Young people nowadays need additional technological skills to compete 
favorably in the global society.” 
  
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The plaintiffs‟ original claims were based in language of the Kansas Education Clause, namely 
the word suitable.  Additionally, plaintiffs made claims that the system violated the Kansas 
Equal Protection Clause as well as the Due Process rights found within the Kansas Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 
The suitability claims made by the plaintiffs include three financial concepts within their claims.  
The discussion of impoverished versus wealthy school districts having various funding ability 
based on local taxation is a discussion of Horizontal Equity in that addresses differences in 
resources unrelated to educational need, specifically wealth. The plaintiff claims regarding 
achievement gaps is a discussion of Pure Vertical Equity because is asserts sufficient differences 
in resources to accommodate educational need measured against outcome standard, but does not 
make a determination regarding the level of that standard.  Finally, the call for cost analysis of a 
suitable education is a Pure Adequacy issue in that it seeks an answer to how much funding 
would need to be within  a system to meet a minimum outcome standard. 
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Case Title: Nebraska Coalition for Education Equity and Adequacy v. Heineman (731 N.W.2d 
164) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Nebraska. 
The NEBRASKA COALITION FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUITY AND ADEQUACY 
(COALITION), on its own behalf and on behalf of its members, et al., Appellants and Cross-
Appellees 
v. 
David HEINEMAN, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Nebraska, et al., 
Appellees and Cross-Appellants. 
 
State:  Nebraska 
Court: Supreme Court of Nebraska 
Decision Date:  May 11, 2007 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
Plaintiffs sought a declaration that Nebraska‟s Constitution requires “an education which 
provides the opportunity for each student to become an active and productive citizen in our 
democracy, to find meaningful employment, and to qualify for higher education;” and a 
declaration that Nebraska‟s education funding system is unconstitutional and an injunction 
enjoining state officials from implementing the system. 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that it cannot determine what level of public education the Legislature must 
provide, nor can it create a standard of “quality.” 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Constitutional clauses in question were the religious freedom clause which reads, 
“religion, morality, and knowledge, however, being essential to good government, it shall 
be the duty of the Legislature to pass suitable laws…to encourage schools and the means 
of instruction” and on the free instruction clause which reads,” The Legislature shall 
provide for the free instruction in the common schools of the state of all persons between 
the ages of five and twenty-one years.” 
 The Coalition alleged that plaintiff districts were unable to adequately pay and retain 
teachers, purchase necessary textbooks, equipment, and supplies, replace or renovate 
facilities; and offer college-bound courses or adequate services for special education, 
English language learners and vocational programs.  They also alleged that a significant 
number of students did not graduate and that a significant number were academically 
deficient on assessments. 
 
Regarding Justiceability: 
 The Court referenced its decision in Shineman v. Board of Education (42 N.W.2d 168) in 
which parents of five-year-olds contended their constitutional rights were violated 
because districts did not provide kindergartens and denied access to first grade to five-
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year-olds.   The Court ruled in that case that the free instruction clause did not provide 
five-year-olds such a right outside of what was determined by the Legislature. 
 The Court also referenced Gould v. Orr (506 N.W.2d 349).  The Court indicated that 
Gould determined that the Court has jurisdiction, but that differs from determining that an 
issue is justiciable. 
 The Court cited the U.S. Supreme Court decision of Baker v. Carr (369 U.S. 211) as a 
standard for justiceability.  The Court ruled under the second Baker criteria that the only 
elements of public schools that can be constitutionally enforced by the Court is the 
mandate that education must be free and available to all children. 
 
Regarding Adequacy:  
 The Court noted that there was a purposeful absence of adjective qualifiers in the State 
Education Clause. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The Plaintiffs were using two Education Clauses within the State Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This was a request by the plaintiffs at an Adequacy claim, but the decision was made based on 
justiciability.  
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Case Title: Oklahoma Education Association v. State (158 P.3d 1058) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
OKLAHOMA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; Independent School District No. I-07 of Rogers 
County, Oklahoma, a/k/a Foyil Public Schools; Independent School District No. I-41 of 
Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, a/k/a Western Heights Public Schools; and Independent School 
District No I-05 of Tulsa County, Oklahoma, a/k/a Jenks Public Schools, Plaintiffs/Appellants 
v. 
STATE of Oklahoma, ex rel.  The OKLAHOMA LEGLISLATURE; Senator Mike Morgan, In 
His OFFICIAL Capacity as President Pro Tempore of the Oklahoma State Senate; and 
Representative Todd Hiett, In His Official Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives 
of the Oklahoma Legislature, Defendants/Appellees 
 
State:  Oklahoma 
Court: Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
Decision Date:  May 8, 2007 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
Plaintiffs contend the existing funding scheme is in violation of the State Education Clause, and 
that adequate education is not being provided. 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that plaintiffs did not have sufficient standing and that there was no 
constitutional mandate for Oklahoma‟s students to be provided an adequate education.  The 
Court decided that the issues at hand were not justiciable because of separation of powers. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court identified three questions before the Court: 
1. Have the plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to show that they have standing to assert 
violations of the rights of Oklahoma students based on the Oklahoma Constitution? 
2. Does the State have a constitutional and statutory duty to provide Oklahoma‟s 
students with a basic, adequate education, and 
3. Do the substantive issues before for this Court present a non-justiciable, separation of 
powers question. 
 
Regarding Standing: 
 The OEA asserted that they had standing because their members had standing to sue in 
their own right. 
o The plaintiffs assert injury to Oklahoma students and no member of OEA is a 
student of the public school system in Oklahoma. 
o The Court ruled OEA did not have standing. 
 The plaintiff school districts assert they have standing by claiming that all Oklahoma 
students are being denied a fundamental right. 
118 
 
o The Court concluded that the plaintiff school districts have not shown that any of 
their students have sustained injury. 
 
Regarding Separation of Powers: 
 The Court ruled that it has no authority to consider the desirability, wisdom or 
practicability of fiscal legislation. 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The State Education Clause was the basis of the plaintiffs‟ claims. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The best categorization for this case is one of Adequacy because it was an attempt to review the 
adequacy of funding system-wide. 
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Case Title: Olsen v. State 
 
Full Citation: 
Supreme Court of Oregon 
Shauna OLSEN, a minor, et.al., Appellants 
v. 
STATE of Oregon, Respondents 
 
State: Oregon 
Court: Supreme Court of Oregon 
Decision Date:  September 3, 1976 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs contended that the public school financing system in the state of Oregon violated 
the Equal Protection Clause in Oregon‟s State Constitution, Article I, s20 of the Oregon 
Constitution.  The plaintiffs‟ second claim was that Article VIII, s 3, of the Oregon State 
Constitution, requiring a “uniform and general system” of schools was also violated by the 
school funding system.  Because the Oregon funding system relied on property wealth, plaintiffs 
contended that the amount of money for education as well as the educational opportunities were 
unequal based on property wealth of districts across the state. 
 
 
Decision: 
 Using the rational basis standard and local control as the State‟s rational basis, the Court 
found that the funding system did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Oregon 
State Constitution.  
 Claiming that defining “uniform” to mean equal financing was not a fair or an 
appropriate working definition within the context of the State Constitution, the court 
found that the funding system did not violate Article VIII, s 3, of the Oregon State 
Constitution, requiring a “uniform and general system” of schools. 
 
Reasoning: 
Regarding the Plaintiffs‟ Equal Protection Claims: 
 The state of Oregon had a state-fixed “minimum acceptable level of school support,” 
which was a minimum level that the state mandated be spent per pupil.  Additionally, the 
state mandated a minimum levy for each district in order for it to qualify for equalization 
funds.  The Court also noted the legal option available through the State‟s Intermediate 
Education District (IED) Board to reorganize school districts and boundaries. 
 The Western and Eastern sides of the state of Oregon managed the taxation of timber 
significantly differently, meaning timber was excluded from taxable property figures in 
eastern Oregon, and in western Oregon it was figured at a rate of thirty percent.  
 Historically, the Oregon Court had found that the Equal Protection Clause of the Oregon 
Constitution and that of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution carry the 
same provisions and principles. 
 The Court cites San Antonio v Rodriguez (411 U.S.1), reviewing the reasoning and the 
decision that the Texas funding system did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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 The Court cites other state level cases in which decisions on the matter varied.  
Specifically, the Court references Serrano v. Priest(5 Cal.3d 584) out of California and 
Robinson v. Cahill (62 N.J. 473) out of New Jersey. 
 The Court indicates a tendency to agree with the Court in New Jersey that simply because 
a clause of the Oregon State Constitution focuses on education, it does not make 
education a fundamental interest because in Oregon many laws are inserted to the State 
Constitution, and this issue had not been addressed in that manner. 
 The Court indicates that it favors a rational basis evaluation, weighing the “interest 
impinged upon, educational opportunity” against the “state objective in maintaining the 
present system of school financing, local control.” 
o The poorest children are not completely deprived of an education, but do not have 
the “tools and programs in the same number or quality” as those in the wealthier 
districts. 
o “The legislature has not expressly stated any objective that is to be attained by its 
system of school financing—“assuming that of maintaining local control.” 
o The wealthier districts may have more local control (via taxation options), but “it 
is not that the poorer districts have no local fiscal control”  
 If depending on local taxation of schools is unconstitutional, that would carry to other 
services such as fire protection and street management. 
 The plaintiffs claim that other, fairer, funding options exist.  The Court indicates that the 
existence of such options does not automatically render the current option 
unconstitutional. 
 
Regarding the Plaintiffs‟ State Education Clause Claims: 
 The plaintiffs‟ claim centered around the adjective “uniform,” claiming that is means 
equal amounts of available financing.  The Court suggested that such a definition of 
uniform would also mean equal facilities, equal programs, etc.  The Court, therefore, 
did not equate “uniform” with equal funding. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 Equal Protection Clause in Oregon‟s State Constitution, Article I, s20 of the Oregon 
Constitution. 
 Article VIII, s 3, of the Oregon State Constitution, requiring a “uniform and general 
system” of schools. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 
 Both the Equal Protection Clause and the Education Clause claims made by the plaintiffs 
were essentially Horizontal Equity claims because they were grounded in the notion that 
the differences between funding for districts were unrelated to educational need, but 
instead were based in property wealth. 
 The Court‟s decision was also essentially a decision based on Horizontal Equity.  
 The concept of Adequacy is hinted at in the Court‟s mention of the state fixed “minimum 
acceptable level of school support,” which was a minimum level that the state mandated 
be spent per pupil, and the state-mandated a minimum levy; however, the decision as it is 
written was not based on Adequacy. 
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Case Title: Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing System (145 N.H. 474) 
 
Full Citation: 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
OPINION OF THE JUSTICES (Reformed Public School Financing System) 
 
State:  New Hampshire 
Court:   Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
 
Decision Date:  December 7, 2000 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The New Hampshire Senate requested that the Supreme Court review a proposed bill with regard 
to its constitutionality.  Specifically, the Senate asked the following two questions: 
 Would the enactment of SB462 FN A LOCAL satisfy the requirements of Part II, 
Articles 5, 6, and 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution? 
 Would the enactment of SB462 FN A LOCAL violate any other provision of the New 
Hampshire Constitution? 
 
Decision: 
 The Court had historically denied general inquiries regarding constitutionality and, 
therefore, declined to address the Senate‟s second question. 
 The Court found that the proposed bill did not satisfy the requirements of part II, articles 
5, 6, and 83 of the New Hampshire Constitution because the property taxation was not 
equal and proportional across the state as had been the mandate by the Court in 
Claremont School District v. Governor (142 N.H. 462) (Claremont II). 
 
Reasoning: 
 The proposed bill would raise and distribute $750,000,000 in state financial aid to 
districts in response to the mandate created by the Court‟s decision in Claremont School 
District v. Governor (142 N.H. 462) (Claremont II). 
 Constitutional Review: 
o Part II, Article 5: 
 States that the legislature can “impose and levy proportional and 
reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes, upon all the inhabitants of, and 
residents within the said state.” 
o Part II, Article 6: 
 States that “the public charges of government, or any part thereof, may be 
raised by taxation.” 
o Part II, Article 83: 
 States that “[k]nowledge and learning, generally diffused through a 
community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; and 
spreading the opportunities and advantages of education through various 
parts of the country, being highly conducive to promote this end; it shall 
be the duty of the legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of this 
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government, to cherish the interest of literature…and all…public 
schools…” 
 Initial review by the Court of significant elements of Claremont School District v. 
Governor (142 N.H. 462) (Claremont II) decision: 
o The Claremont II decision interpreted Part II, Article 83 to “impose a duty on the 
State to provide a constitutionally adequate education for every educable child in 
the public schools in New Hampshire and to guarantee adequate funding.”  
o Additionally, Claremont II decision held that “to the extent that property tax is 
used to comply with the mandate of Part II, Article 5, it must be administered in a 
manner „that is equal in valuation and uniform in rate throughout the State.‟” 
 
 The Court review of the Senate questions found that the proposed Senate Bill 
“contradicts the mandate of Part II, Article 83, which imposes upon the State the 
exclusive obligation to fund a constitutionally adequate education.  The State may not 
shift any of this constitutional responsibility to local communities as the proposed bill 
would do.”   
 The Court indicated that under the proposed bill taxpayers, across the state would be 
paying property tax at disproportionate and unequal rates. 
 Reiteration of key components of the Claremont School District v. Governor (142 N.H. 
462) (Claremont II) decision by the Court for the Senate‟s purposes: 
o “The New Hampshire Constitution imposes solely upon the State the obligation to 
provide sufficient funds for each school district to furnish a constitutionally 
adequate education to every educable child.”  Beyond constitutional adequacy, yet 
to be defined, the legislature may authorize local schools to dedicate additional 
resources beyond what is required. 
o There is no ruling for uniform per pupil expenditures.  “The State mandates 
statewide adequacy--not statewide equality.  It is, however, the State‟s obligation 
to underwrite the cost of an adequate education for each educable child‟ 
o All adequacy funding local districts receive by the state must be used for 
education. 
o “The content of a constitutionally adequate education must be defined, in the first 
instance, by the legislature.” 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 State Education Clause 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 The concept of “extra burden” being paid by some districts over others as a result of 
disproportionate taxation is a Horizontal Equity concern. 
 However, because the “taxation” disparities would come as a result of the State‟s attempting 
to reach an adequacy standard, this review of the bill also addresses the Pure Adequacy 
concept. 
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Case Title: Pauley v Kelly (255 S.E.2d 859) 
 
Full Citation: 
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
Terry Gene PAULEY, etc., et al. 
v. 
John H. KELLY, Treasurer, State of West Virginia, et al. 
 
State: West Virginia 
Court:  Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia 
Decision Date:  February 20, 1979 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs claim that the West Virginia school finance system violates Article XII, Section I 
of the West Virginia State Constitution which requires a “thorough and efficient” education.  
Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that the state education finance system violates the equal 
protection of the law.  The plaintiffs‟ contentions are based in what they perceive as inequalities 
in opportunity and achievement as a result of unequal distribution of annual funding, facilities, 
curriculum and personnel between property-poor districts and property-wealthy districts.  
 
Decision: 
The Court reversed the dismissal of the case and remanded the case with specific inquiries for 
the lower courts to address. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The lower courts had dismissed the case based on the idea that classification the court 
was being asked to consider was not one of wealth or of social class, but instead only one 
of geography (district lines).  The Supreme Court determined that the dismissal was 
improper because the legal theories being present were not deficient and warranted legal 
consideration. 
 The lower court made the following findings regarding plaintiff claims: 
o The facilities, curricula, and other services provided in Lincoln County schools 
failed to meet many of the state and national standards. 
o Physical plant inadequacies in most of Lincoln County‟s schools were significant 
enough to constitute potential threats to the health and welfare of students. 
o The absenteeism and dropout rates were significantly higher in poorer property-
wealth districts than in the wealthier districts. 
o Assessment scores and post-secondary successes were much lower in poor-
property districts than in the wealthier districts. 
o Scores on standardized tests in Lincoln County were below the state and national 
averages in almost every category. 
o A strong positive correlation existed between the amount of spending in districts 
and the educational success rates. 
o Counties with low property-wealth could not offer the quality of educational 
program offered in wealthier districts because the funding for districts was 
dependent in large part on local property tax revenue. 
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o State and federal funding do not eliminate the disparity in available resources 
between property-poor and property-wealthy districts. 
o A specific area of inadequacy in Lincoln County is that of special education. 
Equal Protection Claims 
 Citing Rodriquez (411 U.S.1), the Court noted that federal equal protection rights do not 
apply, but that the State Constitution equal protection standard must be considered 
separately and can require higher standards of protection than those offered at the federal 
level.  
 The State Supreme Court found that education is a fundamental constitutional right 
within the State Constitution; therefore, the court applied the strict scrutiny standard. 
Education Clause Claims 
 The Court review a myriad of cases from various states and determined that across the 
historical considerations of courts‟ decisions, “there is ample authority that courts will 
enforce constitutionally mandated education quality standards. 
 The Court turned to defining the terms “thorough” and “efficient” and “education.” 
o The Court defines “a thorough and efficient system of schools” as “It develops, as 
best the state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies, and social morality 
of its charges to prepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and 
citizenship, and does so economically.” 
o The court defines that this definition mandates “the development of every child to 
his/her capacity of (1) literacy; (2)ability to add, subtract, multiply and divide 
numbers; (3)knowledge of government and to the extent that the child will be 
equipped as a citizen to make informed choices among persons and issues that 
affect his own governance; (4)self-knowledge and knowledge of his/her total 
environment to allow the child to intelligently choose life work and to know 
his/her options; (5)work-training and advanced academic training as the child may 
intelligently choose; (6)recreational pursuits; (7)interests in all creative arts such 
as music, theatre, literature, and the visual arts; (8) social ethics both behavioral 
and abstract, to facilitate compatibility with others in this society.” 
o The Court determined that there were support services implicit in such a 
definition as well. “(1) Good physical facilities, instructional materials and 
personnel; (2)careful state and local supervision to prevent waste and to monitor 
pupil, teacher, and administrative competency.” 
 The Court chose to avoid making a definitive judgment regarding if the State financing 
system failed to provide a thorough and efficient education in the poorer counties because 
they felt expert involvement and legislative roles were fundamental elements to the 
creation of such standards. 
 The Court did note that the education system in Lincoln County was “woefully 
inadequate,” and the Court indicated that they would be surprised if it could meet such a 
standard if it was set. 
 The Court developed several lines of inquiry on remand, asking the lower courts to 
further investigate the following issues: 
o Regarding the Financing System: Are there basic inequities in the seven-factor 
computation by which the foundation formula aid is computed? 
o Regarding Supplemental State Aid: Does a system of systemic supplemental state 
aid compensate in a manner that allows them to reach the established standards? 
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o Regarding Tax Revenues from Special or Excess Levy on Property:  The Court 
determined that any revenue generated from excess levies voted by citizens were 
not subject to attack under the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution; 
however, it may not be excluded from consideration in the “thorough and 
efficient” considerations. 
o Regarding The Property Appraisement System: It should be determined if 
property-poor counties are assessing their properties adequately and if appropriate 
appraisement provisions are being followed in each county. 
o Regarding The State School Building Fund: Are the funds allocated in a manner 
that will provide essential physical facilities to meet the thorough and efficient 
standard? 
o Regarding the Role of the State Board of Finance: The trial court should 
investigate if the State Board of School Finance is fulfilling its legal obligations. 
o Regarding the Roles of the State Superintendent and the State Board of 
Education:  The trial court should require development of the facts about the 
performance of each party‟s duties. 
o Regarding the Local Role: The trial court should determine that the Lincoln 
County Board of Education is fulfilling its responsibilities imposed by the 
thorough and efficient standard in administering a school system. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 The Court created a standard or strict scrutiny to be applied on remand regarding the 
Equal Protection Claim. 
 Additionally, the Court created a specific standard of “thorough and efficient” within the 
State Education Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 The analysis of property-poor versus property-wealthy districts via the equal protection 
claim is a Horizontal Equity claim. 
 The standards created by the court regarding “thorough and efficient” are essentially pure 
Adequacy standards because they address the systemic look at what would be standard 
acceptable outcomes. 
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Case Title: Pendelton School District v. State (345 Or. 596) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Oregon, 
En Banc. 
PENDELTON SCHOOL DISTRICT 16R; Eugene School District 4J; Crow-Applegate-Lorane 
School District 66; Coos Bay School District 9; Corvallis School District 509J; Josephine 
County Unit/Three Rivers School District; Astoria School District 1 C; Creswell School District; 
Lincoln County School District; Amity School District 4J; Reynolds School District #7; Coquille 
School District #8; Parkrose School District #3; Pine Eagle School District #61; Jefferson School 
District; McKenzie School District; Alexandra Kiesling and Timothy Kiesling, minors, by Amy 
Cuddy, their guardian ad litem; Grace Peyerwold, a minor, by David and Maria Perwold, her 
guardians ad litem; Marshall Taunton and Harrison Taunton, minors, by Tim and Wendy 
Taunton, their guardians ad litem; and Benjamin Sherman and Claire Sherman, minors, by Larry 
Sherman and Diane Nichol, their guardians, ad litem 
v. 
STATE of Oregon, Defendant-Respondent, Respondent on Review 
 
State:  Oregon 
Court: Supreme Court of Oregon 
Decision Date:  January 23, 2009 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs are eighteen school districts and seven school children who sought a declaratory 
judgment that Article VIII, Section 8 of the Oregon Constitution requires that the legislature fund 
the school system at a level sufficient to meet certain quality educational goals. 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that while a partial declaratory statement regarding the amount of funding was 
possible, no other judicial action was appropriate. 
 
Reasoning: 
 In November of 2000, Oregon voters approved Article VII, Section 8 which reads: The 
Legislative Assembly shall appropriate in each biennium a sum of money sufficient to 
ensure that the state‟s system of public education meets quality goals established by law, 
and publish a report that either demonstrates the appropriation is sufficient, or identified 
the reasons for the insufficiency, its extend, and its impact on the ability of the state‟s 
system of public education to meet those goals.” 
 In 2001, the legislature responded to Article VII, Section 8 by identifying pre-existing 
statutes as setting the quality goals for public schools and also established the Quality 
Education Commission (QEC) to determine the amount of funding needed to meet those 
goals. 
 The legislature has historically not funded education to the levels recommended by the 
QEC. 
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o As a result, the plaintiffs first claim is that the legislature had failed to appropriate 
the sum of money for 2005-2007 and sought a declaratory judgment that the 
failure was a violation of Article VIII, Section 8. 
 The second claim made by plaintiffs contended that Article VIII, Section 3 which reads, 
“The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for the establishment of a uniform and 
general system of Common schools” required the legislature to appropriate sufficient 
funds to maintain an adequate system.  The suit sought a declaratory judgment that the 
standard had not been met with the 2005-2007 funding appropriations. 
 In their third claim, plaintiffs requires a level of relief, requesting that for the 2007-2009 
biennium the legislature be mandated to fund at the recommend level of the QEC. 
 
Regarding Justiciability: 
 The state contended that it was unconstitutional for the judicial branch to enjoin the 
legislation from passing unconstitutional legislation in the future. 
 Because the question at hand involved “a set of present facts” and not “an abstract 
inquiry about a possible future event,” the Court ruled the matter justiciable. 
 
Regarding Article VIII, Section 8: 
 Plaintiffs contended that the word shall imposes an absolute duty to appropriate a 
specified level of funding. 
o The lower court indicated that shall may only extend to mean “may” but the 
Supreme Court disagreed. 
o The Court in this appeal interpreted shall to be a directive from the voters. 
 The Court recognized that the two parts of Article VIII, Section 8 are in conflict with 
each other.  One is a directive to fund and the other a directive to provide explanation if 
unable to fund.  
 The Court determined that they could provide a limited declaratory judgment that one 
half of Article VIII was violated; but because the other half allows for that violation, no 
injunctive relief is appropriate. 
 
Regarding Article VIII, Section 3: 
 Plaintiffs were contending that Section 3 leans on quality goals established in Section 8 
of Article VII. 
 The Court disagreed, indicating that because Section 8 included a reporting requirement 
if the guidelines could not be met there could not be a mandate exclusive of the “opt out” 
provision. 
 The plaintiffs also claimed that Section 3 had its own requirement of adequacy within it. 
o The Court noted that Section 3 does not include the word adequate, but 
instead uses “uniform and general.” 
o The Court noted that while “common schools” does imply some level of 
basic adequacy, there is not mandate of specific adequacy standards within 
the Article.  
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This case was decided in totality on the State Education Clause. 
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Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
Because the question at hand was the overall level of state funding within a state, it is essentially 
an Adequacy claim. 
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Case Title: Robinson v. Cahill (62 N.J. 473) 
 
Full Citation: 
Supreme Court of New Jersey 
Kenneth ROBINSON, an infant, by his parent and guardian ad litem, Ernestine Robinson, et al, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
v. 
William T. CAHILL, Governor of the State of New Jersey, et al., Defendants--Appellants 
 
State:  New Jersey 
Court:  Supreme Court of New Jersey 
Decision Date:  April 3, 1973 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
State & Federal Equal Protection: 
Plaintiffs contend that the variation of the funding available funding between school districts was 
a violation of both the Federal and State Equal Protection Clauses. 
 
State Taxation Amendments:  
Plaintiffs claim that the amendments reading, “Property shall be assessed for taxes under general 
laws, and by uniform rules, according to its true value” (Art. IV, s7,12) and “Property shall be 
assessed for taxation under general laws and by uniform rules.  All real property assessed and 
taxed locally or by the State for allotment and payment to taxing districts shall be assessed 
according to the same standard of value” (Art.Viii,s1,1) require that taxation for education 
should be uniform state-wide.  
 
Education Amendment: Plaintiffs claim that the amendment in the State Constitution that reads, 
“The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient 
system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in this State between the ages 
of five and eighteen years” (Art.Viii, s4, 1) requires a State level tax burden to fund public 
schools.   
 
Decision: 
Federal Equal Protection Claim: 
 Citing San Antonio v. Rodriquez (411 U.S.1), the Court did not see the need to further 
address the federal Equal Protection Claim as it was presented in this case. 
State Equal Protection Claim: 
 The Court determined that the State Equal Protection provisions were not appropriate to 
be applied in this case. 
 
State Education Clause Claim: 
 The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that the standard of “thorough and 
efficient” was not met with the existing funding structure based on dollar input per pupil 
discrepancies. 
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 The Supreme Court‟s review of the 1970 Act (which was the funding formula being 
transitioned in at the time) indicated that the 1970 Act as reviewed would not meet the 
constitutional standard. 
 The Court stated multiple times that if the State yields the process of taxation for public 
schools to the local level, it is fine; but that ultimately it is the State‟s responsibility to 
ensure that the constitutional mandate is met. 
 
Reasoning: 
 Citing San Antonio v. Rodriquez (411 U.S.1), the Court did not see the need to further 
address the federal Equal Protection Claim as it was presented in this case. 
 In reviewing if the State Constitution‟s Equal Protection provision should be invoked, the 
Court made the determination that rational basis should be the standard for the decision 
because they determined wealth should not be considered a “suspect class” in this context 
and that education does not meet the standard of being a “fundamental right” either. 
 With regard to the Equal Protection claims, the Court noted that other services such as 
fire and police protection, as well as water and public health services, would need to be 
considered in the same vain if the claim were affirmed. 
 With regard to the plaintiff claims regarding the taxation amendments, the Court 
determined the tax clause does not prevent state-level government from delegating 
responsibilities to local-level government because “local government is simply an arm of 
the State.” 
 Considering the clause in the taxation amendment that reads, “shall be assessed according 
to the same standard of value,” the Court did not see it as related to education as it was 
written to address railroad municipalities, and the intent was to ensure that “all taxable 
property within a municipality shall bear the same tax burden of that municipality.” 
 Considering the constitutional phrase “thorough and efficient,” the Court determined that 
its intent was to provide “equal opportunity for children,” not necessarily taxpayers.  
Additionally, the Court noted that regardless of the reason for any shortfall from that 
standard, it remains the burden of the State to ensure that the constructional standard is 
met. 
 The Court found that while, by nature, local funding may cause some level of 
discrepancy in resources, those discrepancies must only be found above and beyond the 
mandated “thorough and efficient.” 
 In looking for a standard on which to base their decision, the Court determined that dollar 
input per pupil was the only appropriate one to use because they could determine no other 
valid criterion for measuring “thorough and efficient.” 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
Although the plaintiffs asserted both State and Federal Equal Protection claims, the only legal 
standard ultimately used after review by the Court was that of the Education Clause in the State 
Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The Court‟s decision included discussion of providing an adequate education to meet the 
“thorough and efficient” standard; however, the decision was made as one of Horizontal Equity 
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because it was based on how taxation yields discrepancies in per pupil inputs without much 
consideration of outcomes. 
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Case Title: Roosevelt Elementary School District No. 66 v. Bishop (179 Ariz. 233) 
 
Full Citation: 
Supreme Court of Arizona, in Banc. 
ROOSEVELT ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER 66; Superior Unified School 
District Number 15; Isaac Elementary School District Number 5; San Carlos Unified School 
District Number 20; Evangelina Miranda, individually and as a parent of Mariela and George 
Dorame, minor children; and Manuel Bustamante, individually and as a parent of Gabrielle and 
Jack Bustamante, minor children; Marco Antonio Ramirez, individually and as a parent of 
Elizabeth, Mark, and Lydia Ramirez, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
v. 
C. Diane BISHOP, Superintendent of Public Instruction, in her official capacity; State Board of 
Education, State of Arizona, Defendants/ Appellees 
 
State: Arizona 
Court: Supreme Court of Arizona 
Decision Date: July 21, 1994 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
State Equal Protection Claim: 
 Plaintiffs assert that because education is the subject of an entire article in the Arizona 
Constitution, it should be considered a fundamental right under that Constitution. 
 The districts and parents assert that the school finance system in place violated the Equal 
Protection Clause, called “the privileges or immunities clause” in Arizona, because 
children are discriminated against based upon where they live. The claim that the State 
could not show a compelling state interest in maintaining a property tax-based funding 
system. 
 
State Education Clause Claim: 
 Plaintiffs claim that in order to fulfill the standards of Article XI of the Arizona 
Constitution, the State must create a funding scheme that is general and uniform. 
 
Decision: 
State Equal Protection Claim: 
 The Court avoids addressing the conflict by stating that the issue at hand is better 
addressed by focusing on the area of the Constitution that specifically addresses 
education. 
 
State Education Clause Claim: 
 The Court determined that because forty-five percent of the funding system created by 
the state relied on property value which varied significantly across the State, the scheme 
itself created disparities and, as a result, violated Article XI of the Arizona Constitution. 
 The Court charged the Legislature with developing a funding scheme that would meet the 
“general and uniform” standards. 
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Reasoning: 
State Equal Protection Claim: 
 The privileges or immunities clause reads, “No law shall be enacted granting to any 
citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities 
which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations” 
(Ariz. Const. Art. II. 13). 
 The districts contend that education is a fundamental right and deserves a “strict scrutiny” 
standard while the State contends that the Court‟s prior decision in Shofstall v. Hollins 
(110 Ariz. 88) calls for a rational-basis test. 
 The Court avoids addressing the conflict by stating that the issue at hand is better 
addressed by focusing on the area of the Constitution that specifically addresses 
education. 
 
State Education Clause Claim: 
 “The Legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for the establishment and 
maintenance of a general and uniform public school system, which system shall include 
kindergarten schools, common schools, high schools, normal schools, industrial schools, 
and a university…” (Ariz. Const. Article XI, 1). 
 The plaintiffs claim it is the State‟s obligation to ensure that the schools are funded in a 
general and uniform manner.  The State asserts that meeting such a standard is the local 
districts‟ responsibility.  The Court determined that Article XI specifically mandates that 
the ultimate responsibility for such a standard is the State‟s.  Although some delegation 
of duty can occur by the State, the State cannot delegate away its constitutional 
responsibility. 
 In reviewing various cases from various states, the Court determined that “general and 
uniform” need not mean identical.  “Funding mechanism that provide sufficient funds to 
educate children on substantially equal terms” can meet such a standard, but systems 
“which themselves create gross disparities are not general and uniform” (179 Ariz. 233). 
 The Court determined that once all districts had reached a level of adequacy, it would not 
be inappropriate for local districts to raise funds above and beyond the standard.  The 
Court, however, did not feel that this case provided ground for the Court to define 
adequacy of education. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The State Education Clause, specifically the phrase “general and uniform” was the legal basis for 
the decision. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 The question addressed by The Court is if the funding system itself created input 
discrepancies.  Such a question is one of Horizontal Equity because it addresses 
differences in funding based on property wealth of districts versus educational need. 
 There was a small amount of pure Vertical Equity addressed by the Court in its 
discussion of districts‟ being able to raise funds above and beyond a certain standard that 
was to be met by all.  This implies an outcome consideration, but the Court chooses not 
to address the adequacy/horizontal equity element in detail.  
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Case Title: Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. (790 S.W.2d 186) 
 
Full Citation: 
Supreme Court of Kentucky 
John A. ROSE, President Pro Tempore of the Senate; Donald J. Blanford, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, Appellants 
v. 
The COUNCIL FOR BETTER EDUCATION, INC. 
et al., Appellees 
 
 
State:  Kentucky 
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky. 
Decision Date: June 8, 1989 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 Plaintiffs claimed that the State Legislature had failed to meet its constitutional obligation 
to “provide an efficient system of common schools throughout the state.” 
 The Plaintiffs contended that the school financing system was too heavily dependent on 
local resources and created inappropriate disparities.  The contention was that such 
disparities violated Sections 1, 3, & 183 of the Kentucky State Constitution. 
 Additionally, the Plaintiffs contended that the disparities created by the existing school 
funding system violated both Federal and State Equal Protection Provisions. 
 
Decision: 
 The Court found that the General Assembly had failed to meet the constitutional 
requirement set forth in Section 183 of the Kentucky Constitution mandating “an efficient 
system of common schools throughout the state.” Specifically, the Court noted that the 
existing system was not “efficient.” 
 The Court identified seven specific capacities for students receiving an “adequate” 
education and created nine specific standards of an “efficient system of common 
schools,” 
 The Court mandated that the General Assembly create a system that meets the obligation 
as determined in this case. 
 
Reasoning: 
 In the language of their decision regarding the analysis of “efficient,” the Court indicated 
that students should receive a “proper and adequate” education (emphasis added). 
 The Court cites Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S.483) indicating that equal 
education must be provided to each student. 
 Defendants claimed that the issue was political, not justiciable as presented, specifically 
with only certain representative school districts as plaintiffs and certain legislators and 
politicians named as defendants. 
 Defendants also claimed that educational laws passed in 1985 had inferentially corrected 
the claims being outlined by the plaintiffs. 
135 
 
 The trial judge from the lower court prepared three lengthy documents summarizing the 
various facts and issues of the case, which the Court reviewed in detail. 
1.  “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment” was submitted by the trial 
court judge on May 31, 1988, identifying four primary issues of analysis and 
providing fact and conclusions about each. 
  “The necessity of defining the phrase „an efficient system of common 
schools.‟” 
 Whether education is a constitutional right under the Kentucky 
Constitution. 
 If the existing school funding formula violated Sections 183 & 4 of the 
Kentucky Constitution. 
 If “poor” students are being denied equal protection. 
2. The trial judge created a second document in which he assigned members to an 
advisory panel to advise him on the matter. 
3. The final document summarized the opinion of the lower court and was the 
primary basis for the appeal to the Supreme Court of Kentucky. 
 The lower court defined an efficient system of schools as a “tax-supported, 
coordinated organization, which provides a free, adequate education to all 
of its students throughout the state, regardless of geographical location or 
local fiscal resources” and that and efficient system of schools “must have 
„substantial‟ uniformity.” 
 More specifically, the lower court outlined what an efficient school system 
must provide. 
 “…to provide sufficient physical facilities, teachers, support 
personnel, and instructional materials to enhance the educational 
process.  And adequate school system must also include careful 
and comprehensive supervision at all levels to monitor personnel 
performance and minimize waste.” 
 It is solely the General Assembly‟s responsibility to create a 
system that fulfills the standard. 
 The Court reviewed the history of State legislation regarding school funding, coming to 
the conclusion that, “every forward step taken to provide funds to local districts and to 
equalize money spent for the poor districts has been countered by one backward step.” 
 The Court states that despite minimal provisions in the funding formula, large variations 
exist creating “unequal educational opportunities.” The Court discussed differences in 
inputs, namely programs offered, as well as outcomes produced, specifically addressing 
achievement test scores. 
 Various comparisons were reviewed from state-to-state, and the determination was made 
that “Kentucky‟s educational effort as being inadequate and well below the national 
effort.”  In addition to reviewing testimony that the property-poor districts had inadequate 
funding, the Court heard testimony that even the highest wealth districts were 
inadequately funded. 
 The Court cited statute that gives local school boards political power and, therefore, 
allows for them to become plaintiffs in a lawsuit. 
 The Court determined that in order to sue the General Assembly, it was not necessary to 
name each member. 
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 The Court reviewed documents in which the framers of Section 183 summarized the 
intent of the legislation. 
 Additionally, the Court reviewed previous cases relating to Section 183 and drew eight 
key conclusions: 
1. The General Assembly is mandated, is duty bound, to create and maintain a 
system of common schools throughout the state. 
2. The expressed purpose of providing such service is vital and critical to the 
well being of the State. 
3. The system of common schools must be efficient. 
4. The system of common schools must be free. 
5. The system of common schools must provide equal educational opportunities 
for all students in the Commonwealth. 
6. The state must control and administer the system. 
7. The system must be, if not uniform, “substantially uniform” with respect to 
the state as a whole. 
8. The system must be equal to and for all students. 
 
 The Court determined that the state‟s burden to meet the educational responsibilities does 
not diminish with financial burden. 
 
Regarding the Justiciability of the Issue: 
 The Court recognized that the question at hand was a definition of efficient as it presents 
itself in the State Constitution, which they determined to be exactly their role, to interpret 
the Constitution.  Therefore, the Court determined that it was their role to define efficient. 
 Additionally, the Court cited Pauley v Kelly (162 W.Va 672) in which a similar decision 
was made. 
 
Regarding the Definition of Efficient: 
 The Court reviewed the testimony of the experts and summarized the testimony to 
determine that efficient system of common schools has the following features: 
1. The system is the sole responsibility of the General Assembly 
2. The tax effort should be evenly spread. 
3. The system must provide the necessary resources throughout the state—they must 
be uniform. 
4. The system must provide an adequate education. 
5. The system must be properly managed. 
 The Court determined that incorporating local taxation into a funding plan was 
acceptable, but did not waive the General Assembly‟s obligation to meet the State 
Constitutional requirements. 
 The Court determined that “a child‟s right to an adequate education is a fundamental one 
under our Constitution.” 
 The Court identified seven capacities with which each child would be provided with 
under an efficient system of common schools.  The Court identified these as minimum 
standards and stated that there is no prohibition against higher standards than these: 
1. Sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in 
a complex and rapidly changing civilization. 
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2. Sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the 
student to make informed choices. 
3. Sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to 
understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation. 
4. Sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical 
wellness. 
5. Sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her 
cultural and historical heritage. 
6. Sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or 
vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work 
intelligently. 
7. Sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students 
to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics 
or on the job market. 
 Ultimately, The Court defined efficient to mean that the system of common schools meet 
the following standards: 
1. The establishment, maintenance and funding of common schools in Kentucky is 
the sole responsibility of the General Assembly. 
2. Common schools shall be free to all. 
3. Common schools shall be available to all Kentucky children. 
4. Common schools shall be substantially uniform throughout the state. 
5. Common schools shall provide equal educational opportunities to all Kentucky 
children, regardless of place of residence or economic circumstances. 
6. Common schools shall be monitored by the General Assembly to assure that they 
are operated with no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, and with no 
political influence. 
7. The premise for the existence of common schools is that all children in Kentucky 
have a constitutional right to an adequate education. 
8. The General Assembly shall provide funding which is sufficient to provide each 
child in Kentucky an adequate education. 
9. An adequate education is one which has as its goal the development of the seven 
capacities recited previously.  
 The Court “directed the General Assembly to recreate and redesign a new system that 
will comply with the standards, but withheld the finality of their decision until 90 days 
after the adjournment of the regular session of the General Assembly in 1990. 
 
Legal Standard Used in the Decision: 
The Court makes a point to state in the conclusion of the decision that the decision was decided 
“solely on the basis of our Kentucky Constitution, Section 183.  We find it unnecessary to inject 
any issues raised under the United States Constitution or the United States Bill of Rights in this 
matter.” 
 
 
Financial Concept Used in the Decision: 
The case was presented as one of Horizontal Equity in that the claim was made that the 
differences in resources were related to geographical place of residence, versus educational need.  
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To some degree the Court addressed that issue, but in larger part the Court took the plaintiffs‟ 
claim of Horizontal Inequity and made a decision that was based in Adequacy.  The Court 
clearly created a standard of adequate outcomes and then mandated an efficient system that gets 
students to those statewide outcomes.  The Court did not address differentiating funding based 
on student or district need, so the decision remains one of pure Adequacy. 
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Case Title: San Antonio v. Rodriguez (411 U.S. 1) 
 
Full Citation: 
Supreme Court of the United States 
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Appellants 
v. 
Demetrio P. RODRIGUEZ et al. 
State: Texas 
Court: Supreme Court of the United States 
Decision Date:  March 21, 1973 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
Plaintiffs contended in the original case, for which this is the appeal, that the school children who 
were members of poor families residing in school districts with low property values  rights were 
being violated under the Federal Equal Protection Clause.  The contention was that because the 
school funding system was highly dependent upon local property taxation, student residents of 
certain low property wealth areas were not being provided assess to equal educational 
opportunities. 
 
Decision: 
 The Court determined that the District Court had erred and that neither a suspect 
classification claim nor the fundamental interest claim could be applied to this case. 
 The Court determined that maintaining local control of school funding fulfilled the 
rational-basis needed to be in compliance with the Federal Equal Protection Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
Reasoning: 
 The decision in front of the Supreme Court of the United States was if the District Court 
had ruled correctly for the plaintiffs that the Texas system of financing public education 
was operating to the disadvantage of a suspect class or was infringing upon fundamental 
rights explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution; thus, requiring a standard of 
strict scrutiny. 
 The Court examined how “poor” would be categorized if it were to be considered a 
suspect classification.  Specifically, the Court considered three categories in this analysis: 
1.) poor persons whose incomes fall below some identifiable level of poverty 2.) poor as 
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determined because they are relatively poorer than others, and 3.) may not be poor, but 
who reside in relatively poorer school districts. 
 The Court considered that precedents that had used wealth (or lack of) as a classification 
involved situations in which the individuals were completely deprived of a benefit and 
that the State was unable to provide an “adequate substitute” for the benefit—no 
precedent existed as a classification for those who received relatively less benefit based 
on wealth status. 
 The Court indicated that the Equal Protection Clause does not requires absolute equality 
or precisely equal advantages 
o The State contended that an adequate education was being provided by providing 
a basic K-12 education. 
 The Court noted that families below a poverty line were scattered across multiple districts 
and did not necessarily live within the districts with the poorest property value. 
 The plaintiffs provided research that a positive correlation existed between assessable 
property per pupil and levels of per-pupil spending. 
 The Court determined that the Texas system did not operate to the peculiar disadvantage 
of any suspect class; thus that it did not lend itself to strict scrutiny analysis. 
 However, the Court was left to consider if education was a “fundamental right” which 
would also invoke a strict scrutiny standard. 
o The Court acknowledged the importance of education, but made it clear that the 
question at hand was if the Constitution specifically outlined education as a 
fundamental right. 
o The Court determined that education was not explicitly or implicitly outlined in 
the Constitution as a right. 
o In response to plaintiff assertions that it should be considered a fundamental right 
because it is provided by the state and is intertwined with fundamental rights 
(such as speech and voting), the Court responded that even if that standard was 
used, the existing education provided for all in Texas would qualify a child to 
leave prepared to utilize free speech and exercise their right to vote. 
 The Court determined that a rational basis scrutiny standard was the best fit for the 
decisions because no suspect class or fundamental right was in consideration. 
 The Court cited a history of, and value of, local control in school finance. 
 The existence of “some inequality” was recognized by the Court, but was not viewed as 
sufficient reason to strike down the entire system, acknowledging parallels in other 
locally funded programs such as police and fire protection. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The standard being used was the Federal Equal Protection Clause.  
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This case was the classic example of Horizontal Equity being applied because the question was 
focused on different resources being provided based on causes other than educational need. Case 
Title:  School Administrative District No. 1 v. Commissioner(659 A.2d 854) 
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Full Citation:   
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT NO. 1 
et al., 
v. 
COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
 
State:  Maine 
Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine 
Decision Date:  June 7, 1995 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The plaintiffs in this appeal contended that the funding reductions implemented pursuant to the 
School Finance Act were a violation of their Equal Protection rights. 
 
Decision: 
Using the rational basis standard, the Court determined that the Legislature‟s reductions were 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest; thus, no constitutional violation had 
occurred. 
 
Reasoning: 
 This appeal was brought by plaintiffs who felt the lower court erred in determining that 
there was not a violation and in its decision to rule on behalf of the commissioner. 
 The Court reviewed the School Finance Act‟s funding formula, specifically noting that it 
provided a foundation level of spending per pupil that is based on the average of local 
operating costs across the state.  The local revenue is figured by taking the mill rate set by 
the Legislature and applying it to the assessed property valuations.  Thus, the variable in 
the funding formula is the assessed property value of a district (and state subsidies vary 
as a result). 
 During the years 1991 through 1994, the State made cuts to the state subsidies in a 
percentage increment that matched the cuts made in total state spending. Plaintiffs 
contended that equity gaps rose as the cuts were made;  however, the plaintiffs did not 
make any adequacy claims at the time. 
 The plaintiffs contended that education is a fundamental right; and thus, strict scrutiny 
should apply.  Both the lower court and the Supreme Judicial Court determined that the 
correct standard was one of rational basis because there is no provision in the Maine 
Constitution guaranteeing a certain level of state funding to education and because there 
was no suspect class being affected. 
 Using the rational basis standard, the Court determined that the Legislature‟s reductions 
were rationally related to a legitimate government interest; thus, no constitutional 
violation had occurred. 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
This decision was made based on State Equal Protection standards. 
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Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
Because this decision was based on the equity impact as determined by the general funding 
system with no consideration of outcomes, this case is one of Horizontal Equity. 
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Case Title: Seattle School District No. 1 v. Washington (90 Wash. 2d 476) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. 
SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.1 OF KING COUNTY, Washington, 
 a Municipal Corporation, et al.,  
Respondents-Cross-Appellants 
v. 
The STATE of Washington et al., Appellants 
 
State:  Washington 
Court: Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. 
Decision Date:  September 28, 1978 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 The original primary plaintiff contention was that the State had not met its obligation to 
“make ample provision” for education by creating a funding system dependent on excess 
levy requests. 
 
Decision: 
 The Court determined that “making ample provision” could not be met by authorizing 
special excess levy requests because it is neither dependable nor regular. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The State legislature set up a funding system in which an “adequate” level of funding was 
established, but any shortfall from the state in funding should be “made up” by the local 
district via an election for an increased levy.  If a first election fails, a second election can 
be held; but if it were to fail, the district would be required to manage with only the state 
portion of funding. 
 The plaintiff district had put forth a levy twice to failure, incurring a great deal of cost 
and resulting in sub-adequate funding for operations of the schools.  The contention was 
that, as a result, the State had failed to provide for its “paramount duty” to make “ample 
provision for the education if its resident children” and “to provide for a general and 
uniform system of public schools.” 
 The lower court issued a declaratory judgment, declaring that the District‟s children have 
a constitutional right to adequately-funded educational programs of instruction.  The 
judgment also declares that the state is required to make available funding, exclusive of 
local levies, for the basic education level.  The Legislature was given until July 1, 1979, 
to comply.  
 The trial court denied the plaintiff‟s claim for $17,000,000 in damages from lost funding 
from the 1975-76 fiscal year. 
 The State contended that the lower court had improperly used declaratory judgment 
because, from their perspective, the Districts are a branch of the State.  The Court 
determined that the declaratory judgment was appropriately used by the lower court. 
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 The State contended that the issue was legislative and not justiciable; the Court disagreed, 
stating that “the ultimate power to interpret, construe and enforce the constitution of this 
State belongs to the judiciary.” 
 The State contended that the Education Clause of the State Constitution (Article 9, 
Section1) was a “preamble” because of where it was grammatically placed and, therefore, 
not binding.  The Court disagreed, ruling the State had a constitutional obligation to meet 
the standards set forth in Article 9, Section 1. 
 In reviewing the language of Article 9, Section, the Court took special note of the word 
“paramount,” indicating that it creates a right for all children to be amply provided with 
an education.  Because the Court determined education was right the State was obligated 
to provide unless the holder of the right prevents the State from providing it; the Court 
was clear that the children of the state of Washington had not created such a situation. 
 The Court clearly stated that they would not make effort to define “ample” “provision” or 
“education” as represented in Article 9, Section 1.  Instead, they provided legislative 
latitude within reason to meet the general meaning of the terms. 
 The Court determined that Article 9, Section 1 required fully sufficient funds from 
legislation for the general and uniform system of public schools. 
 The Court found that compliance with Article 9, Section 1 can only be achieved if 
sufficient funds are derived, through dependable and regular tax sources, to permit school 
districts to provide basic education through a basic program. 
 The Court determined that the lower court had ruled correctly in denying legal costs to 
the plaintiff districts. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision:  This case was tied to the State Education Clause, namely 
Article 9, Section 1 of the Washington State Constitution. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision:   While the focus did address the phrase “ample 
provision” which would lend itself to an adequacy claim, the Court purposely avoided focusing 
on what standard would meet “ample provision.”  Instead the focus was on what funding 
mechanism would need to exist to make ample provisions feasible.  Thus, this case is best 
categorized as a Horizontal Equity decision.  
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Case Title: Serrano v. Priest (487 P.2d 1241) (Serrano I) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
JOHN SERRANO, JR., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v.  
IVY BAKER PRIEST, as State Treasurer, etc., et al., Defendants and Respondents. 
Supreme Court of California 
 
State:  California 
Court: Supreme Court of California 
Decision Date: August 30, 1971  
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 Plaintiffs claimed that the public school finance system was discriminatory and violated 
the Constitution because it was primarily based on wealth generated from local property 
taxes. 
 There were three primary sub-points in the plaintiffs‟ claims: 
o Districts with smaller tax bases are not able to spend as much money per child for 
education as districts with larger assessed valuations. 
o Plaintiff parents contend that, as a result of the school financing scheme, they are 
required to pay a higher tax rate than taxpayers in other districts in order to obtain the 
same or lesser educational opportunities as students in wealthier districts. 
o Plaintiffs contend that the financing scheme is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and under the California Constitution. 
 
Decision: 
The Court found that education is a fundamental interest and remanded the case back to the trial 
court. 
Reasoning: 
 The Court noted that wide disparities exist as a result of vast variations in assessed 
property values.  An example was provided in which Baldwin Park spent $577.49 per 
pupil, but Beverly Hills spent $1231.72.  Those figures correspond with a huge variation 
in assessed property value per child ($3706 in Baldwin Park to $50,885 in Beverly Hills). 
 Under the foundation program, the State makes up the difference between what is 
generated and what could be raised by levying a tax of $1 per $1000.  For Baldwin Park, 
the amount would be $47.91 per child, but in Beverly Hills the amount would be $870 
per child.  
 
Regarding Article IX, Section 5: 
 The Article reads, “The Legislature shall provide for a system of common schools…” 
 Plaintiffs contend there is an implication of fiscal equality; the Court disagreed. 
o The Court noted that Section 5 holds the directive for the system, but Section 6 
focuses on the funding of the system; therefore, funding inferences should not be 
read into Section 5.  
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Regarding Federal Equal Protection: 
 The Court addressed wealth as a suspect classification. 
o The Court determined that the Supreme Court decisions that invalidated wealth 
classifications were not based on purposeful discrimination, but instead on 
unintentional classifications. 
o The Court determined that in the case at hand the governmental action (namely 
the school funding scheme paired with governmental action of drawing school 
district boundary lines) is the cause of the wealth classifications. 
 Education as a Fundamental Interest 
o The Court noted that “education is a major determinant of an individual‟s chances 
for economic and social success in our competitive society” and that “education is 
a unique influence on a child‟s development as a citizen and his participation in 
political and community life.” 
o The Court cited Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483) with regard to 
Supreme Court references. 
o The Court ruled that education is a fundamental interest. 
 Application of Strict Scrutiny 
o The question is if the structure of the finance system is necessary to achieve a 
compelling state interest. 
o The State contended that the compelling interest was “to strengthen and 
encourage local responsibility for control of public education.” 
 The Court noted that the only districts that would be in a position 
to control how much to freely spend on education are those with 
larger property valuations. 
 The Court also noted that districts can maintain fiscal control of 
districts once the initial distribution of funds has occurred. 
o The State asserted that if an equal protection mandate were provided regarding 
wealth and education, the same rule would need to be applied to all tax-supported 
services. 
 The Court indicated that education holds uniqueness in comparison 
to other governmental activities and should be responsive to the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
Both the State Education Clause and the State and Federal Equal Protection Clauses were 
utilized in this case. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This case was an example of Horizontal Equity because it identified assessed property wealth as 
a primary determinate of access to per pupil funding. 
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Case Title: Serrano v. Priest (557 P.2d 929)--Serrano II 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of California 
JOHN SERRANO, JR., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents 
v. 
IVY BAKER PRIEST, as State Treasurer, etc., et al/. Defendants and Appellants; CALIFORNIA 
FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, AFL-CIO, Intervenors and Respondent; BEVERLY HILLS 
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Intervenors and Appellants 
 
State: California  
Court: Supreme Court of California 
Decision Date:  December 30, 1976 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
This case was back to the Supreme Court after having been heard on remand by the trial court 
after Serrano I (487 P.2d 1241).   
 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that the funding system of California‟s public schools violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the State Constitution. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The State Legislature had enacted new laws during the remanded trial (Senate Bill 90 and 
Assembly Bill 1267). 
o The new legislation left school funding based on a “foundation approach” but 
eliminated the supplemental aid component of the formula. 
o The new legislation provided a substantial increase in the foundation level and 
created revenue limits for school districts (with a voter override possible). 
o The Court noted that there had not been a change in the fact that equal tax rates 
generate differing amounts in different districts based on assessed valuations. 
o The Court noted that “it is clear that substantial disparities in expenditures per 
pupil resulting from differences in local taxable wealth will continue to exist 
under SB 90 and AB 1267.” 
 The Court noted that disparities in expenditures per pupil cause and perpetuate disparities 
in the quality and extend of educational opportunities. 
 The trial court ruled that because of the San Antonio v. Rodriguez (411 US 1) decision, 
the California funding system was not in violation of the Federal Equal Protection 
provisions, but that it was in violation of the State Education Clause as well as the State 
Constitution‟s Equal Protection provision. 
 The State made the contention that assessed valuation of a district does not act as a good 
indicator of income levels of families residing within the district. 
o The Court did not see it as its duty to create a system of tax equality based on the 
case at hand. 
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o Additionally, the Court responded by pointing out that districts with low wealth 
have needs that have been created by that low wealth which can never be “caught 
up” without a systematic adjustment. 
 Defendants claim a rational basis level of scrutiny was now appropriate based on the 
Rodriguez decision, but the Court felt the trial court was within its realm to apply strict 
scrutiny based on state constitutional requirements. 
o The Court acknowledged that Rodriguez overruled the Serrano I decision 
regarding the Federal Equal Protection Clause, but that the State Equal Protection 
decisions were still appropriate. 
 Defendants asked the high court to look not only at the funding mechanisms, but also to 
look to outcomes as it evaluates equality of educational opportunities. 
o The Court referred to its Serrano I decision is and did not give much credence to 
the contention. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The final decision of part two of Serrano was the state Equal Protection Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This was a determination of Horizontal Equity in that the question was an outside factor 
(property wealth) affecting school funding. 
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Case Title: Skeen v. State (505 N.W. 2d 299) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Minnesota 
Sheridan SKEEN, et al., Respondents 
v. 
STATE of Minnesota, et al., Appellants, Respondents  
and Virginia Independent School District No, 7, et al., Intervenors, Respondents, Appellants 
 
 
State:  Minnesota 
Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota 
Decision Date:  August 20, 1993 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 The plaintiffs claimed that certain elements of the state education funding system were in 
violation of the Education Clause of the Minnesota Constitution (Art XIII., 1) which 
mandates that the legislature “establish a general and uniform system of public schools” 
and fund it in a manner that will “secure a thorough and efficient system of public 
schools throughout the state.” 
 Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that there was a state Equal Protection violation 
because education was a fundamental right outlined by the State Constitution and the 
right was not being equally provided. 
 The lower Court agreed with the plaintiffs, and the issue was brought to the State 
Supreme Court on Appeal. 
 
Decision: 
 The Court found that the existing system of school financing did not violate the “general 
and uniform system of public schools” phrase in the Education Clause of the Minnesota 
Constitution, nor did it violate the Minnesota Equal Protection Clause; the lower court‟s 
decision was reversed. 
Reasoning: 
 The Court determined that the claims being made regarding the Education Clause were 
not based in an adequacy argument but were, instead, based on the premise of relative 
harm.  Essentially, the claim was that the system created disparities leading to a relative 
disadvantage for life for those in districts receive the lower funding. 
 The Court recognized that the legislature had made significant equalization 
improvements in recent history but recognized that the plaintiffs‟ claims regarding 
inequity focused on three elements of the formula specifically: the referendum levy, 
supplemental revenue, and the debt service levy, claiming that each was unconstitutional 
under the State Constitution. 
o Regarding the referendum levy: 
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 The plaintiffs contended that the ability for local districts to fund above 
and beyond the state standard via level unjustly yielded higher funds for 
high-wealth districts based on the same level of level.   
 The lower court had agreed and found this element unconstitutional. 
o Regarding supplemental revenue 
 The original intent was to provide supplemental per pupil funding for 
districts as the state transitioned to the 1987 legislation which affected the 
funding formula. 
 This revenue is gradually being phased out. 
 The lower court found it unconstitutional because it is more readily 
available to high-wealth districts. 
o Regarding debt service levy 
 The lower court found this issue to be unconstitutional because the higher 
level of indebtedness correlates to the ability to pass referendum levies. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 The plaintiffs made both State Education Clause claims as well as State Equal Protection 
claims. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 The plaintiffs conceded a minimal adequacy level of schools.  This case was primarily 
decided on a Horizontal Equity basis as the focus was on disparities between districts 
based on property wealth.  
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Case Title:  State v. Campbell County School District (19 P.3d 518) --Campbell II 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Wyoming 
STATE of Wyoming, et al., Appellants (Defendants) 
v. 
CAMPBELL COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., 
Appellees (Plaintiffs) 
Campbell County School District, State of Wyoming, et al., Appellants (Plaintiffs/Intervening 
Plaintiffs), 
v. 
State of Wyoming, et al., Appellees (Defendants) 
Big Horn County School District No. One, State of Wyoming, et al., Appellants (Intervening 
Defendants) 
v.  
Campbell County School District, State of Wyoming, et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs). 
State of Wyoming, et al. Appellants (Defendants) 
v. 
Campbell Country School District, State of Wyoming, et al., Appellees (Plaintiffs) 
 
State:  Wyoming 
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming 
Decision Date:  February 23, 2001 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
This case was brought by groups contending that the legislature had yet to create a 
constitutionally-sound funding system for the public schools based on previous court 
decisions (including Campbell I). 
 
Decision: 
 The Court ruled that while some progress had been made, the legislature had not yet met 
the constitutional burden outlined in the State Education Clause. 
 
Reasoning: 
 The Court made one ruling on a variety of cases because they considered the legal 
analysis and conclusions to be the same. 
 The Court made the following determinations regarding necessary requirements of the 
Wyoming state funding system for public schools: 
o The cost-based model approach is capable of supporting a constitutional school 
finance system. 
o The existing funding legislation must be amended by July 1, 2002, in the 
following manner: 
 Adjustment for inflation must occur each biennium using the Wyoming 
cost-of-living index. 
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 Every five years the legislature must conduct a review of the inflation 
adjustments to ensure they have met needs adequately. 
 Administrative and classified salaries must be adjusted to account for 
differences in experience, responsibility and seniority. 
 A maintenance and operation cost formula must be developed. 
 Once an adequate formula is established, it must be fully funded. 
 Small school adjustments must accurately reflect expenses not incurred at 
larger schools. 
 Statewide average costs must be adjusted using the cost-of-living scale. 
o The legislature would provide a one-time supplement to fully fund each school 
district‟s 1998-99 kindergarten component costs to adjust for an error. 
o Capital Construction—the legislature must fund the facilities deemed necessary 
by the State to deliver an adequate education. 
o All facilities must be safe and efficient, including a score of ninety or higher for 
building condition and eighty or higher for technological readiness. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The State Education Clause was the basis for this decision. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This case is an example of Adequacy because it addresses the overall funding system/formula 
against what is “appropriate for the times” regarding a general educational outcome standard. 
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Case Title: Tennessee Small School Systems, Inc. v. McWhertner 
 
Full Citation: 
Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville 
TENNESSEE SMALL SCHOOL SYSTEMS, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
v. 
Ned Ray McWHERTER, et al. Defendants-Appellees, 
Charles O. Frazier, Director of Metropolitan Nashville, Davidson County Public Schools, et al., 
Defendants-Intervenors-Apelleees 
 
 
State:  Tennessee 
Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville 
Decision Date:  March 22, 1993 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 Plaintiffs claimed that the existing school funding system was a violation of Article XI, 
Section 12 of the Tennessee Constitution which mandates that the General Assembly 
maintain and support a system of free public schools. 
 Additionally, plaintiffs claim that the funding system violates the Equal Protection 
Provisions of the State Constitution. 
 
Decision: 
The Supreme Court remanded the case to trial court with the following understandings of Court 
opinion: 
 The General Assembly is constitutionally bound to maintain and support a system of free 
public schools that affords substantially equal education. 
 The General Assembly can create a system that involves levels of delegation to school 
districts or counties, but ultimately it is the General Assembly that is constitutionally 
bound to this obligation. 
 The State‟s existing school funding system had created “constitutionally impermissible 
disparities in the educational opportunities afforded under the state‟s public school 
system.” 
 There is a relationship between school funding levels and quality of education, but there 
are other factors relating to quality of education as well. 
 
Reasoning: 
 A review of the Tennessee Foundation Program (TFP) led the Court to conclude that 
various factors mean that ultimately the State provides very little equalization of funding. 
 Findings of fact led to a determination that the funding scheme had produced large 
funding disparities between districts. 
 The Court also determined, based on offerings and facilities in various districts, that 
“evidence indicates a direct correlation between dollars expended and the quality of 
education a student receives.” 
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 Various educational agencies concurred that the TFP does not equalize funding in a way 
that can meet the lower-wealth districts‟ needs; however, the TFP was reduced the 
following year. 
 In response to defendant and intervenors‟ claims that the issue is not justiciable, the Court 
cited numerous cases creating precedent of justiciability of the issue. 
 Regarding the Education Clause Claims: 
o The Court reviewed various decisions from other states, and acknowledged that 
decisions on such clauses are highly dependent on the wording of each clause 
which varies from state-to-state. 
o The Court determined that there was an “inherent value” of education. 
o The Court determined that “the word education has a definite meaning and needs 
to modifiers in order to describe the precise duty upon the legislature. 
o The Court determined that because the plaintiffs had valid Equal Protection 
claims, it was not necessary to determine at the time the precise mandated level of 
education under the Education Clause. 
 Regarding the State Equal Protection Claims: 
o The lower court determined that the plaintiffs‟ claims met none of the three levels 
of standard, but the Supreme Court re-reviewed the case specifically under the 
rational basis standard. 
o The Court found no rational basis for the funding system. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The Court addresses the Education Clause claims affirmatively for the plaintiffs, but the ultimate 
decision for the plaintiffs was made based on the State Equal Protection violation. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
While “quality” of education was repeatedly cited in the decision, there was never any reference 
to outcomes other than the “inherent value” of education.  Therefore, the decision is best 
categorized as one of Horizontal Equity as the question addressed was if the funding formula 
created different resources based on something other than educational need. 
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Case Title: Unified School District No. 229 v. State of Kansas (885 P.2d 1170) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Kansas 
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 229, et al., 
Appellants 
v. 
The STATE of Kansas, et al. Appellees 
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.217, et al., 
Appellants 
v. 
The STATE of Kansas, et al. Appellees 
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.244, et al., 
Appellants. 
v. 
The STATE of Kansas, et al., Appellees 
UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 373, et al., 
 
 
State:  Kansas  
Court: Supreme Court of Kansas 
Decision Date:  December 2, 1994 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The original plaintiffs were contending that the School District Finance and Quality Performance 
Act L.1991, ch 280 was unconstitutional on a number of grounds. 
 
Decision: 
The Court ruled that the Act did not violate the State Education Clause in the State Constitution 
nor did it violate the State Equal Protection Clause. 
 
Reasoning: 
Regarding Infringement of Local School Board‟s Authority: 
 The plaintiffs argue that the Act violated Article 6, Section 5 of the State Constitution 
which calls for local control of school boards because of the fiscal requirements and 
limits it places on districts.  The assertion was that fiscal control was an integral part of 
local control; the Court disagreed with that assertion because Section 67 of the same 
Article mandates that the legislature be in charge of funding the public schools. 
 
Regarding the Acts “Suitable Provision” for Finance under Article 6, Section 6: 
 Article 6, Section 6 reads, “The legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of 
the educational interests of the state.” 
 Wealthy school districts claimed that the Act‟s leveling process meant cuts and 
reductions and, as a result, there was “cutting of mountain tops to fill valleys” while 
leaving all at a level that was not “suitable.” 
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 The Court noted that suitable and optimal are not synonymous.  
 The Court reviewed multiple cases from other states, but ultimately determined that the 
standard most comparable to the Kansas constitutional requirements were those cases 
focused on adequacy. 
 The Court conducted a close examination of the definition of suitable. 
o The Court took specific noted of the definition created in Kentucky under Rose v. 
Council for Better Education (790 S.W.2d) as well as definitions issued in Abbott 
v. Burke(119 N.J. 287) and Alabama Coalition for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt (Ala.Cir 
1993). 
o The Court determined that the definitions in Hunt, Rose and Abbott were similar 
to the ten goals created by the legislature in efforts to define outcome goals for 
Kansas schools. 
o The Court determined that through the quality performance accreditation (QPA) 
process addressing the ten outcomes, the Act has a system for accountability for a 
suitable education. 
 
Regarding Equal Protection: 
 The wealthier plaintiff districts contended the Act violated the Equal Protection Act of 
the State Constitution. 
 Citing San Antonio v. Rodriquez (411 U.S. 1), the Court determined that rational basis 
was the appropriate level of scrutiny for this review. 
 The Court found a rational basis for each component of the Act, except the low 
enrollment weighting factor. Plaintiffs claim the line was drawn for political reasons at 
1899 students, but the Court found a rational basis for the classifications. 
 
Regarding Multiple Subjects: 
 Plaintiffs contend that too many dissimilar subjects were tied together in the Act in 
violation of Article II, Section 16.  The Court disagreed, finding that all the issues were 
tied together in an appropriate manner and did not violate Article II, Section 16.  
 
Regarding Excessive Tax as a Taking: 
 One group of plaintiffs made the contention that the Act violates the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Articles 1 and 2 of the Kansas 
Bill of Rights because they contend the recapture and redistribution of funds consists of 
“taking” taxes. 
 The Court indicated that the issue at hand is if the recapture districts receive a benefit for 
taxes that ultimately educate students in another school district or whether the mill levy 
imposed in those districts imposes such a disproportionate inequality between the burden 
imposed and the benefit received that it constitutes “taking.” 
 The Court determined that each Kansas taxpayer benefits from the education of all 
students in the State of Kansas. 
 Thus, the Court ruled that the recapture component of the Act is not to be considered 
“taking” constitutionally. 
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Regarding Uniformity: 
 One group of plaintiffs contended that the Act violated Article 2, Section 17 of the 
Kansas Constitution which mandates “uniform operation” throughout the state. 
 The Court determined that as long as funding was distributed using a uniform formula, 
the standard of uniformity had been met. 
 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
Plaintiffs made claims using the State Education Clause, the State Equal Protection Clause and 
State Taxation Articles. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
The plaintiffs claim regarding suitable was one of Adequacy because it claimed that with the 
recapture, no district could meet the standard of adequacy.   
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Case Title: Washakie School District v. Herschler (606 P.2d 310) 
 
 
Full Citation:   
Supreme Court of Wyoming 
Washakie County School District Number One, Donna Moberly, Mary Jane Schmeltzer, Randall 
Rideout, Harold McDonald, Harry Ujifusa, Robert Moody and James Argeris, being all of the 
members of the Board of Trustees of Wasakie County School District Number One; Mary Jane 
Schmeltzer as next friend for Christopher Schmeltzer, Joe Schmeltzer, and Frances Schmeltzer, 
minors; Randall Rideout as next friend for Jason Rideout, Anthony Rideout and Michael 
Rideout, minors; Harold McDonald as next friend for Keven McDonald, Keith McDonald, David 
McDonald, Kenneth McDonald, and Brian McDonald, minors; Harry Ujifusa as next friend for 
Kelly Ujifusa and Gayle Ujifusa, minors; Robert Moody as next friend for Todd Moody, Sherri 
Moody, Cindy Moody, John Moody, Al Moody, and Scott Moody, minors; and James Argeris as 
next friend for Jayme Argeris, Tawn Argeris and Brett Argeris, minors; Unita Couty School 
District Number Six; G. Grant Redden, Clint Walker, F. Danny Eyre, Donald R. Carroll and 
Curtis Morgan being all members of the Board of Trustees of Unita County School District 
Number Six, Fremont County School District Number 25; Dennis Tippets, L.J. Geraud, Patricia 
B. Ferris, Alice Kucera, Stanley Smalley, and Thomas Youtz, being all the members of the 
Board of Trustees of Fremont County School District Number Twenty-Five; and Albert B. 
Schultz 
v. 
Ed Herschler, Governor, State of Wyoming; Lynn Sions, State Superintendent of Public 
Instruction, Shirley Wittler, Wyoming State Treasurer; John Patton, Keith West, Dr. Denis 
Lyman, Barbar Rogers, Keith Becker, Redell Hooper, Karen Hand, Dr. Donald Blakeless, Glenn 
Engleking, being all the members of the Wyoming State Board of Education; Park County 
School District Number Sixteeen, Campbell County School District Number One, Converse 
County School District Number One, Hot Springs County School District Number One, Carbon 
County School District Number Two, Sublette County School District Number Nine, Sweetwater 
County School District Number One, and Lincoln County School District Number One 
 
State:  Wyoming 
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming 
Decision Date:  January 15, 1980 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
The lower Court dismissed the case, but did not provide rational for the dismissal.  The 
appellants claim the case was dismissed for the following reasons. The Court responded to each 
concern: 
 Appellants‟ complaint does not state a claim on which relief can be granted. 
o The Court indicated that the Wyoming Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act 
allows for cases to move forward even if relief cannot be claimed or declared. 
 The appellants‟ complaint lacks specificity, i.e. it does not specifically identify the statute 
or statutes which they allege to be in the convention of the constitution, but rather merely 
assert that the “system of financing public education” is in violation of the Constitution. 
159 
 
o Because it was clear that all parties involved knew and understood the various 
components of the funding “system,” the Court determined the level of specificity 
needed had been met. 
 The appellants each lack standing to bring a complaint. 
o The Court indicated that standing should not be viewed narrowly. 
o The Court determined that school board members and parents were involved 
enough to have standing. 
 The appellants‟ action is not a justiciable controversy. 
o The Court ruled that determining constitutionality of any issue remains in the 
jurisdiction of the Courts. 
 The appellants‟ action is defective because they failed to list every taxpayer as a party. 
o The Court disagreed with this reasoning, indicating that there was no validity to 
such an assertion. 
 The appellants‟ action should be dismissed for failure to request a proper remedy. 
o The Court determined that the appellants‟ request for a declaration of 
unconstitutionality was sufficient. 
 
 
Decision: 
The Court determined that the existing funding system for public schooling in Wyoming was 
unconstitutional in that it fails to offer equal protection as guaranteed by the State Constitution.  
They specifically indicate that they only were creating a constitutional standard in that “whatever 
system is adopted by the legislature, it must not create a level of spending which is a function of 
wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole.” 
 
Reasoning: 
Regarding the Constitutionality of the Existing Funding System: 
 The Court noted a large discrepancy in available funds per pupil across districts, noting 
that for one hundred students in Washakie District No. 1, there is $161,000; but in 
Campbell School District, the same number of students has access to $329,900. 
 The Court noted that “the quality of a child‟s education in Wyoming, measured in terms 
of dollars available for this purpose, is dependent upon the property tax resources of his 
school district. “  Citing Serrano v. Priest (5 Cal.3d 584), the Court noted that the right to 
an education cannot constitutionally be conditioned on wealth in that such a measure 
does not provide equal protection.  The connection to Serrano was made strong when the 
Court compared the Wyoming language and California language in their Equal Protection 
Clauses---they were virtually identical. 
 The Court determined that so much emphasis was on education in the Wyoming 
Constitution that education was clearly a fundamental right, thus requiring a strict 
scrutiny review. 
o The State contended that the “rational basis” was that the funding system was but 
a small part of the quality of education students receive.   
o The Court agreed that there are other components to a quality education; however, 
the Court did not believe the wealthy districts were wasting funds while poor 
districts were provided with what they need. They saw the discrepancy as an 
indicator of poorer districts not getting what they need. 
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Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
The decision was based on the State Equal Protection Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
This decision is an example of Horizontal Equity because the question at hand is if factors other 
than educational need cause an imbalance in funding.  In this case, the focus of that imbalance 
was property wealth. 
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Case Title: West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School District v. Alanis  (78 S.S. 3d 
529) 
Note: Once Alanis resigned as Commissioner of Education, Nelson was substituted as 
appellee/defendant 
 
 
Full Citation: 
Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin 
WEST ORANGE-COVE CONSOLIDATED INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT; Coppell 
Independent School District; La Porte Independent School District; and Port Neches-Groves 
Independent School District, Appellants 
v. 
Felipe ALANIS, Texas Commissioner of Education; The Texas Education Agency; Carol 
Keeton Rylander, Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts; and the Texas State Board of 
Education; Alvarado I.S.D.; Anthony I.S.D.; Bangs I.S.D.; et al; Appellees 
 
 
State:  Texas 
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin. 
Decision Date:  April 11, 2002 
 
Plaintiff Claims: 
 The plaintiffs in West Orange-Cove are asserting that because of the rising costs of 
education the $1.50 cap on local levying was now both a “floor” and a “ceiling” which 
then constitutes an unconstitutional statewide ad valorem tax, asking the Court to declare 
Edgewood IV unconstitutional based on the increased cost of education. 
 
Decision: 
 The Court found that the District Court had made the correct decision in dismissing the 
case based on the special exception that they had failed to state a cognizable cause of 
action. 
 The Court found that the District Court had made the correct decision in determining the 
issue to be unripe. 
 
Reasoning: 
 One of the issues the Court had considered in previous litigation, Carrollton-Farmers 
Branch Independent School District v. Edgewood Independent School District (826 S.W. 
2d 489), was the ability for a state funding formula to determine levy rates without 
creating an unconstitutional state tax.  The Court determined that as long as control and 
discretion remained with the local districts, a formula to enable a levy component to 
remain part of a state funding formula. 
 School districts aligned with the State, specifically Alvarado Independent School District, 
claimed that West Orange-Cove did not have a viable cause of action because they had 
not asserted that “they were required to adopt a $1.50 tax rate in order to provide the 
constitutionally-required general diffusion of knowledge to their students”; West Orange-
Cove had only claimed that they had to tax at the cap to “educate their students.” 
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 The District Court dismissed the case, based on Alvarado‟s claims.  This case is the West 
Orange Cove appeal of this dismissal. 
 Additionally, the State claimed that West Orange-Cove‟s issues were not “ripe” because 
the claim was that the impact was only affecting four districts at the time of litigation.  
The District Court determined that 12.19 percent of districts were taxing at the maximum 
rate and because that number was below fifty percent, the issue was not a ripe claim. 
 
Legal Standard Used in Decision: 
 Although, the decisions at the District Court and the Court of Appeals were based in legal 
process and procedure, the original plaintiff claim was based in the State Education 
Clause. 
 
Financial Concept Used in Decision: 
 Although, the decisions at the District Court and the Court of Appeals were based in legal 
process and procedure, the original plaintiff claim was one of Horizontal Equity in that 
the plaintiffs claimed that the funding formula created inequitable educational situations 
based on local taxation ability. 
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Chapter Four—Data Analysis & Conclusions 
Once they were briefed, the cases were categorized by date, state, legal standard used, financial 
concept used, and whether the decision was generally in favor of school finance reform or 
against such reform.  Multiple frequency analyses were conducted of the various categories. 
 
Before directly answering the five proposed research questions, it is necessary to frame the 
discussion by reviewing how traditional chronological categorizations work with the cases 
studied.   This analysis involved identifying the appropriateness of the three waves 
categorizations based on actual counts of cases within each category.  As previously noted, the 
history of school finance litigation has traditionally been categorized into three waves for the 
ease of generalizations.  Table 2.0 is a shaded chart identifying how the date range of the three 
waves would be chronologically reflected in the cases identified for this study.   
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Table  2.0 Categorization of Cases by Traditional Wave Pattern 
Case Title State Decision Date 
Legal Standard 
Used in the 
Decision 
Financial 
Concept Used 
in Decision 
Decision in 
Favor of or 
Against 
Finance 
Reform 
Serrano v. Priest 
(487 P.2d 1241)--
Serrano I 
California 1971 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause, Federal 
Equal Protection 
Clause, and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Milliken v. Green Michigan 1973 
Combination--
Federal and State 
Equal Protection 
Clauses 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez  (411 
US 1) 
Texas 1973 
Federal Equal 
Protection Clause 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Robinson v Cahill 
I (62 N.J. 473) 
New Jersey 1973 
State Education 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Olsen v. State Oregon 1976 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Buse v. Smith (74 
Wis. 2d 550) 
Wisconsin 1976 
Combination--
State Equal 
Protection Clause 
and State Taxation 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Serrano v. Priest 
(557 P.2d 929)--
Serrano II 
California 1976 
State Equal 
Protection Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Horton v. Meskill 
(172 Conn. 615)--
Horton I 
Connecticut 1977 
State Equal 
Protection Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Seattle School 
District No 1 v. 
Washington (90 
Wash. 2d 476) 
Washington 1978 
State Equal 
Protection Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
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Board of 
Education of 
Cincinnati v. 
Walter (58 Ohio 
St. 368) 
Ohio 1979 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Combination--
Horizontal Equity 
& Pure Vertical 
Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Pauley v. Kelly 
(255 S.E.2d 859) 
West Virginia 1979 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Combination--
Horizontal Equity 
and Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Washakie School 
District v. 
Herschler (606 
P.2d 310) 
Wyoming 1980 
State Equal 
Protection Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
McDaniel v. 
Thomas (248 Ga. 
632) 
Georgia 1981 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Combination--
Horizontal Equity 
and Adequacy 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Board of 
Education, 
Levittown Union  
Free School 
District v. Nyquist 
( 57 N.Y. 2d 27) 
New York 1982 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause, Federal 
Equal Protection 
Clause, and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Combination--
Horizontal Equity 
and Adequacy 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Lujan v. Colorado 
State Board of 
Education (649 
P.2d 1005) 
Colorado 1982 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause, Federal 
Equal Protection 
Clause, and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Dupree v. Alma 
(279 Ark. 340) 
Arkansas 1983 
State Equal 
Protection Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke I 
( 100 N.J. 269) 
New Jersey 1985 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Horton v. Meskill 
(195 Conn. 24)--
Horton II 
Connecticut 1985 
State Equal 
Protection Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Fair School 
Finance Council 
of Oklahoma, Inc. 
v. State (746 P.2d 
1135) 
Oklahoma 1987 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause, Federal 
Equal Protection 
Clause, and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Kukor v. Grover 
(148 Wis.2d 469) 
Wisconsin 1989 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Pure Vertical 
Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
166 
 
Rose v. Council 
for Better 
Education, Inc. 
(790 S.W.2d 186) 
Kentucky 1989 
State Education 
Clause 
Adequacy In Favor of Reform 
Edgewood 
Independent 
School District v. 
Kirby--Edgewood 
I (777 S.W. 2d 
391) 
Texas 1989 
State Education 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Helena 
Elementary 
School District 
No. 1 v. Montana 
(769 p.2d 684) 
Montana 1989 
State Education 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
II 
New Jersey 1990 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Edgewood 
Independent 
School District v. 
Kirby--Edgewood 
II (804 S.W. 2d 
491) 
Texas 1991 
State Education 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Claremont School 
District v. 
Governor (138 
N.H. 183)—
Claremont I 
New Hampshire 1992 
State Education 
Clause 
Adequacy In Favor of Reform 
Edgewood 
Independent 
School District v. 
Kirby--Edgewood 
III (826 S.W. 2d 
489) 
Texas 1992 
Taxation Clause 
of State 
Constitution 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
McDuffy v. 
Secretary of 
Executive Office 
of Education (615 
N.E.2d 516) 
Massachusetts 1993 
State Education 
Clause 
Adequacy In Favor of Reform 
Skeen v. State Minnesota 1993 
State Education 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Tennessee Small 
School Systems, 
Inc. v. 
McWhertner 
Tennessee 1993 
State Equal 
Protection Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Unified School 
District No. 229 v. 
State of Kansas 
(885 P.2d 1170) 
Kansas 1994 
Combination--
State Equal 
Protection, State 
Education Clause, 
and State Taxation 
Clause 
Adequacy 
Against Finance 
Reform 
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Roosevelt 
Elementary 
School District 
No. 66 v. Bishop 
(179 Ariz. 233) 
Arizona 1994 
State Education 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
III 
New Jersey 1994 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Campbell v. State 
I (907 P.2d 1238) 
Wyoming 1995 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
School 
Administrative 
District No. 1 v. 
Commissioner 
(659 A.2d 854) 
Maine 1995 
State Equal 
Protection Clause 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Edgewood 
Independent 
School District v. 
Kirby--Edgewood 
IV (917 S.W. 2d 
717) 
Texas 1995 
Taxation Clause 
of State 
Constitution 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Committee for 
Educational 
Rights v. Edgar 
(174 Ill.2d 1) 
Illinois 1996 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause, Federal 
Equal Protection 
Clause, and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Coalition for 
Adequacy and 
Fairness in School 
Funding, Inc. v. 
Chiles( 680 So.2d 
400) 
Florida 1996 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Leandro v. State 
(346 N.C. 336) 
North Carolina 1997 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Combination--
Adequacy, 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy, and 
Horizontal Equity 
In Favor of Reform 
Claremont School 
District v. 
Governor (142 
N.H. 462)—
Claremont II 
New Hampshire 1997 
Combination--
State Equal 
Protection Clause 
and State Taxation 
Clause 
Combination--
Horizontal Equity 
and Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
DeRolph v. State 
(78 Ohio St.3d 
193) 
Ohio 1997 
State Education 
Clause 
Combination--
Horizontal Equity 
and Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Hull v. Albrecht 
(190 Ariz. 520) 
Arizona 1997 
State Education 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity In Favor of Reform 
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Brigham v. State 
(166 Vt. 246) 
Vermont 1997 
State Education 
Clause 
Pure Vertical 
Equity 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
IV 
New Jersey 1997 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Durant v. State of 
Michigan (456 
Mich. 175) 
Michigan 1997 
Taxation Clause 
of State 
Constitution 
Compliance with 
Taxation 
Regulation 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
V 
New Jersey 1998 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Lewis v. Spagnolo 
(710 N.E. 2d 798) 
Illinois 1999 
Combination--
Education Clause, 
Federal Due 
Process Clause, 
State Due Process 
Clause, State 
Common Law 
Standards. 
Adequacy 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Abbeville v. State 
(335 S.C. 58) 
South Carolina 1999 
State Education 
Clause 
Adequacy In Favor of Reform 
Opinion of the 
Justices (145 N.H. 
474) 
New Hampshire 2000 
State Education 
Clause 
Combination--
Horizontal Equity 
and Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
VI 
New Jersey 2000 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
VII 
New Jersey 2000 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
State v. Campbell 
County School 
District (19 P.3d 
518) --Campbell II 
Wyoming 2001 
State Education 
Clause 
Adequacy In Favor of Reform 
CFE v. State (719 
N.Y.S.2d 475) 
New York 2001 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Lake View School 
District No. 25 of 
Phillips County v. 
Huckabee (351 
Ark 31) 
Arkansas 2002 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause and State 
Equal Protection 
Clause 
Combination--
Horizontal Equity 
& Pure Vertical 
Equity 
In Favor of Reform 
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West Orange-
Cove 
Consolidated 
Independent 
School District v. 
Alanis (78 S.S. 3d 
529) 
Texas 2002 
State Education 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
IX 
New Jersey 2002 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
VIII 
New Jersey 2002 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Montoy v. State Kansas 2003 
Combination--
State Education 
Clause, State 
Equal Protection 
Clause, State Due 
Process Clause 
Combination--
Horizontal Equity, 
Pure Vertical 
Equity and 
Adequacy. 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
XI 
New Jersey 2003 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
X 
New Jersey 2004 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
XII 
New Jersey 2004 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
XIII 
New Jersey 2004 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Columbia Falls 
Elementary 
School District 
No. 6 v. Montana 
(109P.3d 257) 
Montana 2005 
State Education 
Clause 
Adequacy In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
XIV 
New Jersey 2005 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Londonderry v. 
State (958 A. 2d 
930) 
New Hampshire 2006 
State Education 
Clause 
Adequacy In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
XV 
New Jersey 2006 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
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Abbott v. Burke  
XVI 
New Jersey 2006 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Oklahoma 
Education 
Association v. 
State (158 P.3d 
1058) 
Oklahoma 2007 
State Education 
Clause 
Adequacy 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Nebraska 
Coalition for 
Education Equity 
and Adequacy v. 
Heineman (731 
N.W.2d 164) 
Nebraska 2007 
State Education 
Clause 
Combination--
Adequacy and 
Justiceability 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
XVII 
New Jersey 2007 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
XVIII 
New Jersey 2008 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
XIX 
New Jersey 2008 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Committee for 
Educational 
Equality v. State 
(878 S.W.2d 446) 
Missouri 2009 
Combination--
State Equal 
Protection, State 
Education Clause, 
and State Taxation 
Clause 
Horizontal Equity 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Pendelton School 
District v. State 
(345 Or. 596) 
Oregon 2009 
State Education 
Clause 
Adequacy 
Against Finance 
Reform 
Abbott v. Burke  
XX 
New Jersey 2009 
State Education 
Clause 
Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy 
In Favor of Reform 
Connecticut 
Coalition for 
Justice in 
Education 
Funding v. Rell 
Connecticut 2010 
State Education 
Clause 
Adequacy In Favor of Reform 
 
 
     
Traditionally 
Designated 
Wave 1 
Traditionally 
Designated 
Wave 2 
Traditionally 
Designated 
Wave 3 
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Wave One has traditionally been identified as existing from 1971 through 1973 with cases being 
primarily based in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.  The time span for Wave One encompasses only four of the cases identified 
for this study.  Regarding the implication that those cases are grounded in Federal Equal 
Protection claims, the data suggests that to be partially true with three of the four cases being 
decided at least in part based on the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, such a generalization 
regarding those cases is  a bit too broad to effectively represent the era of litigation as two of 
those cases, specifically Serrano v. Priest (487 P.2d 1241) and Milliken v. Green (390 Michigan 
389), were a combination of legal standards.  The fourth case within the Wave One time span 
Robinson v Cahill I (62 N.J. 473), utilizes the State Education Clause. 
 
The traditional Wave Two of school finance litigation is represented by cases from 1973 through 
1989 and suggests that most cases within that wave are based on the Equal Protection Clauses of 
the state constitutions based on the ruling of San Antonio v. Rodriguez  (411 US 1), essentially 
eliminating federal equal protection as a possibility. A review of the categorizations of the cases 
identified for this research includes eighteen cases.  Of those eighteen cases, only six of them 
were decided solely based on State Equal Protection, with nine of the cases being a combination 
of State Equal Protection and at least one other criterion, and four cases being based in a State 
Education Clause.  
 
The final wave is traditionally considered to begin in 1989 with a shift in emphasis to the State 
Education Clauses as the basis for litigation.  That shift is seen in part at the end of Wave Two 
when looking chronologically; of the four cases in wave two that are based in a State Education 
172 
 
Clauses, three of them were decided in 1989 and serve as the transition of the waves.  Wave 
Three is inclusive of fifty-two cases within this study.  Of the fifty-two cases, only six of them 
were not decided in some manner based on State Education Clauses suggesting that labeling 
wave three the wave of the State Education Clause is generally appropriate. 
 
While having general categories to group cases in has been helpful to provide an overarching 
understanding of the general trends of school finance litigation, much can be learned by 
reviewing multiple components of the cases, beyond decision date and legal standard used, to 
determine more specific trends, as well as effectiveness ratings for various combinations of 
categories. 
 
A relevant analysis is to follow the concept of looking at the litigation chronologically, but 
specifically looking to see what the historical trend was regarding decisions being pro-school 
finance reform or anti-school finance reform.  Table 3.0 and Figure 1.0 illustrate the 
chronological frequency of each category.   
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Across the thrity-nine years of cases, overwhelmingly the decisions have been in favor of school 
reform with fifty-five decisions being categorized as pro-school reform and twenty-one of the 
cases being anti-school finance reform.  Notably from 1997 through 2010, a surge of litigation 
occurred, with thirty-eight of the seventy-six cases being within this past thirteen years.  Of those 
thirty-eight cases, 84.2 percent of them were decided in favor of school reform. 
 
Noting the surge of successful plaintiff litigation over the past thirteen years leads to the next 
level of analysis, which focuses on what legal and financial categorizations led to the highest 
levels of plaintiff successes which will answer research questions number one and two.  It is 
significant to look at each factor, financial concept and legal standard separately against success 
rates for school finance reform; it is also significant to conduct an analysis of the combinations 
and their yield.   
 
Research Question Number One:   What is the history of education finance reform 
litigation at the high state courts and U.S. Supreme Court levels with regard to the choice 
of the finance concept being applied (horizontal equity, pure vertical equity, vertical equity 
as adequacy, or adequacy)? 
 
Answering research question number one involves a review of the finance concept utilized in 
each decision and the trends created.   Of the various finance concepts, Horizontal Equity was 
used the most, in twenty-seven of the seventy-six cases, as a basis for decision.   Vertical Equity 
as Adequacy came in a close second with twenty-three instances of that being the decision basis.  
The high frequency of Horizontal Equity and Vertical Equity as Adequacy is logical, based on 
the high frequency of use of the state education clauses as the legal standard.  In fact, of the 
forty-four cases based solely on the state education clause, eight were based in Horizontal Equity 
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and twenty-two were based in Vertical Equity as Adequacy.  The arguments attached to 
education clause claims are tied to adjectives like “thorough and efficient” and “suitable” found 
within those clauses.  The traditional plaintiff claim in such cases is that the standard set by those 
adjectives is not being met.  Thus, the logical financial concepts that emerge are claims that 
differences in resources not related to educational need do not meet the standard set by the 
adjectives (Horizontal Equity) or that various student groups (ie: impoverished, minority, 
students with special needs) are not able to meet the outcomes suggested by the adjectives under 
the existing funding system (Vertical Equity as Adequacy). 
 
In reviewing the use which financial concept yielded the most plaintiff victories, it is necessary 
to review the data found in Table 4.0. 
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Perhaps the riskiest financial standard for a plaintiff to use, based on this historical review, is that 
of Horizontal Equity.  In the cases reviewed in this study, Horizontal Equity was utilized twenty-
seven times, but in only 59.3 percent of the instances was the ruling in favor of school reform.  
By far, the most successful financial concept used by plaintiffs was that of Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy.  Vertical Equity as Adequacy was used twenty-three times, and the courts decided in 
favor of school reform in twenty-two of the twenty-three instances, a 95.6 percent rate of 
success. However, a large percentage of those cases were one version or another of the Abbott v. 
Burke (100 N.J. 269) cases so some caution should be used in drawing large scale conclusions 
based on that number.  Pure Adequacy leaned toward school reform as well, with eight of the 
twelve cases, 66.7percent, being decided in favor of school reform.  Other financial concepts, 
and combinations thereof, yielded some sporadic data points but did not yield significant trends.  
In general, however, the review of these cases indicates that plaintiffs were more successful 
when they stayed within one “pure” financial concept and did not tried blending or combining 
them.  Of the fifty-five decisions that leaned toward school reform, 85.5 percent of them were 
based on a “pure” financial concept and not a combination.   
 
Research Question Number Two:   Which legal standard was used historically in education 
reform litigation for each case and how does that connect with finance concept being 
applied? 
A review of the data in Table 5.0 allows for the following analysis, specifically regarding which 
legal standards were used in the Courts‟ decisions and what type of results they yielded.  
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 It is most appropriate to look first at the four legal standards that were used in isolation for 
decisions and then extend the analysis to include decisions based on combinations of legal 
standards. 
 
Beginning with the legal standard typically associated with the early stages of school finance 
reform, only one case used the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, specifically the 
Equal Protection Clause.  As a result of the San Antonio v. Rodriguez  (411 US 1) decision 
against school finance reform in that case, no further litigation based solely on the federal equal 
protection clause was pursued.  The U.S. Supreme Court essentially set the standard moving 
forward that federal equal protection was not an appropriate legal standard to apply in such 
cases, shifting the legal standard toward state equal protection and what is known as Wave Two. 
 
Of the cases included in this study, eight were decided solely upon the state equal protection 
clause.  Of those eight, seven were decided in favor of school finance reform and one was not.  
The one that was decided against finance reform was School Administrative District No. 1 v. 
Commissioner (659 A.2d 854) in Maine in 1995 and was the last chronological case to use only 
that as the legal standard.  Well into what was considered Wave Three, the trend by 1995 had 
clearly shifted to successful utilization of the state education clauses as the legal standard. 
Forty-four of the seventy-six reviewed cases were decided solely on the state education clause, 
with thirty-eight of those forty-four being decided in favor of school finance reform.  The first 
case decided completely based on a state‟s education clause was Robinson v Cahill I (62 N.J. 
473) in New Jersey in 1973 followed by Abbott v. Burke I (100 N.J. 269) in 1985, also in New 
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Jersey.  Both New Jersey cases focused on the modifiers “thorough and efficient” found within 
the education clause of the state constitution.  The successes in New Jersey forged the way for 
what became the most successful, and most often used, legal standard for school finance 
litigation moving forward. 
 
The fourth individual legal standard on which the included cases were decided is the taxation 
laws found in various state constitutions.  Three cases were decided solely on state taxation law, 
with two being decided in favor of and one being decided against school finance reform. 
 
As listed in Table  5.0, various combinations of legal standards have been used in decisions as 
well.  Often plaintiffs try to include as many angles as possible, hoping that at least one will be 
successful.  The combination strategy is successful only about forty percent of the time with 
eight of the twenty cases decided using a combination of legal standards being decided in favor 
of reform.  
 
It is clear that as various cases were decided, the chronological trend morphed into the primary 
use of state education clause as the legal standard. It is fair to conclude that the San Antonio v. 
Rodriguez (411 US 1) case played a pivotal role in that shift, despite being decided sixteen years 
prior to the start of the State Education Clause trend.  San Antonio v. Rodriguez (411 US 1) 
clearly ruled out the use of the Federal Equal Protection Clause.  While Serrano v. Priest (557 
P.2d 929) delineated the difference between using federal equal protection and state equal 
protection clauses, many future decisions regarding the use of the state equal protection clauses 
leaned heavily upon San Antonio v. Rodriguez  (411 US 1) in ruling against plaintiffs seeking 
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finance reform.  Thus, the shift to the state education clause became the more frequent legal 
standard. 
 
Research Question Number Three:   Which party was successful in each legal decision? 
The question of plaintiff or defendant victory is best answered on a case-by-case basis by 
reviewing the case brief.  However, it is worth noting that for the purpose of analysis, this 
categorization was better extended to be a determination of if the decision was in favor of school 
finance reform or against it.  The evaluation regarding pro-school reform or anti-school reform 
status was made by determining if the decision would require legislature to revise the distribution 
of funds to provide an increase in funding for certain, or all, districts; or if the decisions resulted 
in a mandate for greater equity or adequacy in fund distribution.   If any of those criterions was 
met, the case was categorized as being pro-school finance reform.  This analysis extends beyond 
party victory and refocused the analysis on the potential effect toward further equity or adequacy 
impact of the decision.  A comprehensive listing of the school reform status categorizations is 
within Table 2.0.  
 
 
Research Question Number Four: Is there historically a most successful combination of 
finance concept and legal standard for plaintiff success in education finance reform 
litigation? 
 
After reviewing the legal standard used and financial concept applied to each decision, it is 
relevant to review the combination of both factors against the success rate for school reform.  A 
review of Table 6.0 serves this purpose.   
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Table  6.0 Count of Decision in Favor of or Against Finance Reform 
Legal and Financial Standards Combined 
Against Finance 
Reform 
In Favor of 
Reform 
Grand 
Total 
Combination--Education Clause, Federal Due Process Clause, State Due Process 
Clause, State Common Law Standards. 1   1 
Adequacy 1 
 
1 
Combination--Federal and State Equal Protection Clauses 1   1 
Horizontal Equity 1 
 
1 
Combination--State Education Clause and State Equal Protection Clause 4 4 8 
Combination--Horizontal Equity & Pure Vertical Equity 1 1 2 
Combination--Horizontal Equity and Adequacy 1 1 2 
Horizontal Equity 1 
 
1 
Pure Vertical Equity 1 
 
1 
Vertical Equity as Adequacy 
 
1 1 
Combination--Adequacy, Vertical Equity as Adequacy, and Horizontal Equity 
 
1 1 
Combination--State Education Clause, Federal Equal Protection Clause, and 
State Equal Protection Clause 4 1 5 
Combination--Horizontal Equity and Adequacy 1 
 
1 
Horizontal Equity 3 1 4 
Combination--State Education Clause, State Equal Protection Clause, State Due 
Process Clause   1 1 
Combination--Horizontal Equity, Pure Vertical Equity and Adequacy. 
 
1 1 
Combination--State Equal Protection Clause and State Taxation Clause   2 2 
Combination--Horizontal Equity and Adequacy 
 
1 1 
Horizontal Equity 
 
1 1 
Combination--State Equal Protection, State Education Clause, and State 
Taxation Clause 2   2 
Adequacy 1 
 
1 
Horizontal Equity 1 
 
1 
Federal Equal Protection Clause 1   1 
Horizontal Equity 1 
 
1 
State Education Clause 6 38 44 
Adequacy 2 8 10 
Combination--Horizontal Equity and Adequacy 
 
2 2 
Horizontal Equity 2 6 8 
Pure Vertical Equity 
 
1 1 
Vertical Equity as Adequacy 1 21 22 
Combination--Adequacy and Justiceability 1 
 
1 
State Equal Protection Clause 1 7 8 
Horizontal Equity 1 7 8 
Taxation Clause of State Constitution 1 2 3 
Compliance with Taxation Regulation 
 
1 1 
Horizontal Equity 1 1 2 
Grand Total 21 55 76 
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By far, the most successful combination of legal standard and financial concept applied within 
the reviewed cases was the combination of the State Education Clause and Vertical Equity as 
Adequacy.  That particular combination yielded decisions toward school finance reform in 
twenty-one cases.  However, it is very necessary to note that of those twenty-one cases, nineteen 
of them were one form or another of the Abbott v. Burke (100 N.J. 269) cases out of New Jersey.  
Therefore, it is relevant to consider the next highest number.  The next highest number is the 
State Education Clause and Pure Adequacy which yielded eight decisions in favor of school 
reform.  It is significant to note, however, that one cannot assume that selecting these 
combinations moving forward increases likelihood of success without considering the historical 
placement of these decisions.   
 
As courts make decisions over time, in this study over a period of thirty-nine years, legal trends 
shift and new precedents are created, and thus strategies must evolve as well.  Therefore, a 
review of Table 7.0 is relevant to look at the highest combination that yielded success for those 
seeking school finance reform and where those decisions fall historically. 
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 Once the nineteen Abbott cases are consolidated for purposes of frequency counting, it becomes 
most appropriate to look chronologically at the cases decided with the combination of State 
Education Clause and Pure Adequacy.  Table 7.0 illustrates that this high frequency count 
combination also has a level of timely relevance in that all cases using that combination have 
been decided since 1992, with six of them being decided since 2001. 
 
Additional Question Answered: Do certain states tend to be more school finance reform 
friendly than others? 
Although not proposed as an original research question in this study, another angle of analysis is 
that of considering if certain states tend to be more school finance reform-friendly than others.  
This analysis is best done by reviewing the data within Table 8.0. 
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Table 8.0 State by State Case Litigation Count By Legal and Financial 
Combination 
State 
Against 
Finance 
Reform 
In Favor 
of Reform 
Grand 
Total 
Arizona   2 2 
State Education Clause 
 
2 2 
Arkansas   2 2 
Combination--State Education Clause and State Equal 
Protection Clause 
 
1 1 
State Equal Protection Clause 
 
1 1 
California   2 2 
Combination--State Education Clause, Federal Equal Protection 
Clause, and State Equal Protection Clause 
 
1 1 
State Equal Protection Clause 
 
1 1 
Colorado 1   1 
Combination--State Education Clause, Federal Equal Protection 
Clause, and State Equal Protection Clause 1 
 
1 
Connecticut   3 3 
State Education Clause 
 
1 1 
State Equal Protection Clause 
 
2 2 
Florida 1   1 
State Education Clause 1 
 
1 
Georgia 1   1 
Combination--State Education Clause and State Equal 
Protection Clause 1 
 
1 
Illinois 2   2 
Combination--Education Clause, Federal Due Process Clause, 
State Due Process Clause, State Common Law Standards 1 
 
1 
Combination--State Education Clause, Federal Equal Protection 
Clause, and State Equal Protection Clause 1 
 
1 
Kansas 1 1 2 
Combination--State Education Clause, State Equal Protection 
Clause, State Due Process Clause 
 
1 1 
Combination--State Equal Protection, State Education Clause, 
and State Taxation Clause 1 
 
1 
Kentucky   1 1 
State Education Clause 
 
1 1 
Maine 1   1 
State Equal Protection Clause 1 
 
1 
Massachusetts   1 1 
State Education Clause 
 
1 1 
Michigan 1 1 2 
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Combination--Federal and State Equal Protection Clauses 1 
 
1 
Taxation Clause of State Constitution 
 
1 1 
Minnesota 1   1 
State Education Clause 1 
 
1 
Missouri 1   1 
Combination--State Equal Protection, State Education Clause, 
and State Taxation Clause 1 
 
1 
Montana   2 2 
State Education Clause 
 
2 2 
Nebraska 1   1 
State Education Clause 1 
 
1 
New Hampshire   4 4 
Combination--State Equal Protection Clause and State Taxation 
Clause 
 
1 1 
State Education Clause 
 
3 3 
New Jersey   21 21 
State Education Clause 
 
21 21 
New York 1 1 2 
Combination--State Education Clause, Federal Equal Protection 
Clause, and State Equal Protection Clause 1 
 
1 
State Education Clause 
 
1 1 
North Carolina   1 1 
Combination--State Education Clause and State Equal 
Protection Clause 
 
1 1 
Ohio 1 1 2 
Combination--State Education Clause and State Equal 
Protection Clause 1 
 
1 
State Education Clause 
 
1 1 
Oklahoma 2   2 
Combination--State Education Clause, Federal Equal Protection 
Clause, and State Equal Protection Clause 1 
 
1 
State Education Clause 1 
 
1 
Oregon 2   2 
Combination--State Education Clause and State Equal 
Protection Clause 1 
 
1 
State Education Clause 1 
 
1 
South Carolina   1 1 
State Education Clause 
 
1 1 
Tennessee   1 1 
State Equal Protection Clause 
 
1 1 
Texas 3 3 6 
Federal Equal Protection Clause 1 
 
1 
State Education Clause 1 2 3 
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Taxation Clause of State Constitution 1 1 2 
Vermont   1 1 
State Education Clause 
 
1 1 
Washington   1 1 
State Equal Protection Clause 
 
1 1 
West Virginia   1 1 
Combination--State Education Clause and State Equal 
Protection Clause 
 
1 1 
Wisconsin 1 1 2 
Combination--State Education Clause and State Equal 
Protection Clause 1 
 
1 
Combination--State Equal Protection Clause and State Taxation 
Clause 
 
1 1 
Wyoming   3 3 
Combination--State Education Clause and State Equal 
Protection Clause 
 
1 1 
State Education Clause 
 
1 1 
State Equal Protection Clause 
 
1 1 
Grand Total 21 55 76 
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 Of the thirty-two states with school finance litigation that has been decided at the high court 
level, fifteen of them have only one case.  Having one case on record from the high court can 
mean multiple things.  The decision may have delineated clear expectations for school funding 
that did not leave much further room for interpretation or litigation, as is the case in Kentucky 
with Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. (790 S.W.2d 186), or the decision may indicate 
there may not be a clear constitutional set of guidelines for school finance; thus further cases 
may not have been pursued, as is the case with School Administrative District No. 1 v. 
Commissioner (659 A.2d 854) in Maine.   
 
There are, however, a number of states with multiple cases at the high court level.  Most notably 
is New Jersey with the series of Abbott cases in addition to Robinson v. Cahill (62 N.J. 473), 
putting the total listed cases for New Jersey at twenty-one, all of which were pro-school finance 
reform.  Clearly, New Jersey is a state in which the likelihood of success in cases regarding 
school finance is high.   The states with the next highest number of cases that were decided pro-
school finance reform are New Hampshire with four cases decided in favor of school reform and 
none against, Wyoming and Connecticut with three cases each in favor of school finance reform 
and none against and four states-Arizona, Arkansas, California, and Montana-with two cases 
each decided in favor of school finance reform and none against.  Texas is worth considering in 
this analysis; Texas has six cases, with three being decided in favor of school finance reform and 
three being decided against reform, based on the case being considered.  The conclusion might 
be drawn that Texas is “lukewarm” to such cases; however, it is necessary to remember that 
there is a significant shadow on school finance reform cases in Texas with San Antonio v. 
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Rodriguez (411 US 1) coming from Texas and likely being the most impactful case in school 
finance reform litigation across the nation.   
 
Only three states have more than one high court decision against school finance reform.  The 
first is Texas as previously addressed; the others are Oklahoma and Illinois. In both states, those 
cases involved the State Education Clause either in isolation or in combination with other legal 
standards suggesting, that even in the most modern era of litigation, these states constitutions 
have been interpreted to be less than accommodating to school finance reform litigation. 
 
Research Question Five:  Is there an emerging trend regarding school finance litigation?  
 The issue of a potential recent trend in litigation is best answered affirmatively but with some 
level of reservation regarding the trend being emerging.  The three cases decided within the past 
two years do not create a pattern that allows for any significant conclusion to be drawn regarding 
the final research question.  However, a review of Table 9.0 indicates that since the year 2000, 
sixteen cases were decided affirmatively using the combination of the State Education Clause 
and Vertical Equity as Adequacy.   
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Table 9.0 Legal and Financial Combinations Since 2000 
Legal and Financial Combinations  
2000
 
2001
 
2002
 
2003
 
2004
 
2005
 
2006
 
2007
 
2008
 
2009
 
2010
 
Grand 
Total 
Combination--State Education Clause and State 
Equal Protection Clause 
  
1 
        
1 
Combination--Horizontal Equity & Pure Vertical 
Equity 
  
1 
        
1 
In Favor of Reform 
  
1 
        
1 
Combination--State Education Clause, State Equal 
Protection Clause, State Due Process Clause 
   
1 
       
1 
Combination--Horizontal Equity, Pure Vertical 
Equity and Adequacy. 
   
1 
       
1 
In Favor of Reform 
   
1 
       
1 
Combination--State Equal Protection, State 
Education Clause, and State Taxation Clause 
         
1 
 
1 
Horizontal Equity 
         
1 
 
1 
Against Finance Reform 
         
1 
 
1 
State Education Clause 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 24 
Adequacy 
 
1 
   
1 1 1 
 
1 1 6 
Against Finance Reform 
       
1 
 
1 
 
2 
In Favor of Reform 
 
1 
   
1 1 
   
1 4 
Combination--Adequacy and Justiceability 
       
1 
   
1 
Against Finance Reform 
       
1 
   
1 
Horizontal Equity 
  
1 
        
1 
Against Finance Reform 
  
1 
        
1 
Vertical Equity as Adequacy 2 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 
 
16 
In Favor of Reform 2 1 2 1 3 1 2 1 2 1 
 
16 
Grand Total 2 2 4 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 1 27 
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However, of those sixteen, fifteen of them were Abbott cases.  Therefore, the best answer to the 
final research question is found with the next level of frequency over the past ten years which is 
the combination of the State Education Clause and Pure Adequacy. 
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Chapter Five—Implications for Future Research 
The purpose of any research study is to provide a meaningful interpretation of data that yields 
progress in a given field.  This meta-analysis of the school finance litigation over the past thirty-
nine years provides a historical context for such decisions in a categorized and disaggregated 
form with the purpose of contributing to the field of study for future litigation and analysis 
purposes.   
 
This research allows for an extended consideration of how school finance litigation can be 
reviewed at a more specific level than just considering one component of the case such as the 
legal standard used, the point on a timeline where a case rests, or the type of decision made.  The 
multi-faceted analysis of cases provides an additional point of consideration for future litigators 
as they develop school finance legal cases.  Additionally, this type of analysis allows for 
educational historians to better understand the evolution of school finance as it has been 
impacted by the legal process. 
 
While this dissertation provides one new set of answers, it also provides opportunity for future 
research to extend and continue the analysis in multiple ways.  This analysis did not in any way 
weight cases as related to significance of impact regarding school finance reform.  It is 
abundantly clear that some historical cases have had larger long-term impact than others; future 
research could include an analysis involving such a prioritization process of the cases. 
Additionally, this meta-analysis of cases lends itself to further analysis in the area briefly 
touched upon in Table 8.0, a review of litigation by state and the impact on each specific states 
funding formula.  Additionally, either of the suggested future areas for research could be 
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conducted or this research itself could be duplicated in a manner that is inclusive of lower court 
decisions. 
 
Ultimately, the goal of all school finance litigation is to ensure a quality education for each 
student; understanding the history of school finance reform through research such as that 
presented here will help to propel an adequate and equitable education for all. 
  
195 
 
References 
 
Adams, C.E. (2007). Is Economic integration the fourth wave in school finance litigation?. Emory Law 
Journal, 56.  
 
Baker, B.D., Green, P.C. (2008) Conceptions of Equity and Adequacy in School Finance. In H.F. Ladd 
and E.B. Fiske (eds) Handbook of Research in Education Finance and Policy New York: Routledge. pp. 
203-221 & 311-337. 
 
Burbridge, L.C. (2008). Can the Impact of adequacy-based education reform be measured?. Journal of 
Education Finance, 34(1), 31-55. 
 
Glenn, W.J. (2009).  School finance adequacy litigation and student achievement:  a longitudinal analysis. 
Journal of Education Finance, 34(3), 247-266. 
 
Hanushek, E.A. (Ed.). (2006).  Courting failure. Stanford, CA:  Hoover Institution Press. 
 
Heise, M.  (1995).  State Constitutions, school finance litigation, and the "third wave": from equity to 
adequacy. Temple Law Review, 68, 1151-1176. 
 
Huang, Y., Lukemeyer, A., Yinger, J. (2004) A Guide to State Court Decisions on Education Finance. In 
J.Yinger (ed) Helping Children Left Behind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. pp 317-330. 
 
Koski, W.S., & Reich, R. (2007). When "adequate" isn't: the retreat from equity in educational law and 
policy and why it matters. Emory Law Review, 56(3). 
 
Lukemeyer, Anna (1999) Education finance equity: Judicial treatment of key issues and impact of that 
treatment on reform. Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse University, United States -- New York. Retrieved 
November 10, 2008, from Dissertations & Theses: Full Text database. (Publication No. AAT 9964522). 
 
Lukemeyer, Anna. (2003).  Courts as policymakers.  LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC. 
Ralston Elder, S. (2007). Standing up to legislative bullies: separation of powers, state courts, and 
educational rights. Duke Law Review, 57. 
196 
 
 
Rebell, M. (2005) Adequacy litigations: a new path to equity?  In Petrovich, J., & Stuart Wells, A. (Ed.). 
(2005). Bringing equity back: research for a new era in american educational policy. New York, NY: 
Teachers College Press. 
 
Ryan, J.E., & Saunders, T. (2004). Foreward to symposium on school finance litigation: emerging trends 
or new dead ends. Yale Law and Policy Review, 22, 463-480. 
Underwood, J.K., & Sparkman, W.E. (1991). School finance litigation: a new wave of reform. Harvard 
Journal of Law and Public Policy, 14, 517-544.  
 
Verstegen, DA. (1998).  Judicial analysis during the new wave of school finance litigation: the new 
adequacy in education.  Journal of Education Finance, 24(1), 51-68.  
